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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: SPANISH AND ENGLISH
1.1 Motivación y objetivos de la tesis
Debido a las serias dudas, hoy ya confirmadas, sobre la eficacia del Protocolo de
Kyoto, distintos académicos especialistas en economía ambiental se han planteado
en los últimos años si se podrían diseñar otros tipos de acuerdos internationales que
fuesen más eficaces y permitiesen una reducción de las emisiones de gases de efecto
invernadero (GEI) lo suficientemente importante como para controlar y/o revertir el
cambio climático. En esta línea, la principal motivación de esta tesis es el estudio
de la rentabilidad, estabilidad y eficiacia de acuerdos ambientales internacionales que
permitan hacer frente al problema global del cambio climático.
Una idea sería concentrarse en mejoras tecnológicas que permitan reducir los costes
de mitigación, es decir, los costes económicos de reducir las emisiones de GEI, ya que
esto puede aumentar la disponibilidad de un país para realizar reducciones significa-
tivas de emisiones. Por ejemplo, podría ser beneficioso completar un acuerdo del tipo
Kyoto, es decir un acuerdo exclusivamente de emisiones, con acuerdos sobre el de-
sarrollo de tecnologías más limpias sobre todo si el desarrollo tecnológico no depende
sólo de la propia inversión en inversión y desarrollo (I + D) de un país, sino tam-
bién de I + D de otros países a través de la difusión tecnológica entre países, como
por ejemplo ya han planteado Carraro y Siniscalco (1997). Incluso, sin un acuerdo
explícito sobre las emisiones, un acuerdo tecnológico que condujese al desarrollo y
adopción de tecnologías menos contaminantes podría conducir a una reducción de las
emisiones. Este es el argumento detrás de distintas propuestas, como la de Barrett
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(2006), de un acuerdo climático basado en el desarrolo tecnológico, como por ejemplo
en Barrett (2006). Existen ya distintas propuestas internacionale para promover la
I+D en tecnologías menos contaminantes como el Carbon Sequestration Leadership
Forum (con 21 países miembros más la Comisión Europea), la International Partner-
ship for the Hydrogen Economy (17 países más la Comisión Europea) y el proyecto
ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor), aunque este proyecto no
se puede ver exclusivamente como un proyecto tecnológico para combator el cambio
climático. Una revisión de los acuerdos tecnológicos que se centran en el estudio de
las posibilidades de estos acuerdos para eliminar los incentivos de los países a actuar
como polizones, es decir, para quedarse al margen en las negocianes sobre el clima se
puede encontrar en el muy interesante artículo de Coninck et al. (2008).
En esta línea de investigación, la tesis se plantea el análisis de diferentes tipos de
acuerdos internacionales para combatir el cambio climático con el objetivo de poder
determinar cuál de ellos podría ser más eficaz en la lucha contra el calentamiento
global. El análisis pasa por determinar en primer lugar el nivel de particpación que
los distintos acuerdos podrían promover y en segundo lugar su eficiacia, medida en
en términos de las reducciones de emisiones y de costes que cada acuerdo permitiría
implementar.
El examen de la cooperación internacional en el desarrollo tecnológico como un
complemento a la cooperación internacional sobre la reducción de emisiones de GEI,
es el objetivo principal del segundo capítulo donde se analizan cuatro tipos diferentes
de acuerdos de reducción de emisiones. Los cuatro acuerdos tienen en común que los
países firmantes actúan cooperativamente en la fijación de los niveles de emisiones.
Sin embargo, se consideran distintas hipótesis en los que se refiere a la inversión en
I+D y a su difusión entre distintos países. En todos los acuerdos con un componente
tecnológico, se supone que la inversión efectiva en un país depende de la cantidad
invertida en I + D en ese país, así como de la inversión en I + D en el resto de países
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a través de un factor de difusión (spillovers). El factor de difusión es endógeno de
manera que los países firmantes pueden, si así lo acuerdan, internalizar completa-
mente los efectos externos de la inversión I+D intercambiendo información sobre las
actividades de I+D. En este caso el factor de difusión para los firmantes es máximo
y por lo tanto igual a la unidad. En cambio, para los países no firmantes del acuerdo
tecnológico, el factor de difusión es exógeno e inferior a la unidad.
El examen de la cooperación internacional en el desarrollo tecnológico como una
alternativa a la cooperación internacional para la reducción de emisiones de GEI,
es el principal objetivo del tercer capítulo, donde se analizan tres tipos de acuerdos
tecnológicos. Los tres tipos de acuerdos: Acuerdo de I + D sin intercambio de
información; Acuerdo de I + D sólo de intercambio de información (Research joint
venture); Acuerdo de I + D con intercambio de información, comparten el principal
aspecto de que los países signatarios actúan de forma unilateral en la determinación
del nivel de emisiones, es decir, existe cooperación a nivel tecnológico pero cada país
es libre de fijar su nivel de emisiones. Una comparación entre todos los tipos de
acuerdos (analizado en el segundo y el tercero capítulos), se introduce también en
este capítulo.
El cuarto capítulo de la tesis tiene como objeto evaluar la robustez de los resultados
obtenidos en el tercer capítulo considerando distintas hipótesis sobre las estructura
de costes.En concreto se evalua la robustez de los resultados obtenidos para costes de
inversión y daños medioambientales cuadráticos cuando. En el modelo utilizado en
los capítulos dos y tres se suponen que los costes son lineales.
1.2 Metodología
Como el objetivo de la tesis es el estudio de la formación de coaliciones con ex-
ternalidades, la metodología utilizada ha sido la teoría de juegos. En concreto, la
estabilidad (participación) del acuerdo se ha analizado resolviendo un juego no coop-
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erativo en tres etapas. En la primera etapa, los países deciden de forma no cooperativa
si firman o no un acuerdo de cooperación. En la segunda etapa, deciden sobre los
niveles de inversión en función de la decisión tomada en la primera etapa. Los países
firmantes actúan de forma cooperativa en esta segunda etapa de manera que eligen
los niveles de inversión que minimizan los costes de reducir las emisiones del acuerdo.
Sin embargo, los países no firmantes actúan de forma unilateral y fijan sus niveles de
inversión teniendo en cuenta solamente los costes nacionales. En esta segunda etapa,
los países firmantes pueden compartir o no la información asociada a las actividades
de I + D dependiendo de lo que se haya establecido en la etapa anterior. En cambio
los países no firmantes no comparten ninguna información y sólo se pueden beneficiar
de los efectos externos de las actividades de I + D recogidos en el factor de difusión.
En la tercera etapa se fijan los niveles de emisiones. En esta etpa puede haber co-
operación o no dependiendo del tipo de acuerdo que se haya firmado en la primera
etapa. Si se firma un acuerdo exclusivamente de reducción de emisiones. Sólamente
habrá cooperación en esta etapa. Si se firma un acuerdo de reducción de emisiones y
cooperación tecnológica, los países firmantes actuarán colectivamente tanto en la se-
gunda como en la tercera etapa. Finalmente, si sólo se firma un acuerdo tecnológico,
los países firmantes cooperarán sólo en la segunda etapa. Como es habitual en es-
tos juegos por etapas, la solución se obtiene por inducción hacia atrás, resolviendo
primero la última etapa, para resolver después la segunda y finalemente determinar
la participación. En la primera etapa el nivel de participación lo fija el equilibrio de
Nash donde las estrategias son firmar o no firmar. El acuerdo está formado por todos
los países que deciden firmar. En la segunda y tercera etapa, los niveles de inversión
y de emisiones quedan determinados por un equilibrio de Nash de acuerdo partial en
el que los países firmantes actúan de forma no cooperativa con respecto a los países
no firmantes pero de forma cooperativa con respecto al resto de firmantes.
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1.3 Principales conclusiones
De acuerdo con el análisis presentado en esta tesis, las principales conclusiones
que se obtienen son:
i) Cooperar en las emisiones, incluso si va acompañado con la cooperación en
inversión, sin intercambio de información, no es suficiente para eliminar los incentivos
de los países para actuar como free-rider.
ii) Compartir las inversiones en I + D y evitar la duplicación de actividades de
I + D es suficiente para estabilizar la gran coalición en los altos niveles de daños
marginales. Este resultado se explica por la asimetría en el factor de difusión entre
los signatarios y no signatarios. Como el acuerdo, que incluye el intercambio de
información, implica que los signatarios internalizar completamente los efectos de
spillovers de sus inversiones en I + D, los signatarios pueden eliminar las emisiones
utilizando menos recursos que los países no signatarios. El resultado es que para los
signatarios los costes de inversión son más bajos que para los no signatarios y por
lo tanto los costes totales son también menores. Por otra parte, hay externalidades
negativas de la cooperación para los no signatarios, es decir, la cooperación aumenta
los costes totales de los no signatarios. Por eso, si un país abandona la gran coalición,
sus costes totales aumentan debido al incremento en los costes de inversión, que hace
que la gran coalición sea estable.
iii) Si los países signatarios invierten al nivel máximo de inversión en I + D para
eliminar completamente las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero, la cooperación
en la tercera etapa del juego (las emisiones) no afecta ni el nivel de cooperación, ni
los costes totales.
iv) Para niveles altos de daños marginales, se ha encontrado que los acuerdos que
incluyen tanto la cooperación en inversión en I + D como intercambio de información
son los acuerdos dominantes. Sin embargo, para valores bajos de daños marginales,
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los acuerdos dominantes cambian según los diferentes intervalos de daños marginales
como se explica en detalle en el tercer capítulo.
v) Al examinar la robustez de los diferentes supuestos del modelo, se encontró
que los dos supuestos de rendimientos constantes a escala de la inversión en I + D
(costes de inversión lineales) y el supuesto de de los daños ambientales lineales no son
críticos para obtener el resultado de que l gran coalición es estable y beneficosa para
altos niveles de daños marginales.
6
1.4 Introduction
Climate change is becoming an important issue in human lives. Many changes
have been observed in global climate over the past century, including the increment
in global average temperature and sea level, a warmer and more acidic ocean, at-
mospheric moisture and the human activities have led to large increases in the green-
house gas emissions (GHG). Greenhouse gases include water vapor, carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, ozone and a variety of manufactured chemicals that help
capture the heat by absorbing infrared radiation, which in turn causes an elevation
of the average surface temperature above what it would be in the absence of these
gases.
Due to the absence of a supra-national authority that can enforce environmen-
tal policies to control greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on a global scale, countries
have had to negotiate an international environmental agreement (IEA), the Kyoto
Protocol, to address this problem. The aim of the Kyoto Protocol was to achieve a
reduction in GHG emissions of 5% taking as reference the level of 1990 for countries
of Annex B in the commitment period 2008-2012. However, this target of abating
GHG emissions was not achieved for that period. Limited coverage and moderate
emission reductions requirements are two limitations that reduced the eﬀectiveness
of the agreement.
1.5 Work Motivation
Because of the doubts about the eﬀectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol, several schol-
ars have asked whether other types of agreements can be designed to achieve large
reductions of GHG emissions. Designing a profitable and stable international environ-
mental agreement (IEA) that deals with the shortcomings of Kyoto-type agreement
is the main motivation of this work.
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One idea would be to focus on technology improvements in order to reduce abate-
ment costs, as this might increase a country’s willingness to undertake significant
emission reductions. For example, it could be beneficial to supplement a Kyoto-type
agreement with technology elements if technological development depends not only
on a country’s own R&D investment but also on R&D by other countries through
cross-country technology spillovers, see for instance, Carraro and Siniscalco (1997).
Even with no explicit agreement on emissions, a technology agreement leading to
increased R&D in clean technologies, and thus to lower abatement costs, might yield
a reduction in emissions. This is the argument behind the proposals of a climate
agreement on technology development, see for instance, Barrett (2006).
1.6 Literature Survey
The analysis of profitability and stability of IEAs has been studied since the
seminal paper by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993). They show that an IEA is formed
when conditions of profitability and stability are satisfied. They consider a model
where signatories of IEA may choose means of self-enforced transfers to induce non-
signatories to join the IEA. However, expanding coalitions requires some form of
commitment, but such commitment is inconsistent with the notion of self-enforcement
as claimed by Barrett (1994).
Then, the importance of studying self-enforcing IEA has been highlighted since
the seminal paper by Barrett (1994), which employed some concepts from game the-
ory to explore the properties of self-enforcing IEAs. Using two diﬀerent modelling
approaches, Barrett has concluded that self-enforcing IEAs, which establish rules for
managing shared environmental resources, may not be able to improve substantially
upon the non-cooperative outcome. The first model of self-enforcing IEA analyzed by
Barrett solves jointly for the number of signatories, the terms of IEA and the actions
of non-signatories. In this model, it has been concluded that the self-enforcing IEA
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can sustain a large number of signatories only when the diﬀerence in the net benefits
between the non-cooperative and full cooperative outcome is very small. Otherwise,
a self-enforcing IEA may not exist or it may not be able to sustain more than two or
three countries. The second model analyzed by Barrett, which takes the IEA to be an
equilibrium to an infinity repeated game, shows that full cooperative outcome can be
sustained by large number of countries only when the diﬀerence in global net benefits
between the non-cooperative and full cooperative outcome is small. Otherwise, the
full cooperative outcome can be sustained by only a few countries or by non at all.
Since then, diﬀerent strands of the literature about self-enforcing IEAs and how to
overcome the free-riding incentives to stabilize an IEA with high level of cooperation
have emerged.
These strands of the literature are including, but not limited to, the following
points:
1.6.1 Transfers
One strand of the literature is concentrated on the possibility of using self-financed
transfers to compensate the countries that might lose by joining the environmental
agreements (see for instance, Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Hoel (1994), Carraro et
al. (2006) and Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010)).
As mentioned before, Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) show that using means of self-
transfers induces non-signatories to join the IEA which is close to one of the main
conclusions by Hoel (1994), that cooperating countries should try to induce the non-
cooperating countries through appropriate transfers in order to tax the consumption
and production of carbon at the same rate as in the cooperating countries.
Carraro et al. (2006) develop a general framework which allows the study of
transfers role in IEAs by proposing transfers using both internal and external financial
resources, to achieve both self-enforcing and welfare optimal agreements.
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Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) show that when there is diﬀerences in the en-
vironmental damages among countries, the level of cooperation, that can be bought
through a self-financed transfers scheme, increases with the degree of asymmetry.
1.6.2 Policy Tools
Another strand of the literature is concentrated on the choice of the policy tools
to form an IEA (see for instance, Hoel (1993), Moher (1995), Finus and Rundshagen
(1998), Carraro and siniscalco (1998), Barrett and Stavins (2003) and Turunen-Red
and Woodland (2004)).
Hoel (1993) uses some kind of carbon tax to examine the need for harmonization of
carbon taxes across countries inside the IEA. Hoel also discusses a similar arrangement
through a system of emission permits which are internationally tradable between
agreements, while Moher (1995) study the linking of international environmental
problems to the international permit trade. Moher analyzes the impact of trade
opportunities on countries incentives to continue environmental cooperation.
Finus and Rundshagen (1998) analyze the coalition formation process with asym-
metric countries. They show that the total welfare is higher by comparison to the
Nash equilibrium under the policies of uniform emission reduction quota and an ef-
fluent tax. Carraro and Siniscalco (1998) discuss mechanisms and strategies to oﬀset
the free-riding incentives and increasing welfare. They conclude that partial coalitions
and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of players, and the agreements
such as the grand coalition are most unlikely to exist.
Barrett and Stavins (2003) study the role of protocols and policy architectures
to induce participation and compliance in IEA, while Turunen-Red and Woodland
(2004) show that a policy of emission tax reforms accompanied with reforms in tariﬀs
can be used as alternative to the emission tax reforms accompanied by international
income transfers which in turn is going to achieve the desirable welfare outcome.
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1.6.3 Linkage
The strand of the literature which is related to our work can be defined under
the concept of (linkage). In particular, to link the unstable emission IEA with an
agreement on technological cooperation (the issue of the second chapter in this thesis)
which is shown to be profitable and stable. This has been analyzed in the seminal
paper by Carraro and Siniscalco (1997), by employing a numerical example to show
that overcoming the free-ride incentive can be obtained through this kind of linkage.
The model used in this paper considers the interactions between the government and
domestic firms in one country and the governments in diﬀerent countries.
The authors conclude that linking the investment in R&D with the environmen-
tal negotiation increases the stability of the environmental cooperation, number of
signatories and the total welfare of cooperating countries.
Even with no explicit agreement on emissions, a technology agreement leading to
increased R&D in clean technologies, and thus to lower abatement costs might yield a
reduction in emissions (the issue of the third chapter in this thesis). This idea has been
highlighted recently by Barrett (2006). In this paper, an alternative treaty system
to Kyoto has been proposed. This system is a system of two treaties, one promoting
cooperative R&D and the other encouraging the adoption of breakthrough technology
emerging from this R&D.
Barrett concluded that breakthrough technologies can not improve the perfor-
mance with the exception of breakthrough technologies that exhibit increasing returns
to scale. Ruis and Zeeuw (2010) give support to this idea in a framework of a model
with quadratic investment costs and without spillovers eﬀects. The main reason that
explains the diﬀerence of the results obtained in our thesis with those obtained by
Barrett (2006) is that while Barrett assumes global investment in R&D to be a perfect
public good, we assume that some imperfections exist and introduce an asymmetry be-
tween signatories and non-signatories as regards the degree of spillovers. This change
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is enough to reverse the nature of the game when emissions are completely eliminated
and hence the fact that diﬀerent results are obtained. The idea that the degree of
spillovers is diﬀerent among countries which cooperate than among countries which
do not cooperate can be also found in Xepapadeas (1995) and Carraro and Siniscalco
(1997). In Xepapadeas (1995), it is assumed that when all countries enter into an
international agreement, the level of technology is common to all countries (it is a
perfect public good). Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) normalize to zero the spillover
eﬀects for non-signatories. The model of the present thesis assumes that spillover
eﬀects are positive for non-signatories and are fully internalized for signatories under
the types of agreements which include R&D information exchange.
Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010) show that a focus on the R&D phase in the develop-
ment of breakthrough technologies can change the result obtained by Barrett (2006).
Assuming that the cost of adoption decreases with respect to the level of R&D, they
find that even without increasing returns to scale, a technology agreement can yield
better results than those obtained by focusing on abatement targets, although the
first best cannot be achieved. This result is obtained when the non-cooperative equi-
librium with full adoption exists and for a diﬀerent timing of the game. Hoel and de
Zeeuw (2010) assume that the agreement chooses R&D expenditures after the par-
ticipation stage. Hong and Karp (2012) explore a similar idea but in the framework
of the standard model of an IEA formation with linear payoﬀ. The authors assume
that the cost of abatement decreases with respect to the level of R&D. Moreover, they
assume, as in Barrett (2006), that countries individually decide whether to invest in a
public good that reduces abatement costs before the participation stage. Their find-
ings show that using mixed strategies at the participation stage the standard result
mentioned above reverses: membership can be large but only when the treaty does
make all countries substantially better oﬀ. Mixed strategies create endogenous risk so
that risk aversion increases the equilibrium probability of participation. In the fourth
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chapter, we extend this research to the case of quadratic abatement and investment
costs but assuming the timing proposed by Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010) and focusing
on pure strategies at the participation stage.
Barrett (2009) introduces a survey of the possibilities of developing breakthrough
technologies that are needed to reduce emissions dramatically. The breakthrough
technologies analyzed in this paper include wind energy, solar energy and nuclear en-
ergy. Hoﬀert et al. (2002) introduce technical discussion of some of the breakthrough
technologies. The authors survey possible future sources, evaluated for their capabil-
ity to supply massive amounts of carbon emission-free energy and for their potential
for large-scale commercialization. They concluded that a broad range of intensive
R&D is needed to produce technological options that can allow both stabilization
and economic development.
The issue of linkage has been highlighted by many scholars in other diﬀerent
ways. de Coninck et al. (2008) provide an overview of technology-oriented agree-
ments stressing their potential role in addressing the free-riding incentives in climate
negotiations. They find that the technology-oriented agreements which aim to knowl-
edge sharing and coordination and R&D could increase the overall eﬃciency and ef-
fectiveness of international climate cooperation. However, those types of agreements
have limited environmental eﬀectiveness on their own as concluded by the authors.
Nevertheless, the results of this paper indicate that technology-oriented agreements
could potentially provide a valuable contribution to the global response to climate
change depending on their design, implementation and their expected role relatively
to other components of policy portfolio.
The eﬀect of technology spillovers on the stability of international climate coalition
has been studied in Nagashima and Dellink (2008). They address the eﬀects of asym-
metric spillovers, that aﬀect the marginal abatement cost curve, on the participation
in an emission agreement. Their results show that spillovers do not substantially in-
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crease the success of IEAs. However, in their model the size of the spillovers cannot be
controlled by the signatories, as their state of technology is exogenous. More recently,
Nagashima et al. (2011) have extended this analysis by relaxing the assumption of
exogenous technological, but do not consider knowledge spillovers. Unlike the results
obtained in the thesis, their results continue being pessimistic, stable coalitions are
smaller when the gains from cooperation are large.
Investing in R&D to overcome the free-riding incentives in IEA taking into account
the spillovers eﬀects has been also analyzed in diﬀerent ways in Heal and Tarui (2010),
Benchekroun et al (2011) and Harstad (2012).
Heal and Tarui (2010) study the incentives to develop advanced pollution abate-
ment technology when technology may spillover across agents and pollution abate-
ment is a public good. In a framework of a general model, the authors examine how
the eﬀect of technological innovation on the cost structure of emission abatement
influences the agents, incentives to reduce emissions and to invest in R&D in new
technologies. Benshekron et al (2011) investigate how the success of the attempt to
mitigate emissions of GHG emissions through international negotiations, depends on
the adaptive measures taken by diﬀerent countries to reduce the negative eﬀects of
climate change. They show that the increase in eﬀectiveness of adaptation diminishes
the individual countries incentives to free-ride on global agreement over emissions. A
dynamic game has been presented by Harstad (2012) where players can contribute to
a public bad, invest in technologies and write incomplete contracts.
Next, it is worth adding that diﬀerent empirical papers give support to the idea
that supplementing an emission agreement with technology elements or replacing an
emission agreement with a technology agreement can have positive eﬀects on the
participation into the agreement. See for instance the papers written by Buchner et
al. (2005), Kemfert (2004), Buchner and Carraro (2005) and Lessmann and Edenhofer
(2011).
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Buchner et al. (2005) study whether linking the cooperation on climate change
with cooperation on technological innovation and diﬀusion can motivate the US to
sign the Kyoto or not. The paper analyzes mainly two points. First, the incentives
for Europe, Japan and Russia to adopt the linkage strategy. Second, the incentives
for US to join a coalition which cooperates on GHG emission control and on R&D
investment and technological diﬀusion.
Following the analysis of the same issue, Kemfert (2004) studies whether incentives
exist for non-cooperation nations like USA to join a coalition based upon linkage,
taking into account the spillover eﬀects. The model used in this paper concluded
the existence of incentives for climate control coalitions coupled with issue linkage of
technological innovations. Thus, there is an incentive for US to join a full coalition
or small coalition on climate control and technological improvements with Europe,
Japan and Russia.
Buchner and Carraro (2005) study the idea of replacing international cooperation
on GHG emission control with international cooperation on climate-related technolog-
ical innovation and diﬀusion. It has been concluded in this paper that technological
cooperation, without any commitment to emission control, may not lead to a suﬃcient
abatement of GHG concentrations.
Lessman and Edenhofer (2011), by using a numerical model, analyze the diﬀer-
ences of several technology agreements and how they interact. They conclude that
participation in and environmental eﬀectiveness of the IEA are raised less eﬀectively
when the technology oriented agreement focuses on research cooperation in mitiga-
tion technology rather than cooperation on augmenting productivity in the private
good sector.
Finally, it is important to highlight the literature survey about the investment in
R&D with spillovers and the research joint ventures. The seminal paper, concerning
R&D spillover, by D’ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) analyzed a symmetric duopoly
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model of R&D and spillovers in order to compare three diﬀerent games, depending
on whether firms cooperate or compete in the diﬀerent stages of the game played. In
the first game, it has been assumed that firms act non-cooperatively in both output
and R&D. In the second game, it is assumed that firms act cooperatively in the
R&D stage while compete in the output stage. In the third game, monopoly game
has been analyzed assuming that firms act cooperatively in both stages. The main
conclusion of this paper is that cooperation in R&D increases both expenditures
in R&D and quantities of production, with respect to the non-cooperative solution
whenever the spillover is large enough and vice versa. D’ Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) paper has been commented by Henriques (1990) by showing that comparing the
pure cooperative and the pure non-cooperative solutions as defined by d’ Aspremont
and Jacquemin is only meaningful when the non-cooperative solution is stable, which
means that spillovers are not too small.
The seminal paper by Kamien et al. (1992), concerning the research joint ven-
tures, which our specification to the countries eﬀective investment is built on, has
analyzed the eﬀects of R&D cartelization and research joint ventures on oligopolistic
competition by using four diﬀerent scenarios. The diﬀerent scenarios are depending
on whether countries are coordinating their R&D investments and sharing R&D ef-
forts or not. It is shown that creating a competitive research joint venture reduces
the equilibrium level of technological improvements and increases equilibrium prices
compared to when firms conduct R&D independently.
The cooperation on technological development by assuming the endogeneity of
the R&D spillovers has been analyzed by Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), while Yi
and Shin (2000) examine the endogenous formation of research coalitions with high
spillovers among symmetric firms. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) examine the eﬀects
of research joint ventures on all aspects of innovative performance in the case where
R&D spillovers are endogenously chosen both in the absence of a research joint venture
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and once the research joint venture has formed. The number of research coalitions
and their sizes are determined endogenously in Yi and Shin (2000). The stability of
the grand research coalition and eﬀects on stable research structure of an increase in
research, have been also analyzed in this paper.
Greenlee (2005) examines the eﬀects of research sharing on welfare and on firm
incentives to form joint ventures. In contrast to Kamien et al. (1992), Greenlee
allows for imperfect research sharing among partners and assumes that firms optimally
adjust individual research intensities in response to changes in the membership of any
joint venture.
Kamien and Zang (2000) propose a representation of a firm’s eﬀective R&D eﬀort
level that incorporates absorptive capacity as a strategic variable into the existing
research joint venture models. The analysis in this paper reveals that if the firms can
cooperate in setting their R&D budgets, then they choose identical R&D approaches
and dissimilar approaches if they cannot.
Amir et al. (2008) conclude that a given R&D investment should always produce
more cost reduction if devoted to one lab rather than two independent labs operated
under natural spillovers. The conclusion of this paper coincides with one of the
important results of this thesis, that an agreement which doesn’t allow for sharing
R&D eﬀorts can’t enhance the non-cooperative outcome.
1.7 Scope and Work Organization
The aim of the present work is to examine diﬀerent types of international envi-
ronmental agreements in order to determine what would be the dominant agreement
(at the diﬀerent levels of marginal damages) with respect to both the total costs of
signatories countries and the level of cooperation. The model used in the analysis is
a three-stage static model (explained in chapter 2), where the membership game is
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played in the first stage, the investment game is played in the second stage and finally
the emission game is played in the third stage.
Examining the international cooperation on technological development as a sup-
plement to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions, is the main ob-
jective of the second chapter where four diﬀerent types of emission agreements are
analyzed. The four agreements share the main aspect that signatories countries act
cooperatively in the third stage of the game (emission game). However, the second
stage of the game (investment game) diﬀers from one type to another depending on
whether signatories are sharing R&D eﬀorts and coordinating their R&D activities or
not. In all agreements, it is assumed that eﬀective investment in one country depends
on the amount invested in R&D in that country as well as on the investment in R&D
undertaken in all countries through technological spillovers.
In the types of agreements that include information exchange (emission agreement
with information exchange and emission and R&D agreement with information ex-
change), the technological spillovers is perfect among signatories, which means that
signatories countries avoid the duplication of R&D eﬀorts. However, the technological
spillovers is not perfect among signatories in the other two types (emission agreement
and emission and R&D agreement without information exchange).
Examining the international cooperation on technological development as an alter-
native to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions, is the main objective
of the third chapter where three diﬀerent types of technological agreements are ana-
lyzed. The three diﬀerent types of agreements (R&D agreement without information
exchange, research joint venture agreement and R&D agreement with information
exchange), share the main aspect that signatories countries act non-cooperatively
in the third stage of the game (emission game). A comparison between all types of
agreements (analyzed in second and third chapters), is also introduced in this chapter.
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An extension of the analysis which examines the robustness of the model for the
dominant agreements at the high levels of marginal damages, is the main objective of
the fourth chapter. The quadratic investment costs and the quadratic environmental
damages are the two diﬀerent assumptions that have been analyzed in this chapter.
1.8 Main Conclusions
According to the analysis introduced in this thesis, the main conclusions can be
summarized as follows
• Cooperating on emissions even if it is accompanied with cooperating on in-
vestment without information exchange, is not enough to eliminate countries
incentives to act as free-rider.
• Sharing R&D investments and avoid duplication of R&D activities is enough to
stabilize the grand coalition at the high levels of marginal damages. This result
is explained by the asymmetry in the spillovers parameter between signatories
and non-signatories. As the agreement, which includes information exchange,
implies that signatories fully internalize the spillover eﬀects of their invest-
ments in R&D, signatories can eliminate emissions using less resources than
non-signatories. The result is that the signatories’ investment costs are lower
than the non-signatories’ investment costs and hence the total costs are also
lower. Moreover, there are negative externalities for non-signatories stemming
from cooperation, i.e. cooperation increases the total costs of non-signatories.
In this framework, if one country abandons the grand coalition, its total costs
increase because of the increase in investment costs, which makes the grand
coalition stable.
• As far as signatories countries invest at the maximum level of R&D investment
to eliminate completely the GHG emissions, cooperation in the third stage of
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the game (emissions) does not aﬀect neither the level of cooperation nor the
total costs.
• At high levels of marginal damages, it is found that the agreements which in-
clude both cooperation on R&D investment and information exchange are the
dominant agreements. However, for low values of marginal damages, the dom-
inant agreements are changing according to the diﬀerent intervals of marginal
damages as explained in details in the third chapter.
• By examining the robustness of the diﬀerent assumptions of the model, it is
found that both of the assumptions of constant returns to scale of the R&D
investment (linear investment costs) and the assumption of linear environmental
damages are not critical for achieving the result that grand coalition is stable
and profitable, at the high levels of marginal damages.
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CHAPTER 2
EMISSION AGREEMENTS WITH DIFFERENT TYPES
OF TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION
2.1 The Model
We develop a static model with  countries that pollute the atmosphere and
negotiate the control of greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions, taking into account the
eﬀects of spillovers in R&D from one country to another. The model is based on
Golombek and Hoel (2005). We assume that the eﬀective investment in a country
   = 1   depends on the amount invested in R&D in that country, , and also
the investments in R&D undertaken in all other countries. However, technological
spillovers is not perfect, only a part of the R&D investments undertaken in other
countries is beneficial for country  Hence, the eﬀective investment of country  is
given by
 =  + −  ∈ [0 1] (2.1)
where − = P 6= . This specification for eﬀective R&D investment was intro-
duced by Spence (1984) and it has been recently used by Golombek and Hoel (2005,
2008, 2011) in the analysis of climate policy under technology spillovers.1 However,
following the approach adopted by Kamien et al.(1992) in their analysis of the ef-
fects of R&D cartelization and research joint ventures on oligopolistic competition,
1Golombeck and Hoel (2005, 2008, 2011) analyze the eﬀects on R&D investments, emissions
and welfare of diﬀerent types of agreements implemented by diﬀerent types of instruments, includ-
ing a technology agreement implemented by a subsidy but they do not study the stability of the
agreements.
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we assume that countries can coordinate by pooling their R&D eﬀorts so as to fully
internalize the spillovers eﬀects which implies that in this case  = 1 for signatories
In the absence of any explicit abatement activities, emissions in each country
depend only on the technology level of the country. So, the business as usual emissions
(BAU) for a level of eﬀective investment equal to  is defined as ¯() = − with
   0 and  is representing the emissions abatement per each unit invested in
clean technologies. According to that, we can define the abatement of country  as
 = ¯()− = −− where  stands for the current emissions generated by
country  Thus, abatement costs depend on both the level of abatement and the level
of eﬀective investment. The eﬀective R&D investment reduces the abatement costs
because it reduces the intensity of emissions in the production of goods and services
for a country. The greater the eﬀective R&D investment, the lower the ratio of GHG
emissions over the GDP of the country and, consequently, the lower the abatement
costs. For this specification, there exists a critical value for  given by
 =  (2.2)
for which GHG emissions are completely eliminated, in other words, fossil fuels could
be completely substituted by other non-polluting energies. We assume that abatement
costs are quadratic
() = 
2
2 = 2( −  −)
2   0 (2.3)
Following Golombek and Hoel (2005), the price of R&D investments is normalized
to one and investment is irreversible. So, the cost of investing in R&D is () = .
Finally, the environmental damages in each country depend on the sum of total
emissions,  = P=1 We assume that the environmental damages are linear:
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() =    0. Thus, we can write the total costs of controlling GHG emissions
for the representative country as follows
 = 
2
( −  −)2 +  +  (2.4)
where  =  + − with  ∈ [0 1] and  =P=1
The fully non-cooperative equilibrium will be analyzed in the next section, in order
to examine whether the diﬀerent types of agreements, that will be studied later, are
profitable to signatories in comparison with the non-cooperative equilibrium or not.
2.2 Fully Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
In the fully non-cooperative equilibrium, players make decisions independently.
Thus, under the assumption of our model, countries don’t cooperate neither in the
emission nor in the investment game. The fully non-cooperative equilibrium can be
calculated as the equilibrium of a two-stage game. In the first stage, countries decide
the level of investment in R&D. In the second stage they decide about emissions. In
both stages, the Nash equilibrium is calculated. Solving by backward induction, we
begin analyzing the equilibrium of the second stage.
For a given technology, the optimal emissions can be calculated by minimizing the
total cost function given by (2.4) which yields for the representative country2
 = ¯ −  (2.5)
So that, the eﬀective investment which yields zero emissions for each country is
given by
 = ¯ (2.6)
2In order to simplify the notation, ¯ will be used to represent the diﬀerence  − (). Thus, for
 ≥  the model has a trivial solution with  = 0,  = 0.
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which is lower than the critical value for the eﬀective investment given by (2.2) that
eliminates completely the GHG emissions. Therefore, the level of emissions could be
positive or zero depending on the level of eﬀective investment in the following way
 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
¯ −    ∈ (0 ¯]
0   ∈ (¯ ]
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭

Using (2.5), the global emissions can be calculated as follows
 =
X
=1
 = ¯ −  (2.7)
where  is the global eﬀective investment in R&D given by
 =
X
=1
 =
X
=1
( + −) (2.8)
By substituting both (2.5) and (2.7) in (2.4), the total costs function can be
written as
 = 
2
2 + 
¡¯ −  ¢+  (2.9)
Observe that the global eﬀective investment in R&D becomes a public good. Any
investment made by a country reduces the total costs of all countries.
Now, we calculate the equilibrium for the first stage. As the cost of investing in
R&D is linear, there is a linear programming problem defined for the representative
country as follows
min
{}
 = 
2
2 + 
¡¯ −  ¢+  (2.10)
  ≥ 0  (2.11)
where  is given by (2.8).
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By taking the first derivative of total costs function given by (2.10) with respect
to investment in R&D, taking into account that  = 1+(−1), the following
critical value of marginal damages defined by condition  = 0 is obtained
ˆ = 1(1 + ( − 1))  (2.12)
such that when  ≥ ˆ, total costs are decreasing with respect to , and the countries
invest in R&D until emissions are completely eliminated, while for   ˆ, total costs
are increasing with respect to , and countries decide not to invest in R&D.
First, assuming that  ≥ ˆ, as countries invest to eliminate emissions, both 
and  are substituted by zero in the total costs functions given by (2.4). Thus, the
optimization problem for each country can be represented as follows
min
{ }
 = 2 ( − )
2 +  (2.13)
  =  + − ≥ ¯ (2.14)
 =  + − ≤  (2.15)
The solution of this optimization problem yields the following level of investment
for each country
 =  − 12 (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.16)
while the eﬀective investment is given by
 =  − 12  (2.17)
which satisfies the constraint on eﬀective investment given by (2.15). However, in
order to investigate whether the constraint on eﬀective investment given by (2.14)
is satisfied or not, the diﬀerence between the levels of eﬀective investment given by
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(2.17) and (2.6) is taken and it is found that the constraint is satisfied at any level of
marginal damages higher than
˜ = 1 (2.18)
which is higher than ˆ.
Therefore, it is concluded that the decisions about the level of investment for each
country and the corresponding total costs functions depend on the level of marginal
damages. Thus, for  ∈ (ˆ ˜], as the constraint given by (2.14) is not satisfied,
countries invest at the level of eﬀective investment given by (2.6) and the level of
investment for each country in this case is given by
 = ¯(1 + ( − 1))  (2.19)
Finally, doing the substitution of both investment and eﬀective investment in the
total costs function given by (2.13), the following expression is obtained
 = 
2
2 +
¯
(1 + ( − 1))  (2.20)
However, if  ≥ ˜, countries increase their investment to the maximum level
that eliminates the GHG emissions and the level of eﬀective investment is now given
by (2.17). Doing the substitution in the total costs function given by (2.13), the
following expression is obtained
 = 122 +
 − 1
2 (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.21)
Observe that although the eﬀective investment is independent of the technology
diﬀusion parameter, both the investment in R&D and the total costs decrease as the
technology spillovers increase.
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Finally, if   ˆ, as the optimal policy for the countries is not to invest, the
emissions increase to the BAU emissions level given by  = ¯ and the total costs
are given by
 = 
2
2 + ¯ (2.22)
which corresponds to the outcome of the standard model of emissions abatement for
a given technology.
2.3 Emission Agreement
The formation of emission agreement is modeled as a three-stage game. Each
game will be described briefly in a reverse order as the subgame-perfect equilibrium
of this three stage game is computed by backward induction.
Given the level of participation in the agreement and the investment in R&D of all
countries, at the third stage, the emission game, non-signatory countries choose their
emissions acting non-cooperatively and taking the emissions of all other countries as
given in order to minimize their own costs of controlling pollution. On the other hand,
signatories countries choose the emissions acting cooperatively in order to minimize
the aggregate costs of the agreement. At the second stage, the R&D investment game,
each country acting non-cooperatively decides its own R&D level given the R&D
investments of other countries. As there is no information exchange, the marginal
abatement costs of all countries (signatories and non-signatories) are decreased by
the country’s R&D eﬀect in addition to some spillover from other countries’ R&D.
In other words, the spillover is not increased because of the agreement. Thus, the
eﬀective investment is given by (2.1) but this expression can be written as follows
 =  + 
Ã−1X
=1
 +
−X
=1

!
  = 1  
for signatories, and
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 =  + 
Ã X
=1
 +
−−1X
=1

!
  = 1   − 
for non-signatories. Where  stands for the number of signatories,  for a signatory
country and  for a non-signatory country.
Signatories and non-signatories choose their R&D investment simultaneously. Thus,
R&D investments are provided by the partial agreement Nash equilibrium with re-
spect to a coalition defined by Chander and Tulkens (1995). Finally, we assume that
at the first stage, countries play a simultaneous open membership game with a sin-
gle binding agreement. In a single agreement formation game, the strategies for each
country are to sign or not to sign and the agreement is formed by all players who have
chosen to sign. Under open membership, any country is free to join the agreement if
interested. Finally, we assume that the signing of the agreement is binding on signa-
tories. They therefore acquire a commitment to stay and implement the agreement
during the second stage of the game so that full compliance is achieved. The game
finishes when the emission sub-game is over.
2.3.1 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment Game
In this section, stages two and three are solved by backward induction assuming
that in the first stage  countries with  ≥ 2, have signed the agreement.
As we have supposed that there is no cooperation between non-signatories coun-
tries in the emission game, the solution of this stage for non-signatories is given
exactly as in the fully non-cooperative equilibrium.
For signatories countries, as they select emissions minimizing the joint costs of
all signatories and taking into account the environmental damages of all countries in
the agreement, then emissions for signatories should be calculated by minimizing the
following total costs function
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 =
X
=1
 =
X
=1
³ 
2
¡ −  −¢2 + ´   = 1 
where  stands for the total costs of the agreement, which yields3
 =  −  − 
  (2.23)
In this case, the eﬀective investment which yields zero emissions for each signatory
country is given by
 = 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (2.24)
Thus, the level of emissions for signatories countries could be positive or zero
depending on their level of eﬀective investment in the following way
 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 − ()−    ∈ (0 1
¡ −  ¢]
0   ∈ ( 1
¡ −  ¢  ]
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭

Using (2.5) and (2.23), the global emissions can be written as follows
 =  − 
¡ + 2 − ¢−  (2.25)
where  is given by the sum of eﬀective investment for both non-signatories and
signatories as follows
 =
−X
=1
Ã
 + 
Ã X
=1
 +
−−1X
=1

!!
+
X
=1
Ã
 + 
Ã−1X
=1
 +
−X
=1

!!

(2.26)
3For  ≥ , the model has a trivial solution with  = 0,  = 0. As the level of  that
yields the trivial solution for signatories countries is lower than that yields the trivial solution for
non-signatories countries, the focus will be on the values of  below , and on the values of 
below  if full cooperation is achieved.
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By substituting the emissions in the total costs for signatories and non-signatories
countries, we obtain
 () = 
2
2 + 
µ
 −  ( + 
2 − )− 
¶
  = 1  −  (2.27)
 () = 
22
2 + 
µ
 − 
¡ + 2 − ¢− ¶   = 1  (2.28)
where the first term of total costs represents the abatement costs and the second term
represents the environmental damages. Observe that the global eﬀective investment
in R&D becomes a public good. Any investment made by a country reduces the total
costs of all countries.
Next, the partial agreement Nash equilibrium of the investment game is calculated.
As all countries, signatories and non-signatories do not cooperate at this stage, each
non-signatory country selects investment to minimize the following expression of the
total costs
min
{ }
 () = 
2
2 + 
µ
 −  ( + 
2 − )− 
¶
+   (2.29)
  ≥ 0  = 1   −  (2.30)
For signatories countries, the optimization problem that yields the optimal invest-
ment is
min
{}
 () = 
22
2 + 
µ
 −  ( + 
2 − )− 
¶
+  (2.31)
  ≥ 0  = 1   (2.32)
Although these two linear programming problems are not identical to that of the
fully non-cooperative equilibrium, the eﬀect of investment on total costs is the same as
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that obtained in the fully non-cooperative equilibrium which yields the same critical
value of marginal damages given by (2.12), such that
if 
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

=

⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
ˆ then 



 


⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

=

⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
0
Therefore, when  is greater than ˆ, total costs are decreasing with respect to
the investment in R&D for both signatories and non-signatories independently of
the level of participation, and both signatories and non-signatories invest in R&D
until emissions are completely eliminated.4 However, when  is lower than ˆ, total
costs are increasing with respect to the investment in R&D for both signatories and
non-signatories countries and the optimal policy is not to invest.
Thus, when  ≥ ˆ, as both types of countries invest to eliminate completely
the emissions, the optimization problem for non-signatories is the same presented
by (2.13)-(2.15). However, for signatories countries, the optimization problem is
represented by
min
{}
 = 2
¡ − ¢2 +  (2.33)
  =  + − ≥ 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (2.34)
 =  + − ≤  (2.35)
Assuming symmetry, −, − can be written as
− = ( − − 1) +  − = ( − ) + (− 1)
4We assume that  is high enough, in particular,  is higher than  ( (1 +  ( − 1))) in order
to allow for the analysis at some levels of marginal damages higher than ˆ and lower than the
value of  =  which yields the trivial solution.
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By solving the optimization problems for both non-signatories and signatories, the
following pair of reaction functions of investment in R&D are obtained
 =
 ¡ − ¢− 1
2 (1 + ( − − 1))  (2.36)
 =

³
 −  ( − ) 
´
− 1
2 (1 + (− 1))  (2.37)
which establishes that the increase in investment of one type of countries reduces the
investment of the other type, in other words, the investments in R&D are strategic
substitutes.
The solution to the previous system yields the same optimal level of investment in
R&D and eﬀective investment, for both non-signatories and signatories, as those given
by (2.16) and (2.17). It is known already that the constraint on eﬀective investment for
non-signatories is satisfied for any level of marginal damages higher than or equal to
˜ given by (2.18). However, as the constraint on eﬀective investment for signatories
countries given by (2.34) is diﬀerent from the constraint on eﬀective investment for
non-signatories given by (2.14), it is important now to examine whether the level of
eﬀective investment given by (2.17) satisfies the constraint on eﬀective investment for
signatories countries given by (2.34) or not. It is found that the constraint is only
satisfied at any level of marginal damages higher than or equal to
˜() = 1 (2.38)
which is always lower than ˜ and higher than or equal to ˆ provided that  ≥ ˘,
where
˘ = − 1 − 1  (2.39)
and vice versa.
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As the order of the critical values of marginal damages will be changed depending
on the value of the diﬀusion parameter , two possibilities should be analyzed. First,
if  ≥ ˘, the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˜()  ˆ
Second, if   ˘, the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˜()
In both cases, if  ≥ ˜, as both types of countries invest at the maximum to
eliminate the GHG emissions, total costs are given by the same expression of the
fully non-cooperative equilibrium given by (2.21) and the following proposition is
concluded
Proposition 1 At the high levels of marginal damages, in particular if  ≥ ˜, total
costs of both signatories and non-signatories countries of the emission agreement are
the same as total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium.
Next, if  ≥ ˘, and  ∈ (ˆ ˜()], as any level of marginal damages in this
interval is lower than the levels given by (2.18) and (2.38), thus the level of eﬀective
investment given by (2.17) doesn’t satisfy the constraints on eﬀective investment for
both types of countries in this interval. According to that, both non-signatories and
signatories reduce their eﬀective investment to the levels given by (2.6) and (2.24)
respectively. In this case, the levels of investment for both types are obtained as
follows
 = ¯ − − 
 =
1

µ
 − 
¶
− −
33
and the following pair of reaction functions are obtained
 =
¯
 − 
1 + ( − − 1)  (2.40)
 =
1

¡ −  ¢− ( − )
1 + (− 1)  (2.41)
The solution to the previous system yields the following optimal level of invest-
ments
 = (1− ) +

 (2 − (1 + )+)
(1− )(1 + ( − 1))  (2.42)
 = (1− ) +

 (2 − − (1− ))
(1− )(1 + ( − 1))  (2.43)
In order to investigate the eﬀect of cooperation on the level of investment for both
signatories and non-signatories, the first derivatives of the levels of investment given
by (2.42) and (2.43) are taken as follows

 = −
 (1 +  ( − 2))
 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.44)

 =
 (2− 1)
 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  0 (2.45)
By analyzing (2.44), it is concluded that the eﬀect of cooperation on the level of
investment in R&D of a signatory country changes depending on the level of spillovers.
Thus, it is suﬃcient that for any  ≤ 1 , there is a negative relationship between
the level of cooperation and the investment in R&D by a signatory country. For a
non-signatory country, analyzing (2.45), it is obvious that there is always a positive
relationship between the level of cooperation and the level of investment in R&D.
In order to guarantee positive levels of investment for both signatories and non-
signatories, the levels of investments given by (2.42) and (2.43) are analyzed and the
next proposition is concluded
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Proposition 2 Non-signatories’ investment is positive for all  provided that   ˆ
but this is not the case for signatories if   1 .
Proof: Appendix 1.
This means that in the emission agreement, at the range of marginal damages
given by  ∈ (ˆ ˜()], non-signatories will invest in R&D regardless the level
of the spillovers. Nevertheless, the non-negative constraint applies for signatories
countries (i.e. signatories invest at zero level) at the high levels of spillovers as the
investment done by non-signatories will be enough to eliminate the emissions.
By taking the diﬀerence between the levels of investments given by (2.42) and
(2.43)
 −  = −
µ 
 (1− )
¶
(− 1)  0
it is obvious that the level of investment by a non-signatory country is higher than
the level of investment by a signatory country. The explanation of this result returns
to the fact that signatories reduce their investment than non-signatories because they
have to do more eﬀorts in reducing emissions as they cooperate in the third stage of
the game. Using (2.26), the global eﬀective investment can be written as follows
 = ¯ −

(
2 − ) (2.46)
where the level of cooperation has a negative eﬀect on the global eﬀective investment.
The logic behind this is that while the level of cooperation has no eﬀect on the
eﬀective investment of non-signatories, it aﬀects negatively the eﬀective investment
of signatories, thus, the net eﬀect is the reduction of the global eﬀective investment
as the cooperation increases.
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Doing the substitutions for eﬀective investment, the total costs for non-signatories
and signatories countries become
 () = 
2
2 +
(1− ) +  (2 − − (1− ))
(1− )(1 + ( − 1))  (2.47)
 () = 
22
2 +
(1− ) +  (2 − (1 + )+)
(1− )(1 + ( − 1))  (2.48)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the investment costs. It can be directly concluded that cooperation has a positive
eﬀect on the total costs of non-signatories as cooperation in the third stage is not
aﬀecting the abatement cost of non-signatories, therefore, the eﬀect of cooperation
on the total costs of their total costs is given by the same expressions as (2.45).
In order to investigate the profitability of joining the emission agreement in the
range of marginal damages  ∈ (ˆ ˜()], the total costs function of a signatory
country given by (2.48) should be compared by the total costs function of playing
fully non-cooperatively given by (2.20).
Now, the diﬀerence between (2.48) and (2.20) is taken as follows
 ()− = 
µ¡2 − 1¢ 
2
+
1
 (1 +  ( − 1))
µ2 − (1 + )+  + 1− 
1− 
¶¶

(2.49)
which is increasing in . Thus, substituting for  = ˆ in (2.49), the diﬀerence in
total costs becomes
 ()−  = 
2 (1 + )− 2 (1 + )+ 2 + (1− )
22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))2  (2.50)
This diﬀerence in the total costs is analyzed and the following proposition is
concluded
Proposition 3 The emission agreement is not profitable in the range of marginal
damages  ∈ (ˆ ˜()].
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Proof: Appendix 2.
Thus, the emission agreement is dominated by the fully non-cooperative equilib-
rium in the range of marginal damages  ∈ (ˆ ˜()].
Next, if  ≥ ˘ and  ∈ (˜() ˜], as any level of marginal damages in this
interval is higher than the level of marginal damages given by (2.38), thus the level of
eﬀective investment given by (2.17) satisfies the constraint on eﬀective investment for
signatories countries only, while it doesn’t satisfy the constraint on eﬀective invest-
ment for non-signatories. According to that, the reaction functions of investment for
non-signatories and signatories in this case are given by (2.40) and (2.37) respectively.
The solution of these reaction functions yields the following levels of investment
 = (− ) (1− ) +  (1− )2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.51)
 = (− 1) (1− )−  ( − ) (1− )2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.52)
such that the level of eﬀective investment for non-signatories is still given by (2.6),
while the level of eﬀective investment for signatories is given by (2.17). In order to
investigate the eﬀect of cooperation on the level of investment for both non-signatories
and signatories, the first derivatives of the levels of investment given by (2.51) and
(2.52) are taken and it is found that cooperation has a positive eﬀect on the investment
for both non-signatories and signatories provided that   ˜ = 1 which is satisfied
in this interval of marginal damages.
Doing the substitutions for eﬀective investment in the total costs functions of
non-signatories and signatories, the following expressions are obtained
 () = 
2
2 +
(− ) (1− ) +  (1− )
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.53)
 () = 122 +
(− 1) (1− )−  ( − ) (1− )
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.54)
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where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the investment costs.
In order to investigate the profitability of joining the emission agreement at
 ∈ (˜() ˜], the total costs function of a signatory country given by (2.54)
should be compared by the total costs function of playing fully non-cooperatively.
By substituting  = 1 in (2.53), the total costs function of the fully non-cooperative
equilibrium in this case are obtained as follows
 = 
2
2 +
(− ) (1− ) +  (1− )
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.55)
Now the diﬀerence between (2.55) and (2.54) is taken as follows
 −  () = (1− )22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))
¡2+  + 1− ¢  (2.56)
where  = (1 + ) ( − 1)  and  =  (1− )− 2 (− 1− ).
By analyzing the diﬀerence in total costs given by (2.56), it is found that total costs
of signatory country are higher than total costs of the non-cooperative equilibrium
for any level of cooperation higher than ∗, where ∗ is given by
∗ = 1
2
¡
( − 1) (1 + ) 2 + ( (1− ) + 2 (1 + ))  + 1− ¢  (2.57)
Thus, for any level of cooperation higher than ∗, the emission agreement is not
profitable in this range of marginal damages. Next, it is important to examine the
profitability of the grand coalition by substituting for  =  in total costs function
given by (2.54) which yields
 () = 122 +
(− 1) (1− )
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.58)
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and then taking the diﬀerence between (2.55) and (2.58) as follows
 −  () = (1− ) (
2 ( − 1) (1 + )−  ( − 2) (1 + ) + 1− )
22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1)) 
(2.59)
which is negative for any   ∗, where ∗ is given by
∗ =  (1 + ) (2− ) + (1− ) (1− ) (1 + )  (2.60)
By taking the diﬀerence between  and ∗ as follows
 −∗ = (1 + ) ( (1− )−  (2− ))− (1− ) (1− ) (1 + ) 
it is found that the diﬀerence is positive for any  higher than ∗, where ∗ is given
by
∗ = 
2 ( − 1) +  (2− ) + 1
 ( − 2)− 2 ( − 1) +  (2.61)
Next, we compare ∗ with ˆ as follows
ˆ − ∗ =  ( (1− ) +  − 3) (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1)) 
which is positive for any   −3−1, that converts to 1 at the high values of  .
According to that, the diﬀerences in the total costs given by (2.59) is negative for any
level of marginal damages higher than ˆ and the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 4 The grand coalition of the emission agreement is not profitable in the
range of marginal damages  ∈ (˜() ˜], while it could be profitable at some level
of cooperation lower than the grand coalition.
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The following numerical example proofs this result. In this numerical example,
the total costs of both non-signatories and signatories given by (2.53) and (2.54) are
calculated in the interval of marginal damages  ∈ (˜() ˜], under the following
assumptions
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 05  = 075
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 2 901 2 2 998 3 094 8 3 191 5 3 288 3 3 385 3 4812 3 579
 2 088 7 2 185 5 2 282 3 2 379 2 475 8 2 573 2 669 2 766
 0619 0522 2 0425 4 0328 7 0231 9 0135 0038 3 −0058
 21: Profitability of emission agreement at ∈(˜() ˜]
Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium given by  = 2707 7 and the total
costs of signatories countries.
Notice that if   ˘ and  ∈ (ˆ ˜], the analysis is identical to that presented
above and the previous proposition is applied here. The following numerical example
proofs this result using the same total costs functions as the previous numerical
example, but now assuming that   ˘.
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 05  = 025
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 62163 62420 62676 62933 63189 63446 63702 6396
 6 070 5 6 096 2 6 121 8 6 147 4 6 173 1 6 198 7 6 2244 6 25
 0094 6 0068 9 0043 3 0017 7 −0008 −0034 −0059 −0085
 22: Profitability of emission agreement at ∈(ˆ˜]
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Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium given by  = 61651 and the total
costs of signatories countries.
Finally, when  is lower than ˆ, total costs are increasing with respect to the
investment in R&D for both non-signatories and signatories and the optimal policy
is not to invest. In this case, the total costs are given as follows
 () = 
2
2 +  −
2

¡ + 2 − ¢  (2.62)
 () = 
22
2 +  −
2

¡ + 2 − ¢  (2.63)
It is immediate that total costs for signatories are always higher than total costs
for non-signatories at any level of cooperation and we are in the standard model of
emissions abatement with linear damages.
2.3.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
We use stability conditions to investigate which is the level of participation the
emission agreement can achieve. First, we present the definition of coalitional stability
from d’Aspremont et al. (1983), which has been extensively used in the literature on
international environmental agreements.5
Definition 5 An agreement consisting of  signatories is stable if  () ≤  (−
1) for  = 1   and  () ≤  (+ 1) for  = 1   − 
The first inequality, which is also known as the internal stability condition, simply
means that any signatory country is at least as well-oﬀ staying in the agreement as
5We avoid to use the term self-enforcing in the definition because as has been pointed out by
McEvoy and Stranlund (2009) is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative
agreements, not to enforcing compliance with these agreements once they are signed.
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withdrawing from it, assuming that all other countries do not change their member-
ship decisions. The second inequality, which is also known as the external stability
condition, similarly requires any non-signatory to be at least as well-oﬀ remaining
a non-signatory as joining the agreement, assuming once again, that all other coun-
tries do not change their membership decisions. To check the stability conditions the
auxiliary function Ω() =  () −  ( − 1) is used. If Ω() = 0 has a unique
positive solution and Ω() is increasing around this positive solution, then there is
a self-enforcing agreement given by the greatest natural number on the left of the
positive solution to equation Ω() = 0 provided that this number is equal to or lower
than  If we represent this number by ˜ we have that Ω(˜) is negative and the
internal stability condition is satisfied. Moreover, as Ω() is an increasing function,
Ω(˜+ 1) where ˜+ 1 is the lowest natural number on the right of the positive solu-
tion to equation Ω() = 0 must be positive which means that  (˜+ 1) is greater
than  (˜) which according to Definition 1 means that an agreement consisting of
˜ countries is also externally stable.6 If  is lower than ˜ the grand coalition could
be stable provided that Ω() is negative. If Ω() = 0 has more than one positive
solutions, we could have more than one self-enforcing agreement.
Next, the stability analysis is performed to investigate whether there exists a
stable emission agreement. As the emission agreement is not profitable except for
some level of participation when the level of marginal damages is in the range of
 ∈ (˜() ˜], we study next the stability of the agreement in this range only, as
no country will have the incentive to participate in the agreement in the other ranges
of marginal damages. Thus, the auxiliary function Ω() is built using the total costs
functions given by (2.53) and (2.54).
6If the positive solution to Ω() = 0 is a natural number. The self-enforcing agreement consists
of a number of signatories equal to the solution to the equation and the internal stability condition
is satisfied as an equality.
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Ω() =  ()−  (− 1)
Ω() = − (1− ) (
2 ( − 1) (1 + ) +  ( − 2) (1− ) + (1− ))
22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  0
This means that the internal stability condition is satisfied for any level of coop-
eration regardless the level of . By investigating the stability of the grand coalition,
we find that Ω() = Ω(), which means that the internal stability condition for the
grand coalition is satisfied and the following proposition is concluded7
Proposition 6 The grand coalition of the emission agreement is stable for any level
of marginal damages  ∈ (˜() ˜].
This proposition is already proofed in table 2.1, as it is clear that  () 
 (−1) for any level of cooperation. However, the grand coalition of the emission
agreement will not be signed because it is not profitable for signatories.
According to the previous analysis, it is concluded that allowing for some tech-
nological spillovers (although it is not perfect) in the emission agreement reduces the
incentives of countries to deviate and act as free-rider, which in turn increases the
participation for some levels higher than three countries (as in the standard model)
but lower than the grand coalition which is not profitable in this case.
In the following sections, we analyze other types of agreements that include tech-
nological cooperation in diﬀerent ways in order to investigate if this technological
cooperation has an eﬀect on the profitability of signatories and their decisions on the
participation or not.
7Notice that for the grand coalition, there is no need to investigate the external stability condition.
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2.4 Emission and R&D Agreement without Information Ex-
change
An emission and R&D agreement without information exchange is modeled as a
three-stage game as the emission agreement. Given the level of participation and
the investment in R&D of all countries, at the third stage, the emission game, non-
signatory countries choose their emissions acting non-cooperatively and taking the
emissions of all other countries as given in order to minimize their own costs of
controlling pollution. On the other hand, signatories countries choose the emissions
acting cooperatively in order to minimize the aggregate costs of the agreement. At the
second stage, the R&D investment game, unlike the emission agreement, signatories
countries act cooperatively so as to minimize agreement total costs, while each non-
signatory country acts non-cooperatively to decide its own R&D level given the R&D
investments of other countries. The marginal costs of abatement, as in the emission
agreement, are decreased by the country’s R&D eﬀorts in addition to some spillover
from other countries’ R&D. Finally, the membership game is played in the first stage
of the game.
2.4.1 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment Game
In this section, stages two and three are solved, as done in the emission agreement,
by backward induction assuming that in first stage  countries with  ≥ 2 have
signed the agreement. As signatories cooperate while non-signatories countries act
non-cooperatively at the third stage of the game, the emissions, the solution of this
stage is identical to the solution that has been developed in the emission agreement.
Next, the partial agreement Nash equilibrium of the investment game is calcu-
lated. As the non-signatories countries do not cooperate at this stage, the solution
is identical to the solution that has been developed in the emission agreement for
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non-signatories. Thus, non-signatories countries will invest in R&D provided that
the marginal damages are higher than ˆ where ˆ is given by (2.12).
For signatories countries, as they are minimizing the agreement total costs given
by
 =
X
=1
 = 
32
2 + 
µ
 −  ( + 
2 − )− 
¶
+
X
=1

their optimization problem which yields the optimal investment is given as follows
min
{1}
 = 
32
2 + 
µ
 −  ( + 
2 − )− 
¶
+
X
=1
 (2.64)
 1
µ
 − 
¶
− − ≥  (2.65)
 ≥ 0 (2.66)
where  is given by (2.26).
By taking the first derivative of the agreement total costs function given by (2.64)
with respect to investment in R&D, taking into account that  = 1+( −1),
the following critical value of marginal damages defined by condition  = 0
is obtained
ˆ1() = 1(1 + ( − 1))  (2.67)
Now, we have that the critical value of  which triggers investment in R&D de-
pends on the number of signatories. It is easy to see that ˆ1() decreases with respect
to the level of cooperation and takes values between
ˆ1() = 1(1 + ( − 1)) ≤ ˆ

1() ≤ ˆ1(2) = 12(1 + ( − 1)) 
Therefore, when  is greater than ˆ1(2), the total costs of the agreement are de-
creasing with respect to investment independently of the level of participation, and
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signatories invest in R&D until emissions are completely eliminated. However, when
 is in the interval (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], the total costs of the agreement are decreasing
depending on the number of signatories. In this case, for a given value of , it is
necessary a minimum of cooperation, given by  = ˆ1(), to make the investment in
R&D profitable. If this is not the case, signatories do not invest in clean technolo-
gies and cooperation is not enough to promote the replacement of fossil fuels. The
condition  = ˆ1() yields the following solution for 
ˆ1 = 1(1 + ( − 1))  (2.68)
Thus, given  in the interval (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], participation in the agreement must
be at least equal to the lowest natural number on the right of ˆ1 to make it profitable
for signatories to invest in R&D. Moreover, as ˆ1() is a decreasing function with
respect to  , the minimum level of participation decreases as the marginal damages
increase.
As we have clarified, the decision on investing in R&D for both signatories and
non-signatories depends critically on the value of marginal damages. Taking into
account this result, the optimal decision of the countries can be characterized as
follows: If the damages are great enough, in particular when   ˆ, both signatories
and non-signatories invest in R&D. If  belongs to the interval (ˆ1(2) ˆ], only
signatories invest in R&D independently of the number of signatories. However, if 
belongs to the interval (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], signatories will invest in R&D provided that the
participation is greater than the critical value given by (2.68). Finally, if  is equal
or lower than ˆ1() both signatories and non-signatories countries are not going
to invest. Figure 2.1 shows which is the pattern of investment for signatories and
non-signatories depending on the marginal damages and the number of signatories.
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Figure 2.1: Decisions on investment in R&D for signatories and non-signatories
of the emission and R&D agreement without information exchange.
Conjecture 7 ˆ1() defines the stable participation.
Next, the level of investment at the diﬀerent levels of marginal damages is cal-
culated. Three possibilities must be considered. First, both signatories and non-
signatories invest in R&D. Second, only signatories invest. Third, both signatories
and non-signatories do not find profitable to invest in R&D.
When   ˆ, both types of countries invest in R&D to eliminate completely
the emissions. In this case, the optimization problem of non-signatories’ countries is
the same presented by (2.13)-(2.15). Nevertheless, for signatories countries, as they
minimize the agreement total costs, the optimization problem is given as follows
min
{1}
 = 
2
X
=1
¡ − ¢2 + X
=1
 (2.69)
where the conditions on eﬀective investment are the same given by (2.34)-(2.35).
The solution of the optimization problem for signatories yields the following reaction
function of signatories’ investment
 =

³
 −  ( − )
´
− 1
2 (1 +  (− 1))  (2.70)
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while the reaction function of non-signatories’ investment is still given by (2.36) which
confirms again that the investments in R&D are strategic substitutes.
The solution of both (2.36) and (2.70) yields the optimal level of investments for
both non-signatories and signatories as follows
 = ( − 1) (1− )−  (− 1)2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.71)
 = (− 1) (1− ) +  ( − ) (− 1)2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.72)
such that the eﬀective investment for signatories is now given by
 = − 12  (2.73)
while the eﬀective investment for non-signatories is still given by (2.17).
We already know from the solution of fully non-cooperative equilibrium that non-
signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (2.17) satisfies the constraint on eﬀective
investment given by (2.14) for any level of marginal damages higher than ˜ which
is given by (2.18). However, for signatories countries, it is found that the level of
eﬀective investment given by (2.73) satisfies the constraint given by (2.34) at any
level of marginal damages higher than or equal to
˜1() = 12  (2.74)
which is lower than ˜ and higher than ˆ provided that  ≥ ˘1 where
˘1 = 
2 − 1
 − 1  (2.75)
and vice versa. By comparing ˜1() with ˆ1(2), it is found that ˜1() is higher than
ˆ1(2) for any  ≥ ∗1 where
∗1 = 
2 − 2
2 ( − 1)  (2.76)
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and vice versa.8
As the order of the critical values of marginal damages will be changed depending
on the value of the diﬀusion parameter, three possibilities should be analyzed. First,
if  ≥ ˘1, the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˜1()  ˆ  ˆ1(2)  ˆ1()
Second, if  ∈ (∗1 ˘1], the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˜1()  ˆ1(2)  ˆ1()
and finally, if   ∗1, the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˆ1(2)  ˜1()  ˆ1()
Notice that for high levels of cooperation, the value of ˘1 is going to be very high,
even higher than 1 for some levels of cooperation. As it is more suitable to assume
that  is not very high, our analysis for profitability of joining the agreement will be
focused on the second and third cases when  ∈ (∗1 ˘1] and   ∗1. However, the
levels of investments and the corresponding total costs functions of non-signatories
and signatories countries will be analyzed for the diﬀerent three cases.
In all cases, if  ≥ ˜, as the levels of eﬀective investment for both non-signatories
and signatories given by (2.17) and (2.73) satisfy, in this interval of marginal damages,
8Notice that ˘1  ∗1, then any   ˘1 is also higher than ∗1.
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the constraints on eﬀective investment for both types given by (2.14) and (2.34)
respectively, the following expressions of total costs are obtained 9
 () = 122 +
( − 1) (1− )−  (− 1)
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.77)
 () = 1222 +
(− 1) (1− ) +  ( − ) (− 1)
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.78)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the investment cost.
Next, we analyze the case when  ≥ ˘1. If  ∈ (˜1() ˜], as any level of
marginal damages in this interval is higher than the level of marginal damages given
by (2.74), thus the level of eﬀective investment given by (2.73) satisfies the constraint
on eﬀective investment for signatories countries given by (2.34). However, the level of
eﬀective investment for non-signatories given by (2.17) doesn’t satisfy, in this interval
of marginal damages, the constraint on their eﬀective investment given by (2.14),
and therefore non-signatories countries reduce their eﬀective investment to the level
given by (2.6). According to that, the reaction function of signatories’ investment is
the same given by (2.70), while the reaction function for non-signatories is given as
follows
 =
− − 
 (1 +  ( − − 1))  (2.79)
The solution of both reaction functions yields the following levels of investment
for non-signatories and signatories
 = ( − ) (1− ) +  (1− )2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.80)
9We avoid analyzing the profitability in this case, as it will be concluded in the analysis of the
Nash equilibrium of the membership agreement that the agreement is not stable in this interval of
marginal damages.
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 =  (1− ) +  ( − )− (1 +  ( − − 1))2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.81)
Doing the substitutions for eﬀective investment in the total costs functions of
non-signatories and signatories, the following expressions are obtained
 () = 
2
2 +
( − ) (1− ) +  (1− )
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.82)
 () = 1222 +
 (1− ) +  ( − )− (1 +  ( − − 1))
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  (2.83)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the investment costs.
Next, if  ∈ (ˆ ˜1()], the levels of eﬀective investment for non-signatories and
signatories are given by (2.6) and (2.24) respectively. In this case the solution of the
second stage is the same as that developed in the emission agreement where the total
costs of non-signatories and signatories are given by (2.47) and (2.48) respectively
and the same proposition of the emission agreement is directly concluded here
Proposition 8 Emission and R&D agreement without information exchange is not
profitable in the range of marginal damages  ∈ (ˆ ˜1()].
Now, if  ∈ (ˆ1(2) ˆ], as marginal damages are low enough to make it unprof-
itable for non-signatories to invest in R&D, then the level of investment for signatories
countries can be obtained as follows
 = ( −

 )
(1 + (− 1))  (2.84)
Notice that the level of investment is decreasing with the level of cooperation.
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The eﬀective level of investment for signatories is still the same given by (2.24),
while for the non-signatories countries it becomes
 =  = ( −

 )
(1 + (− 1))  (2.85)
while the global eﬀective investment is given by
 = 
¡ −  ¢ (1 + ( − 1))
(1 + (− 1))  (2.86)
By substituting (2.86) in (2.25), the global emissions, which is the sum of non-
signatories emissions, is given as follows
 = ( − )(¯(1− ) +

 (2 − ))
(1 + (− 1))  (2.87)
Doing the substitution of the eﬀective investments in the total costs functions,
the following expressions for the total costs of non-signatories and signatories are
obtained
 () = 
2
2 +
( − )(¯(1− ) +  (2 − ))
(1 + (− 1))  (2.88)
 () = 
22
2 +
( − )(¯(1− ) +  (2 − ))
(1 + (− 1)) +
( −  )
(1 + (− 1))  (2.89)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the environmental damages, while the third term in the total costs of signatories
countries represents the investment costs.
However, if  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], the total costs functions for non-signatories and
signatories are still the same given by (2.88) and (2.89) until we reach to the lowest
natural number on the right of the curve ˆ1() in figure 2.1, at this point the total costs
function of signatories countries is still the same given by (2.89), while non-signatories’
total costs function should be changed taking into account that by moving form the
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area above the curve ˆ1() in figure 2.1 to the area below, signatories countries will
react to the exit reducing investment to zero. For zero investment, the total costs of
non-signatories is given by
 () = 
2
2 + 
µ
 − 
¡ + 2 − ¢¶  (2.90)
Second, if  ∈ (∗1 ˘1] and  ∈ (ˆ ˜] the total costs for non-signatories are
given by (2.82), while given by (2.83) for signatories countries. However, if  ∈ (˜1()
ˆ], signatories countries invest to eliminate the emissions while non-signatories coun-
tries don’t invest at all. In this case, the global level of emissions is given by the sum
of non-signatories emissions as follows
 =
−X
=1
 =
−X
=1
µ
 −  − 


¶
= ( − )
µ
 − 
¶
− 
−X
=1
  (2.91)
where
−X
=1
 =   =
−X
=1
Ã

X
=1

!

Now, the optimization problem of the second stage for signatories countries should
be represented as follows
min
{1}
 = 
2
X
=1
¡ − ¢2 + µ( − )µ − 
¶
−  
¶
+
X
=1

  = (1 +  (− 1)) ≥ 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (2.92)
 = (1 +  (− 1)) ≤  (2.93)
The solution of the previous optimization problem yields the following level of
investment and eﬀective investment for signatories countries
 =  ( ( − ) + )− 12 (1 +  (− 1))  (2.94)
 =  ( ( − ) + )− 12  (2.95)
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such that the condition on eﬀective investment given by (2.92) is satisfied at any level
of marginal damages higher than
˘1() = 1 (+  ( − ))  (2.96)
which is lower than ˆ1(). The critical value of marginal damages ˘1() diﬀers from
˜1() given by (2.74), because ˘1() is calculated assuming that investment of non-
signatories equal to zero, while ˜1() was calculated assuming that non-signatories
investment is positive.
As ˘1()  ˆ1()  ˆ1(2), it can be concluded that the solution in the range of
marginal damages given by  ∈ (ˆ1(2) ˆ] is the same as presented above, such that
the total costs functions are given by
 () = 
2
2 + 
µ
( − )
µ
 − 
¶
−  
¶
 (2.97)
 () = (1−  ( − ))222
2
+ 
µ
( − )
µ
 − 
¶
−  
¶
+  (2.98)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the environmental damages, while the third term in the total costs of signatories
countries represents the investment costs. Notice that  is given by (2.94), while  
is given as follows
  =  ( − )
µ ( ( − ) + )− 1
2 (1 +  (− 1))
¶
 (2.99)
However, if  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], the total costs functions for non-signatories and
signatories are still the same given by (2.97) and (2.98) until we reach to the lowest
natural number on the right of the curve ˆ1() in figure 2.1, at this point the total costs
function of signatories countries is still the same given by (2.98), while non-signatories’
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total costs function is given by (2.90) assuming that signatories investment equal to
zero.
Finally, if   ∗1, it is clear that for any level of marginal damages lower than
ˆ, the critical value of marginal damages given by (2.74) doesn’t play role in sat-
isfying the constraint over signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (2.92) and the
new critical value of marginal damages (2.96) is the one that plays this role. Thus,
it can be concluded that the analysis, at the diﬀerent intervals of marginal damages,
under the assumption   ∗1 is exactly the same as the analysis developed under the
assumption  ∈ (∗1 ˘1].
Next, the profitability of joining the emission and R&D agreement without in-
formation exchange is analyzed, numerically for any   ˘1, at the diﬀerent levels
of marginal damages. First, In order to investigate the profitability of joining the
emission and R&D agreement without information exchange at  ∈ (ˆ ˜], the
total costs function of a signatory country given by (2.83) should be compared by the
total costs function of playing fully non-cooperatively. By substituting for  = 1 in
(2.82), the total costs function of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium in this case
is the same given by (2.55). By taking the diﬀerence between (2.55) and (2.83), the
following proposition is concluded
Proposition 9 Emission and R&D agreement without information exchange is prof-
itable at  ∈ (˜1() ˜] only for the high levels of cooperation.
The following numerical example proofs this result where
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 05  = 025
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 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 61138 6088 6062 6037 6011 5986 59599 5934
 61902 6207 9 621 6 204 6192 6177 61598 6141
 −0025 −0043 −0045 −0038 −0027 −0012 00053 0024
 23: Profitability of emission and R&D agreement without information exchange at ∈(ˆ˜]
Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium (in this case given by  = 61651)
and the total costs of signatories countries.
Second, the profitability is examined at both intervals of marginal damages  ∈
(ˆ1(2) ˆ] and  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)] and the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 10 Emission and R&D agreement without information exchange is prof-
itable at  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ].
The following numerical example proofs this proposition for  ∈ (ˆ1(2) ˆ] by
using the total costs of both non-signatories and signatories given by (2.97) and (2.98),
under the assumptions
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 027  = 025
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 186 1361 9903 7035 5942 2889 1 336 00182
 3196 2507 1992 1593 1275 1015 7 977 6139
 43 1119 1634 20 33 2351 2611 28 28 30121
 24, Profitability of emission and R&D agreement without information exchange at ∈(ˆ1(2)ˆ]
Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium (in this case given by  = 36 259)
and the total costs of signatories countries.
Finally, the previous proposition is proofed for  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)] using the total
costs of both non-signatories and signatories given by (2.97) and (2.98), until we reach
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to the lowest natural number on the right of the curve ˆ1(), the total costs function
of non-signatories is replaced by (2.90). Under the assumptions
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 025
if it is assumed that  = 011, the minimum level of cooperation needed to make the
investment in R&D profitable is given by
ˆ1 = 2 797 2
According to that, the profitability of  = 3, is examined using total costs func-
tions given by (2.90) and (2.98) as follows
 = 21 943  (2) = 21 93  (3) = 20 971  = 0972 
However, the profitability of any level of cooperation higher than  = 3 is exam-
ined using total costs functions given by (2.97) and (2.98) and the results are shown
in next table
 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 5 639 9 4 108 5 2 920 5 1 971 8 1 196 5 0550 42 000303
 17 041 14 090 11 794 9 956 8 8 453 5 7 200 1 6 138 5
 −2149 0802 3 098 4 935 2 6 438 5 7 691 9 8 753 5
 25, Profitability of emission and R&D agreement without information exchange at ∈(ˆ1()ˆ1(2)]
Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium (in this case given by  = 14 982)
and the total costs of signatories countries.
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2.4.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
In this section, the stability analysis is studied to investigate whether there exist
a stable emission and R&D agreement without information exchange or not. For
 ≥ ˜, the auxiliary function Ω() is built using the total costs functions given by
(2.77) and (2.78)
Ω() = 
2 (1 +  ( − 2) + 2 ( − 1))− 2 (1 +  ( − 1)) + 1 +  ( − 2)− 2 ( − 1)
222 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1)) 
(2.100)
which is a convex function that has a minimum at
 = (1 +  ( − 1))
(1 +  ( − 2) + 2 ( − 1))  (2.101)
At the minimum given by (2.101), the auxiliary function Ω() given by (2.100) is
positive, which means that the agreement is not stable for any level of cooperation.
Thus, for the grand coalition, the analysis of the auxiliary function Ω() concludes
the same result as follows
Ω() = 
2 (2 − 1) ( − 1) +  (2 ( − 4) + 3 − 2) +2 − 2 + 1
222 (1− ) (1 +  ( − 1))  0
(2.102)
and the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 11 At the high values of marginal damages, in particular if  ≥ ˜,
the emission and R&D agreement without information exchange is not stable for any
level of cooperation.
By analyzing the previous numerical example, looking at the total costs of non-
signatories and signatories at the diﬀerent levels of marginal damages, the following
proposition is concluded
58
Proposition 12 Emission and R&D agreement without information exchange is only
stable at the level of cooperation given by the lowest natural number on the right of
the curve ˆ1() in the interval  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)].
2.5 Emission Agreement with Information Exchange on R&D
Investment
The emission agreement with information exchange on R&D investment is mod-
eled as a three stage game as the emission agreement. The main diﬀerence between
the two agreements is that the signatories countries in the emission agreement with
information exchange share their R&D eﬀorts and avoid the duplication of R&D
activities. As a result of sharing R&D eﬀorts, the marginal costs of abatement of
signatories countries are decreased by the sum of all R&D eﬀorts in the agreement,
in addition to some spillover from non-signatories countries’ R&D investments, i.e.
spillover is increased for signatories because of the agreement. Then if all countries
are in the agreement, the eﬀective investment in R&D is given by
 =  =
X
=1
  = 1  
2.5.1 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment Game
In this section, stages two and three are solved, as done in the emission agreement,
by backward induction assuming that in first stage  countries with  ≥ 2 have
signed the agreement. As signatories cooperate while non-signatories countries act
non-cooperatively at the third stage of the game, the emissions, the solution of this
stage is identical to the solution that has been developed in the emission agreement.
Nevertheless, the global level of investment is now given by
 =
−X
=1
Ã
 + 
Ã X
=1
 +
−−1X
=1

!!
+
X
=1
Ã X
=1
 + 
Ã−X
=1

!!
 (2.103)
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Next, the partial agreement Nash equilibrium of the investment game is calcu-
lated. As the non-signatories countries do not cooperate at this stage, the solution
is identical to the solution that has been developed in the emission agreement for
non-signatories. Thus, non-signatories countries will invest in R&D provided that
the marginal damages are higher than ˆ where ˆ is given by (2.12).
For signatories countries, acting non-cooperatively at this stage, the optimization
problem that yields the optimal investment is given as follows
min
 () = 
22
2 + 
µ
 −  ( + 
2 − )− 
¶
+  (2.104)
 1
µ
 − 
¶
−− −  ≥  (2.105)
 ≥ 0  = 1   (2.106)
where  is given by (2.103).
By taking the first derivative of the total costs function given by (2.104) with
respect to investment in R&D, taking into account that  = + ( −), the
following critical value of marginal damages defined by condition   = 0 is
obtained
ˆ2() = 1(+ ( − ))  (2.107)
As in the emission and R&D agreement without information exchange, the critical
value of  which triggers investment in R&D depends in the number of signatories. It
is easy to see that ˆ2() decreases with respect to the level of cooperation and takes
values between
ˆ2() = 1 ≤ ˆ

2() ≤ ˆ2(2) = 1(2 + ( − 2)) 
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When  is greater that ˆ2(2), the total costs of the agreement are decreasing with
respect to investment independently of the level of participation, and signatories
invest in R&D until emissions are completely eliminated. However, when  is in the
interval (ˆ2() ˆ2(2)], the total costs of the agreement are decreasing depending on
the number of signatories. In this case, it is necessary a minimum of cooperation,
given by  = ˆ2(), to make the investment in R&D profitable. If this is not the
case, signatories do not invest in clean technologies and cooperation is not enough to
promote the replacement of fossil fuels. The condition  = ˆ2() yields the following
solution for 
ˆ2 = 1
1− 
µ
1
 −
¶
 (2.108)
The decision on investing in R&D for both signatories and non-signatories depends
critically on the marginal damages in the same way as declared in the emission and
R&D agreement without information exchange. Figure 2.2 shows which is the pattern
of investment for signatories and non-signatories depending on the marginal damages
and the number of signatories.
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Figure 2.2: Decisions on investment in R&D for signatories and non-signatories
of the emission agreement with information exchange on R&D investment.
Conjecture 13 ˆ2() defines the stable participation.
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Next, the level of investment at the diﬀerent levels of marginal damages is cal-
culated. The same three possibilities that have been considered in the emission and
R&D agreement without information exchange are considered here. First, both sig-
natories and non-signatories invest in R&D. Second, only signatories invest. Third,
both signatories and non-signatories do not find profitable to invest in R&D.
When   ˆ, both types of countries invest in R&D to eliminate completely
the emissions. In this case, the optimization problem of non-signatories’ countries
is the same presented by (2.13)-(2.15). Nevertheless, for signatories countries, the
optimization problem is given as follows
min
 = 2
¡ − ¢2 +  (2.109)
  =  +  ( − ) ≥ 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (2.110)
 =  +  ( − ) ≤  (2.111)
The solution of the optimization problem for signatories yields the following reac-
tion function of signatories’ investment
 =

³
 −  ( − )
´
− 1
2  (2.112)
while the reaction function of non-signatories’ investment is still given by (2.36) such
that the investments in R&D are strategic substitutes.
The solution of both (2.36) and (2.112) yields the optimal levels of investments
for both non-signatories and signatories as follows
 =  − 12 (1 +  ( − ))  (2.113)
 =  − 12 (1 +  ( − ))  (2.114)
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Although signatories’ investment is less than non-signatories’ investment, the
eﬀective investment for both types of countries is the same, as in the fully non-
cooperative equilibrium, given by (2.17). We already know from the solution of fully
non-cooperative equilibrium that non-signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (2.17)
satisfies the constraint on eﬀective investment given by (2.14) for any level of marginal
damages higher than ˜ which is given by (2.18). However, for signatories countries,
it is found that the level of eﬀective investment given by (2.17) satisfies the constraint
given by (2.110) at any level of marginal damages higher than or equal to ˜() given
by (2.38). It is known from the analysis of emission agreement that ˜() is lower
than ˜ and higher than or equal to ˆ provided that  ≥ ˘ and by comparison, it
is found that ˜() ≥ ˆ2() for any  ≥ ∗2 where
∗2 = − 2 − 2  (2.115)
and vice versa.
As the order of the critical values of marginal damages will be changed depending
on the value of the diﬀusion parameter, three possibilities should be analyzed. First,
if  ≥ ˘, the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˜()  ˆ  ˆ2(2)  ˆ2()
Second, if  ∈ (∗2 ˘], the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˜()  ˆ2(2)  ˆ2()
and finally, if   ∗2, the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˆ2(2)  ˜()  ˆ2()
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For high levels of cooperation, the value of ˘ is going to be very high, reaches to 1
at the level of full cooperation. As it is more suitable to assume that  is not very high,
our analysis for profitability of joining the agreement will be focused on the second
and third cases when  ∈ (∗2 ˘] and   ∗2. However, the levels of investments and
the corresponding total costs functions of non-signatories and signatories countries
will be analyzed for the diﬀerent three cases.
In all cases, if  ≥ ˜, as the level of eﬀective investment for both non-signatories
and signatories given by (2.17) satisfies, in this interval of marginal damages, the con-
straints on eﬀective investment for both types given by (2.14) and (2.110) respectively,
the following expressions of total costs are obtained
 () = 122 +
 − 1
2 (1 +  ( − ))  (2.116)
 () = 122 +
 − 1
2 (1 +  ( − ))  (2.117)
In order to investigate the profitability of joining the agreement at this interval
of marginal damages, the total costs function of a signatory country given by (2.117)
is compared by the total costs function of playing fully non-cooperatively given by
substituting for  = 1 in (2.116) which is the same given by (2.21). The comparison
yields the following expression
 ()−  = −( − 1) (− 1) (1 +  ( − − 1))2 (1 +  ( − )) (1 +  ( − 1))  0
which means that total costs of signatories are lower than total costs of playing fully
non-cooperatively and the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 14 The emission agreement with information exchange on R&D in-
vestment is profitable at  ≥ ˜.
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First, we analyze the case when  ≥ ˘. If  ∈ (˜() ˜], as any level of marginal
damages in this interval is higher than the level of marginal damages given by (2.38),
thus the level of eﬀective investment given by (2.17) satisfies the constraint on eﬀective
investment for signatories countries given by (2.110). However, this level of eﬀective
investment doesn’t satisfy, in this interval of marginal damages, the constraint on
non-signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (2.14), and therefore non-signatories
countries reduce their eﬀective investment to the level given by (2.6). According to
that, the reaction function of non-signatories’ investment is the same given by (2.79),
while for signatories it is given as follows
 =

³
 −  ( − )
´
− 1
2  (2.118)
The solution of the reaction functions yields the following levels of investment for
non-signatories and signatories
 =  (1− ) +  − 2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.119)
 =  (1− ) +  ( − )− (1 +  ( − − 1))2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.120)
Doing the substitutions for eﬀective investment in the total costs functions of
non-signatories and signatories, the following expressions are obtained
 () = 
2
2 +
 (1− ) +  − 
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.121)
 () = 122 +
 (1− ) +  ( − )− (1 +  ( − − 1))
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.122)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the investment costs.
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Next, if  ∈ (ˆ ˜()], the levels of eﬀective investment for non-signatories
and signatories are given by (2.6) and (2.24) respectively. In this case, the reaction
functions for non-signatories and signatories are given by
 =
− − 
 (1 +  ( − − 1))  (2.123)
 = − −  ( − )


  (2.124)
The solution to these reaction functions yields the following levels of investment
 =  (1− ) +  (− 1) (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.125)
 =  (1− ) +  (− 1)−  (− 1) (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.126)
According to that, total costs are given by
 () = 
2
2 +
 (1− ) +  (− 1)
 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.127)
 () = 
22
2 +
 (1− ) +  (− 1)−  (− 1)
 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.128)
Now, if  ∈ (ˆ1(2) ˆ], as marginal damages are low enough to make it unprof-
itable for non-signatories to invest in R&D, then the level of investment for signatories
countries can be obtained as follows
 = 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (2.129)
where the level of investment is decreasing with the level of cooperation.
66
The eﬀective level of investment for signatories is still the same given by (2.24),
while for the non-signatories countries it becomes
 = 
µ
 − 
¶
 (2.130)
which is increasing with the spillover, while the global eﬀective investment is given
by
 = 1
µµ
 − 
¶
((1− ) + )
¶
 (2.131)
Finally, adding the emissions for non-signatories, we obtain the global emissions
as follows
 = ( − )
µ
¯ − 
µ
 − 
¶¶
 (2.132)
Doing the substitution of the eﬀective investments in the total costs functions,
the following expressions for the total costs of non-signatories and signatories are
obtained
 () = 
2
2 + ( − )
µ
¯ − 
µ
 − 
¶¶
  = 1  −  (2.133)
 () = 
22
2 + ( − )
µ
¯ − 
µ
 − 
¶¶
+
1

µ
 − 
¶
  = 1 
(2.134)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the environmental damages, while the third term in the total costs of signatories
countries represents the investment costs.
However, if  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], the total costs functions for non-signatories and
signatories are still the same given by (2.133) and (2.134) until we reach to the
lowest natural number on the right of the curve ˆ2() in figure 2.2, at this point the
total costs function of signatories countries is still the same given by (2.134), while
non-signatories’ total costs function should be changed taking into account that by
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moving form the area above the curve ˆ2() in figure 2.2 to the area below, signatories
countries will react to the exit reducing investment to zero. For zero investment, the
total costs of non-signatories is given by (2.90).
Second, if  ∈ (∗2 ˘] and  ∈ (ˆ ˜], the total costs for non-signatories
are given by (2.121), while given by (2.122) for signatories countries. However, if
 ∈ (˜() ˆ], signatories countries invest to eliminate the emissions while non-
signatories countries don’t invest. In this case, the global level of emissions is given
by (2.91). Now, the optimization problem of the second stage for signatories countries
should be represented as follows
min
{}
 () = 2
¡ − ¢2 + µ( − )µ − 
¶
−  
¶
+ 
  =  ≥ 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (2.135)
 =  ≤  (2.136)
The solution of the previous problem yields the following level of investment and
eﬀective investment for signatories countries
 =  ( ( − ) + )− 12  (2.137)
 =  ( ( − ) + )− 12  (2.138)
such that the condition on eﬀective investment given by (2.135) is satisfied at any
level of marginal damages higher than
˘2() = 1 (+  ( − ))  (2.139)
which is equal to ˆ2(). The critical value of marginal damages ˘2() diﬀers from
˜() given by (2.38), because ˘2() is calculated assuming that investment of non-
signatories equal to zero, while ˜() was calculated assuming that non-signatories
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investment is positive. As ˘2() = ˆ2()  ˆ2(2), it can be concluded that the
solution in the range of marginal damages given by  ∈ (ˆ2(2) ˆ] is the same as
presented above, and the total costs functions are given by
 () = 
2
2 + 
µ
( − )
µ
 − 
¶
−  
¶
 (2.140)
 () = (1−  ( − ))
2
222 + 
µ
( − )
µ
 − 
¶
−  
¶
+  (2.141)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the environmental damages, while the third term in the total costs of signatories
countries represents the investment costs. Notice that  is given by (2.137), while
  is given as follows
  =  ( − )
µ ( ( − ) + )− 1
2
¶
 (2.142)
However, if  ∈ (ˆ2() ˆ2(2)], the total costs functions for non-signatories and
signatories are still the same given by (2.140) and (2.141) until we reach to the lowest
natural number on the right of the curve ˆ2() in figure 2.2, at this point the total
costs function of signatories countries is still the same given by (2.141), while non-
signatories’ total costs function is given by (2.90) assuming that signatories investment
equal to zero.
Finally, if   ∗2, it is clear that for any level of marginal damages lower than ˆ,
the critical value of marginal damages given by (2.38) doesn’t play role in satisfying
the constraint over signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (2.135) and the new
critical value of marginal damages (2.139) is the one that plays this role. Thus, it
can be concluded that the analysis, at the diﬀerent intervals of marginal damages,
under the assumption   ∗2 is exactly the same as the analysis developed under the
assumption  ∈ (∗2 ˘].
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Next, the profitability of joining the emission agreement with information ex-
change is analyzed, numerically for any   ˘, at the diﬀerent levels of marginal
damages and the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 15 Emission agreement with information exchange on R&D investment
is profitable at any level of marginal damages.
The following numerical examples proof this result.
First, in order to investigate the profitability of joining emission agreement with
information exchange at  ∈ (ˆ ˜], the total costs function of a signatory country
given by (2.122) should be compared by the total costs function of playing fully non-
cooperatively. By substituting for  = 1 in (2.121), the total costs function of the
fully non-cooperative equilibrium in this case are the same given by (2.55). Under
the assumptions
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 05  = 025
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 7275 7996 8877 9979 11396 1329 1593 19896
 2543 215 1946 1847 18214 1861 1976 22
 3622 4015 4219 4318 43437 4304 4189 39651
 26: Profitability of emission agreement with information exchange at ∈(ˆ˜]
Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium (in this case given by  = 61651)
and the total costs of signatories countries.
Second, the profitability is examined at the interval of marginal damages  ∈
(ˆ2(2) ˆ] using the total costs of both non-signatories and signatories given by
(2.140) and (2.141), under the assumptions
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 027  = 025
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 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 2824 2422 20198 1617 1214 8104 4063 0018
 3481 2913 24118 1943 14925 1053 6 218 1 953
 1453 7126 12141 1683 21334 2573 3004 3431
 27: Profitability of emission agreement with information exchange at ∈(ˆ2(2)ˆ]
Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium (in this case given by  = 36 259)
and the total costs of signatories countries.
Finally, the profitability is examined at the interval of marginal damages  ∈
(ˆ2() ˆ2(2)] using the total costs of both non-signatories and signatories given by
(2.140) and (2.141), until we reach to the lowest natural number on the right of the
curve ˆ2(), the total costs function of non-signatories is replaced by (2.90). Under
the assumptions
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 025
if it is assumed that  = 011, the minimum level of cooperation needed to make the
investment in R&D profitable is given by
ˆ2 = 8 787 9
According to that, the profitability of  = 9, is examined using total costs func-
tions given by (2.90) and (2.141) as follows
 = 21 943  (8) = 21 604  (9) = 3 825 5  = 18 118 
However, the profitability of any level of cooperation higher than  = 9 is exam-
ined using total costs functions given by (2.140) and (2.141) as follows
 = 14 892  (9) = 1 660 3  (10) = 1 952 5  = 12 940
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2.5.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
In this section, the stability analysis is studied to investigate whether there exist
a stable emission agreement with information exchange on R&D investment or not.
For  ≥ ˜, by examining directly the stability of the grand coalition, the auxiliary
function Ω() is built using the total costs functions given by (2.116) and (2.117)
Ω() = −( − 1) ( − 1− )2 (1 + )  0
Finally, by analyzing the previous numerical example, looking at the total costs
of non-signatories and signatories at the diﬀerent levels of marginal damages lower
than ˜, the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 16 The grand coalition of emission agreement with information ex-
change is stable at for any  ≥ ˆ2(2). However, in the interval  ∈ (ˆ2() ˆ2(2)],
the unique stable agreement is given by the lowest natural number on the right of the
curve ˆ2().
2.6 Emission and R&DAgreement with Information Exchange
An emission and R&D agreement with information exchange is modeled as a three-
stage game as the emission and R&D agreement without information exchange. The
main diﬀerence between the two agreements is that the signatories countries in the
emission and R&D agreement with information exchange share their R&D eﬀorts and
avoid the duplication of the R&D activities. As a result of sharing the R&D eﬀorts,
the marginal costs of abatement of signatories countries are decreased by the sum of
all R&D eﬀorts in the agreement, in addition to some spillover from non-signatories
countries’ R&D investments, i.e. the spillover is increased for the signatories because
of the agreement.
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2.6.1 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment Game
In this section, stages two and three are solved, as done in the emission agreement
by backward induction assuming that in first stage  countries with  ≥ 2 have
signed the agreement. As signatories cooperate while non-signatories countries act
non-cooperatively at the third stage of the game, the emissions, the solution of this
stage is identical to the solution that has been developed in the emission agreement.
Nevertheless, the global level of investment is now given by (2.103).
Next, the partial agreement Nash equilibrium of the investment game is calcu-
lated. As non-signatories countries do not cooperate at this stage, the solution is
identical to the solution that has been developed in the emission agreement for non-
signatories. Thus, non-signatories countries will invest in R&D provided that the
marginal damages are higher than ˆ where ˆ is given by (2.12).
For signatories countries, as they are minimizing the agreement total costs, the
optimization problem that yields the optimal investment is the same given by (2.64),
while the constraints on investments are given by (2.105)-(2.106).
By taking the first derivative of the agreement total costs function given by (2.64)
with respect to investment in R&D, taking into account that  = + ( − ),
the following critical value of marginal damages defined by condition  = 0
is obtained
ˆ3() = 1 (+  ( − ))  (2.143)
As in the emission and R&D agreement without information exchange, the critical
value of  which triggers investment in R&D depends in the number of signatories.
It is easy to check that ˆ3() decreases with respect to the level of cooperation and
takes values between
ˆ3() = 12 ≤ ˆ

3() ≤ ˆ3(2) = 12 (2 +  ( − 2)) 
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When  is greater than ˆ3(2), the total costs of the agreement are decreasing with
respect to investment independently of the level of participation, and signatories
invest in R&D until emissions are completely eliminated. However, when  is in the
interval (ˆ3() ˆ3(2)], the total costs of the agreement are decreasing depending on
the number of signatories. If this is not the case, signatories do not invest in clean
technologies and cooperation is not enough to promote the replacement of fossil fuels.
This minimum level of cooperation, solved by the condition  = ˆ3(), is given by
the positive root of the following expression
 (1− ) ˆ23 + ˆ3 − 1 = 0 (2.144)
The decision on investing in R&D for both signatories and non-signatories depends
critically on the marginal damages in the same way as declared in the emission and
R&D agreement without information exchange. Figure 2.3 shows which is the pattern
of investment for signatories and non-signatories depending on the marginal damages
and the number of signatories.
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Figure 2.3: Decisions on investment in R&D for signatories and non-signatories
of emission and R&D agreement with information exchange.
Conjecture 17 ˆ3() defines the stable participation.
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Next, the level of investment for diﬀerent levels of marginal damages is calculated.
The same three possibilities that have been considered in the emission and R&D
agreement without information exchange are considered here. First, both signatories
and non-signatories invest in R&D. Second, only signatories invest. Third, both
signatories and non-signatories do not find profitable to invest in R&D. When  
ˆ, both types of countries invest in R&D to eliminate completely the emissions. In
this case, the optimization problem of non-signatories’ countries is the same presented
by (2.13)-(2.15). Nevertheless, for signatories countries, the optimization problem
is given by (2.69), while the constraints on their eﬀective investment are given by
(2.110)-(2.111).
The solution to the optimization problem for signatories yields the following re-
action function of signatories’ investment
 =

³
 −  ( − )
´
− 1
22  (2.145)
while the reaction function of non-signatories’ investment is given by (2.36).
The solution of both (2.36) and (2.145) yields the optimal levels of investments
for both non-signatories and signatories as follows
 =  (1− )− + 2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.146)
 =  (1− ) +  ( − )− (1 +  ( − − 1))22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.147)
such that the level of eﬀective investment for non-signatories is given by (2.17), while
it is given by (2.73) for signatories countries.
We already know from the solution of fully non-cooperative equilibrium that non-
signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (2.17) satisfies the constraint on eﬀective
investment given by (2.14) for any level of marginal damages higher than ˜ which is
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given by (2.18), while for signatories countries, the constraint on eﬀective investment
given by (2.110) is satisfied for any level of marginal damages higher than ˜1() which
is given by (2.74). It is known from the analysis of emission and R&D agreement
without information exchange that ˜1() is lower than ˜ and higher than or equal
to ˆ provided that  ≥ ˘1 and by comparison, it is found that ˜1() ≥ ˆ3() for
any  ≥ ∗3 where
∗3 = 
2 − 4
2 ( − 2)  (2.148)
and vice versa.
As the order of the critical values of marginal damages will be changed depending
on the value of the diﬀusion parameter, three possibilities should be analyzed. First,
if  ≥ ˘1, the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˜1()  ˆ  ˆ3(2)  ˆ3()
Second, if  ∈ (∗3 ˘1], the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˜1()  ˆ3(2)  ˆ3()
and finally, if   ∗3, the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˆ3(2)  ˜1()  ˆ3()
As concluded in the emission and R&D agreement without information exchange,
for high levels of cooperation, the value of ˘1 is going to be very high, even higher
than 1 for some levels of cooperation. Thus, our analysis for profitability of joining
the agreement will be focused on the second and third cases when  ∈ (∗3 ˘1] and
  ∗3. However, the levels of investments and the corresponding total costs functions
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of non-signatories and signatories countries will be analyzed for the diﬀerent three
cases.
In all cases, if  ≥ ˜, as the levels of eﬀective investment for both non-signatories
and signatories given by (2.17) and (2.73) satisfy, in this interval of marginal damages,
the constraints on eﬀective investment for both types given by (2.14) and (2.110)
respectively, the following expressions of total costs are obtained
 () = 122 +
 (1− )− + 
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.149)
 () = 1222 +
 (1− ) +  ( − )− (1 +  ( − − 1))
22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.150)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the investment cost.
Next, we analyze the case when  ≥ ˘1. If  ∈ (˜1() ˜], as any level of
marginal damages in this interval is higher than the level of marginal damages given
by (2.74), thus the level of eﬀective investment given by (2.73) satisfies the constraint
on eﬀective investment for signatories countries given by (2.110). However, the level of
eﬀective investment for non-signatories given by (2.17) doesn’t satisfy, in this interval
of marginal damages, the constraint on their eﬀective investment given by (2.14), and
therefore non-signatories countries reduce their eﬀective investment to the level given
by (2.6). According to that, the reaction function of non-signatories’ investment is
the same given by (2.79), while for signatories countries it is given as follows
 =

³
 −  ( − )
´
− 1
22  (2.151)
The solution of the reaction functions yields the following levels of investment for
non-signatories and signatories
 =  (1− )− + 2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.152)
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 =  (1− ) +  ( − )− (1 +  ( − − 1))22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.153)
Doing the substitutions for eﬀective investment in the total costs functions of
non-signatories and signatories, the following expressions are obtained
 () = 
2
2 +
 (1− )− + 
2 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.154)
 () = 1222 +
 (1− ) +  ( − )− (1 +  ( − − 1))
22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (2.155)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the investment costs.
Next, if  ∈ (ˆ ˜1()], the levels of eﬀective investment for non-signatories and
signatories are given by (2.6) and (2.24) respectively. In this case the solution of the
second stage is the same as that developed in the emission agreement with information
exchange where the total costs of non-signatories and signatories are given by (2.127)
and (2.128) respectively.
Now, if  ∈ (ˆ3(2) ˆ], as marginal damages are low enough to make it unprof-
itable for non-signatories to invest in R&D, then the level of investment for signatories
countries is the same given by (2.129), and the total costs for non-signatories and sig-
natories are given by (2.133) and (2.134) respectively.
However, if  ∈ (ˆ3() ˆ3(2)], the total costs functions for non-signatories and
signatories are still the same given by (2.133) and (2.134) until we reach to the
lowest natural number on the right of the curve ˆ2() in figure 2.3, at this point the
total costs function of signatories countries is still the same given by (2.134), while
non-signatories’ total costs function should be changed taking into account that by
moving form the area above the curve ˆ2() in figure 2.3 to the area below, signatories
countries will react to the exit reducing investment to zero. For zero investment, the
total costs of non-signatories is given by (2.90).
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Second, if  ∈ (∗3 ˘1] and  ∈ (ˆ ˜], the total costs for non-signatories
are given by (2.154), while given by (2.155) for signatories countries. However, if
 ∈ (˜1() ˆ], signatories countries invest to eliminate the emissions while non-
signatories don’t invest. In this case, the global level of emissions is given by (2.91).
Now, the optimization problem of the second stage for signatories countries should
be represented as follows
min
{1}
 = 
2
X
=1
¡ − ¢2 + µ( − )µ − 
¶
−  
¶
+
X
=1

  =  ≥ 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (2.156)
 =  ≤  (2.157)
The solution of the previous problem yields the following level of investment for
signatories countries
 =  ( ( − ) + )− 122  (2.158)
The level of signatories’ eﬀective investment is the same given by (2.95), such
that the condition on eﬀective investment given by (2.156) is satisfied for any level
of marginal damages higher than ˘1() given by (2.96) which is equal to ˆ3(). As
˘1() = ˆ3()  ˆ3(2), it can be concluded that the solution in the range of marginal
damages given by  ∈ (ˆ3(2) ˆ] is the same as presented above, and the total costs
functions are given by
 () = 
2
2 + 
µ
( − )
µ
 − 
¶
−  
¶
 (2.159)
 () = (1−  ( − ))
2
222 + 
µ
( − )
µ
 − 
¶
−  
¶
+  (2.160)
where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term represents
the environmental damages, while the third term in the total costs of signatories
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countries represents the investment costs. Notice that  is given by (2.158), while
  is given as follows
  =  ( − )
µ ( ( − ) + )− 1
2
¶
 (2.161)
However, if  ∈ (ˆ3() ˆ3(2)], the total costs functions for non-signatories and
signatories are still the same given by (2.159) and (2.160) until we reach to the lowest
natural number on the right of the curve ˆ3() in figure 2.3, at this point the total
costs function of signatories countries is still the same given by (2.160), while non-
signatories’ total costs function is given by (2.90) assuming that signatories investment
equal to zero.
Finally, if   ∗3, it is clear that for any level of marginal damages lower than ˆ,
the critical value of marginal damages given by (2.74) doesn’t play role in satisfying
the constraint over signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (2.156) and the new
critical value of marginal damages (2.96) is the one that plays this role. Thus, it
can be concluded that the analysis, at the diﬀerent intervals of marginal damages,
under the assumption   ∗3 is exactly the same as the analysis developed under the
assumption  ∈ (∗3 ˘1].
Next, the profitability of joining the emission and R&D agreement with infor-
mation exchange is analyzed, numerically for any   ˘1, at the diﬀerent levels of
marginal damages and the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 18 Emission and R&D agreement with information exchange is prof-
itable for any level of marginal damages.
The following numerical examples proof this result.
First, in order to investigate the profitability of joining emission and R&D agree-
ment with information exchange at  ≥ ˜, the total costs function of a signatory
country given by (2.150) should be compared by the total costs function of playing
80
fully non-cooperatively which is obtained by substituting for  = 1 in (2.149). Under
the following assumptions
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 2  = 025
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 7301 8 8857 993 1131 1315 1573 196
 2526 208 1838 171 1667 16897 1789 1998
 3724 417 4412 454 4583 45603 4461 4253
 28: Profitability of emission and R&D agreement with information exchange at ≥˜
Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium (in this case given by  = 625)
and the total costs of signatories countries.
Second, the profitability is examined at the interval of marginal damages  ∈ (ˆ
˜], using the total costs of both non-signatories and signatories given by (2.154) and
(2.155), under the following assumptions
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 05  = 025
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 7234 7946 8818 99097 1131 1319 1581 1975
 2455 2028 1801 16852 1647 1676 1782 1998
 37097 4137 4364 44799 4519 4489 4383 4168
 29: Profitability of emission and R&D agreement with information exchange at ∈(ˆ˜]
Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium (in this case given by  = 61651)
and the total costs of signatories countries.
Third, the profitability is examined at the interval of marginal damages  ∈ (ˆ3(2)
ˆ] using the total costs of both non-signatories and signatories given by (2.159) and
(2.160), assuming that
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 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 027  = 025
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 2808 24068 20063 16058 12053 8045 4033 0018
 3476 29075 24063 19386 14899 1053 6238 1 998
 1499 7184 12196 16873 2136 2573 30022 34 26
 210: Profitability of emission and R&D agreement with information exchange at ∈(ˆ3(2)ˆ]
Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium (in this case given by  = 36 259)
and the total costs of signatories countries.
Finally, the profitability is examined at the interval of marginal damages  ∈
(ˆ3() ˆ3(2)] using the total costs of both non-signatories and signatories given by
(2.159) and (2.160), until we reach to the lowest natural number on the right of the
curve ˆ3(), the total costs function of non-signatories is replaced by (2.90). Under
the assumptions
 = 1  = 2  = 20  = 10  = 025
if it is assumed that  = 011, the minimum level of cooperation needed to make the
investment in R&D profitable is given by
ˆ3 = 2 193 3
According to that, the profitability of  = 3, is examined using total costs func-
tions given by (2.90) and (2.160) as follows
 = 21 943  (2) = 21 93  (3) = 18 165  = 3 778 
However, the profitability of any level of cooperation higher than  = 3 is ex-
amined using total costs functions given by (2.159) and (2.160) and the results are
shown in the next table
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 5 6 7 8 9 10
 8 227 1 6 581 9 4 937 4 3 292 9 1 648 1 00303
 12 218 9 907 5 7 787 2 5 785 5 3 862 7 1 995
 2 674 4 984 5 7 104 8 9 106 5 11 029 12 897
 211: Profitability of emission and R&D agreement without information exchange at ∈(ˆ3()ˆ3(2)]
Note: The profitability () is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the
total costs of fully non-cooperative equilibrium (in this case given by  = 14 982)
and the total costs of signatories countries.
2.6.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
In this section, the stability analysis is studied to investigate whether there exist a
stable emission and R&D agreement with information exchange or not. By analyzing
the previous numerical example, looking at the total costs of non-signatories and
signatories at the diﬀerent levels of marginal damages, the following proposition is
concluded
Proposition 19 The grand coalition of emission and R&D agreement with informa-
tion exchange is stable at any level of marginal damages higher than or equal to ˆ3(2).
However, in the interval  ∈ (ˆ3() ˆ3(2)], the unique stable agreement is given by
the lowest natural number on the right of the curve ˆ3().
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, a model of three-stage game has been used to analyze four diﬀerent
types of emission agreements. The diﬀerent agreements share the main aspect that
signatories countries act cooperatively in the third stage of the game (emission game).
However, the second stage of the game (investment game) diﬀers from one type to
another depending on whether signatories are sharing R&D eﬀorts and coordinating
their R&D activities or not. In all agreements, it is assumed that eﬀective investment
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in one country depends on the amount invested in R&D in that country as well as on
the investment in R&D undertaken in all countries through technological spillovers.
In the types of agreements that include information exchange (emission agreement
with information exchange and emission and R&D agreement with information ex-
change), the technological spillovers is perfect among signatories, which means that
signatories countries avoid the duplication of R&D eﬀorts.
According to the analysis introduced in this chapter for the diﬀerent agreements, it
is found that cooperating on emissions and investment without information exchange
is not enough to eliminate countries incentives to act as free-rider. It is found also
that emission agreement is not profitable at the high levels of cooperation. However,
cooperating in the second stage of the game (investment game), as in the emission and
R&D agreement without information exchange, increases the profitability for the high
levels of cooperation and increases at the same time countries incentives to deviate.
Therefore, emission and R&D agreement without information exchange is not stable
except for the level of participation given by the lowest natural number on the right
of ˆ1() in the interval of marginal damages given by  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)].
In both emission agreement with information exchange and emission and R&D
agreement with information exchange, it is concluded that sharing R&D eﬀorts is
enough to stabilize high levels of cooperation, even the grand coalition, at the high
levels of marginal damages where countries incentives to free-ride over the investment
of other countries is eliminated as a result of sharing information.
2.8 Appendices
2.8.1 Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 2
By analyzing the level of investment for signatories given by (2.42), there is a
critical value for the level of the marginal damages for the signatories that can be
obtained as follows
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 = −  (1− )2 − (1 + )+   (2.162)
such that if the marginal damages are higher than this critical value, the non-negative
constraint applies. Substituting for  =  in (2.162), it is obtained that
() =   (2.163)
which is the critical value that separates the trivial solution from the relevant one.
While if  is substituted by 2, it is obtained that
(2) =  (1− )
( − 4) + 2  (2.164)
Notice that the function which represents the critical value of  given by (2.162)
is a convex function in the interval [2 ] with a minimum given by
∗ = 1
2 +

2

It is obvious that ∗  2. Now, we must investigate the relationship between ∗
and 
 − ∗ =  − 1
2  (2.165)
so that, two cases should be analyzed (when   1 and when   1).
First, when   1 , then ∗   . Provided that ∗   , the level of marginal
damages given by (2.162) must be increasing on the left of  which implies that the
minimum is lower than  . In order to conclude the characteristics of (2.162), the
diﬀerence between (2) and () is taken
(2)− () = 
µ − 2− (2 − 4)
( − 4) + 2
¶

which is equal to zero at  = 12. Thus, (2) will be higher than () for any
  12 (Figure 2.4 illustrates this result) and vice versa.
85
nN
Nc /
2/2/1 N2
)2(d
0sjx
0sjx
d
0sjxdˆ
FIGURE 2.4
Second, when  ≤ 1 , then ∗ ≥  . It is immediate that ()  () for
all  ∈ (2  − 1) (Figure 2.5 illustrates this result). In this case the investment of
signatories is positive for  ∈ (2 ) and  ∈ (0 ).
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Following the same analysis for the non-signatories countries, there is also a critical
value for the level of the marginal damages for non-signatories that can be obtained
from (2.43) as follows
 = −  (1− )2 − − (1− )  (2.166)
Substituting for  =  in (2.166), it is obtained
() = −  (1− )(2 − + 1)− 1  (2.167)
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that is going to be negative if
  12 − + 1  (2.168)
and positive if the contrary applies.
On the other hand, substituting for  = 2, it is obtained
(2) =  (1− )
1− 3  (2.169)
that is going to be negative if   13 and positive if the contrary applies. In order to
conclude the characteristics of (2.166), the diﬀerence between (2) and  is taken
(2)−  = 
µ
(1− ) − 1 + 3
(1− 3)
¶

that is going to be negative for any   13 and vice versa.
As we have two critical values of the spillovers parameter, we have to distinguish
three diﬀerent cases, when  ∈ ¡0 12−+1¢, when  ∈ ¡ 12−+1  13¢ and when  ∈¡
1
3
 1¢.
First, when  ∈ ¡0 12−+1¢, then both (2) ()  0 and (2)   . Thus,
() is positive in the interval [2 ]. Assuming the denominator of (2.166)
() = 2 − − (1− ) 
then, the first derivative of  becomes
0 =  (1− ) 
0
()
()2  0
and the second derivative
” =  (1− )  ()()2
³
”()()− 2 0()2
´
 0
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Then () is a convex function and the non-signatories invest positively in R&D
(Figure 2.6 illustrates this result).
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Second, when  ∈ ¡ 12−+1  13¢, then (0) = 0 and in this case ()  0 for
2 ≤   0, while ()  0 for  ≥   0. The analysis when ()  0 is the same
like the previous case. Now, the analysis when ()  0 must be investigated.
0 =  (1− )  (2− 1)
(2 − − (1− ))2 
” =  (1− ) 2 (
2 − − (1− ))2 − 22 (2− 1) (2 − − (1− )) (2− 1)
(2 − − (1− ))4 
Analyzing the numerator
¡2 − − (1− )¢ ¡2 ¡2 − − (1− )¢− 22 (2− 1)2¢
= −2 ¡2 − − (1− )¢ (3 (− 1) + 1)  0
thus ”  0 and the function () in the interval [0   ] is concave. Consequently,
the non-signatories invest positively in R&D (Figure 2.7 illustrates this result).
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Finally, when  ∈ ¡1
3
 1¢, then () for all  ∈ [2  ] and the non-signatories invest
positively in R&D.
2.8.2 Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 3
By taking the first derivative of (2.50) with respect to the level of cooperation, it
is found that this diﬀerence is convex function with a minimum given by
∗ = 1 + 
1 +   (2.170)
By substituting the minimum given by (2.170) in the numerator of (2.50) as follows
µ
1 + 
1 + 
¶2
(1 + )−2 (1 + )
µ
1 + 
1 + 
¶
+2+(1− ) = − 
2
1 +  ( − 1)
2  0
Thus, the total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium is higher than the
total costs of a signatory country at the minimum. Here, it is important to investigate
the relation between the minimum given by (2.170) and both of ( 2) in order to
have a complete view about the relation between the total costs given by (2.50) at
any level of cooperation. First, ∗ is compared with  as follows − ∗ = −1
1+  0
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When  is substituted by  in the numerator of (2.50) as follows
()2 (1 + )− 2 (1 + ) () + 2 + (1− ) = (1− ) ( − 1)2  0
it is concluded that the total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium are lower
than the total costs of signatories at the level of full cooperation. In other words, the
full cooperation is not profitable for the emission agreement. Next, ∗ is compared
with 2 as follows
∗ − 2 = −1 +  ( − 1)
1 +   0 ∀
0 ≤ 1 − 1 
According to proposition 2, we assume that   1 in order to guarantee a
positive investment in R&D for signatories countries. Thus, it is obvious that any
level of   1 is lower than 0 and consequently ∗  2. When  is substituted by
2 in the numerator of (2.50) as follows
(2)2 (1 + )− 2 (1 + ) (2) + 2 + (1− ) = 3 − 2 + 1  0 ∀00 ≤ 1
2 − 3 
Again, as  = 1 is lower than 00 for any  ≥ 3, then the diﬀerence in the
total costs given by (2.50) is positive at  = 2, which means that the total costs of a
signatory country are higher than the total costs of a fully non-cooperative equilibrium
at any level of cooperation.
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CHAPTER 3
EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF
TECHNOLOGICAL AGREEMENTS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO EMISSION AGREEMENTS
3.1 R&D Agreement Without Information Exchange
R&D agreement without information exchange is modeled as a three stage game
as the emission and R&D agreement without information exchange that has been
analyzed in the second chapter. The main diﬀerence between the two agreements is
that all countries, in the R&D agreement without information exchange, are acting
non-cooperatively at the third stage of the game (emission game).
3.1.1 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment Game
In this section, stages two and three are solved by backward induction assuming
that in the first stage  countries, with  ≥ 2, have signed the agreement. As we
have supposed that there is no cooperation in the third stage of the game (emissions),
total emissions and total costs supported by all countries are given, as in the fully
non-cooperative equilibrium, by (2.7) and (2.9) while the global eﬀective investment
in R&D is given by (2.26).
Next, the partial agreement Nash equilibrium of the investment game is calculated.
As the non-signatories countries do not cooperate at this stage, the solution for non-
signatories is identical to the solution that has been developed in the fully non-
cooperative equilibrium. Thus, non-signatories countries will invest in R&D provided
that the marginal damages are higher than ˆ, where ˆ is given by (2.12).
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For signatories countries, as they are minimizing the agreement total costs given
by
 =
X
=1
 =
X
=1
µ2
2 + 
¡¯ −  ¢+ ¶ 
the optimization problem that yields the optimal investment is given as follows
min
{1}
 = 
2
2 + ¯ −  +
X
=1
 (3.1)
 ¯ − − ≥ 
 (3.2)
 ≥ 0 (3.3)
where  is given by (2.26).
Although the optimization problem is diﬀerent from the optimization problem of
signatories of emission and R&D agreement without information exchange given by
(2.64)-(2.66), the eﬀect of investment on total costs function is the same. Thus, the
critical value of marginal damages which defines the stable R&D agreement without
information exchange is the same ˆ1() given by (2.67). Therefore, the decision on
investing in R&D for both signatories and non-signatories are defined as in Figure
2.1.
When  ≥ ˆ, as signatories invest in R&D to eliminate completely the GHG
emissions, their optimization problem is given by (2.69), while the constraints on
eﬀective investment are given by (2.14)-(2.15).
As the optimization problem is the same as that presented in the emission and
R&D agreement without information exchange, the solution of this stage yields the
same levels of investments for non-signatories and signatories given by (2.71) and
(2.72) respectively, and the eﬀective investment for signatories is now given by (2.73).
However, as the constraint on signatories’ eﬀective investment is diﬀerent, the
critical value of marginal damages for which the constraint on eﬀective investment
given by (2.14) is satisfied, is now ˜() given by (2.38) instead of (2.74). It is
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already known that ˜() ≥ ˆ provided that  ≥ ˘ where ˘ is given by (2.39). By
comparison, it is also found that ˜() ≥ ˆ1(2) for any  ≥ ˆ1 where
ˆ1 = − 22 ( − 1)  (3.4)
and vice versa.
According to that, three possibilities should be analyzed. First, if  ≥ ˘, the
range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˜()  ˆ  ˆ1(2)  ˆ1()
Second, if  ∈ (ˆ1 ˘], the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˜()  ˆ1(2)  ˆ1()
and finally, if   ˆ1, the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˆ1(2)  ˜()  ˆ1()
Notice that for high levels of cooperation, the value of ˘ is going to be very high,
reaches to 1 at the level of full cooperation. Thus, our analysis for profitability of
joining the agreement will be focused the two cases when  ∈ (ˆ1 ˘] and when   ˆ1.
However, the levels of investments and the corresponding total costs functions of non-
signatories and signatories countries will be analyzed for the diﬀerent three cases.
In all cases, when  ≥ ˜, total costs for non-signatories and signatories are
given by (2.77) and (2.78) respectively. Next, we analyze the case when  ≥ ˘. If
 ∈ (˜() ˜], total costs for non-signatories and signatories are given by (2.82) and
(2.83) respectively. However, if  ∈ (ˆ ˜()] , as the eﬀective investment given by
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(2.73) doesn’t satisfy, for any  ≤ ˜(), the constraint on eﬀective investment given
by (2.66), signatories countries reduce their eﬀective investment to the same level as
non-signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (2.6). According to that, total costs of
both non-signatories and signatories are the same given by (2.20).
Next, if  ∈ (ˆ1(2) ˆ], as marginal damages are low enough to make it unprof-
itable for non-signatories to invest in R&D, the optimal investment level for signatories
is given by
 = ¯(1 + (− 1))  (3.5)
where the level of investment in R&D is decreasing with the number of signatories
countries. The eﬀective investment for signatories countries is still the same given
by (2.6) as their emissions are zero, but the eﬀective level of investment for non-
signatories countries changes to
 = ¯(1 + (− 1))  (3.6)
which is lower than the eﬀective investment of the signatories and, consequently, lower
than the eﬀective investment of non-signatories at the higher levels of the marginal
damages. Using (2.26), global eﬀective investment becomes
 = ( − ) +  = ¯(1 + ( − 1))(1 + (− 1))  (3.7)
Finally, Using (2.23), global emissions can be written as
 = ¯( − )(1− )
1 + (− 1)  (3.8)
which decrease with cooperation. Doing the substitutions for the eﬀective investments
in the total cost functions, the total costs for non-signatories and signatories are
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obtained as follows
 = 
2
2 +
¯( − )(1− )
1 + (− 1)   = 1   −  (3.9)
 = 
2
2 +
¯( − )(1− )
1 + (− 1) +
¯
(1 + (− 1))   = 1   (3.10)
where the first term represents the abatement costs, the second term represents the
environmental damages and the third term, in the total costs of signatories countries,
represents the investment costs. It is easy to notice that cooperation has a negative
eﬀect on total costs for both non-signatories and signatories.
However, if  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], total costs functions are still the same given by
(3.9) and (3.10) until we reach to the lowest natural number on the right of the curve
ˆ1() in Figure 2.1, at this point the total costs function of signatories countries is
still the same given by (3.10), while non-signatories’ total costs function should be
changed taking into account that by moving form the area above the curve ˆ1()
in Figure 2.1 to the area below, signatories countries will react to the exit reducing
investment to zero. For zero investment, the total costs of non-signatories is given by
(2.22).
Second, if  ∈ (ˆ1 ˘] and  ∈ (ˆ ˜] the total costs for non-signatories are given
by (2.82), while given by (2.83) for signatories countries. However, if  ∈ (˜() ˆ],
as signatories countries invest to eliminate the emissions, total costs function are given
by (2.97) and (2.98) for non-signatories and signatories respectively. Nevertheless, as
the constraint on eﬀective investment is now given by
 = (1 +  (− 1)) ≥ ¯ (3.11)
instead of (2.92), the critical value of marginal damages which satisfies this constraint
is now given by
˚1() = 1 (1 +  ( − ))  (3.12)
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Notice that ˚1() is higher than ˆ1() for all  ≥ 2, while it is lower than ˆ1(2)
for high levels of cooperation. If  ∈ (ˆ1(2) ˆ], the solution is the same as presented
above provided that  ≥ ˚1(). Otherwise, total costs will be given by (3.9) and
(3.10). For  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], as ˚1()  ˆ1(), the solution is the same as that
presented for  ≥ ˘ and  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)].
Finally, if   ˆ1, it is clear that for any level of marginal damages lower than
ˆ, the critical value of marginal damages given by (2.38) doesn’t play role in sat-
isfying the constraint over signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (2.92) and the
new critical value of marginal damages (3.12) is the one that plays this role. Thus,
it can be concluded that the analysis, at the diﬀerent intervals of marginal damages,
under the assumption   ˆ1 is exactly the same as the analysis developed under the
assumption  ∈ (ˆ1 ˘].
Next, the profitability of joining the R&D agreement without information ex-
change is analyzed for any level of   ˘. Notice that as the total costs functions at
the high levels of marginal damages are the same as those obtained in the analysis
of the emission and R&D agreement without information exchange, the numerical
example given by Table 2-3 is applied here and the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 20 R&D agreement without information exchange is profitable for  ≥
ˆ.
However, if  ∈ (ˆ1(2) ˆ] and   ˚1() and for  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)] at any
level of cooperation higher than the lowest natural number on the right of the curve
ˆ1(), where total costs functions are given by (3.9) and (3.10), the profitability is
not analyzed as it will be shown, analytically, in the analysis of the Nash equilibrium
of the membership game that the agreement is not stable in this interval of marginal
damages.
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3.1.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
In this section, the stability analysis is studied to investigate whether there exist a
stable R&D agreement without information exchange or not. As the stability at high
values of marginal damages can be concluded directly fromTable 2-3 and Table 2-4, we
analyze here the cases when  ∈ (ˆ1(2) ˆ] and   ˚1() and when  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)]
where total costs functions are given by (3.9) and (3.10).
Now, the auxiliary function Ω() is built using total costs for non-signatories given
by (3.9) and total costs for signatories given by (3.10)
Ω˘() = ¯
1 + (− 1)(
1
 −
(1− )(1 + ( − 1))
1 + (− 2) ) (3.13)
where Ω˘() is an increasing concave function and the solution to Ω˘() = 0 yields
˘ = 1 ((1− )(1 + ( − 1))− 1) + 2 (3.14)
In the light of our assumption that ˆ1(2)    ˆ, if  is substituted by ˆ in
(3.14), then ˘ = 1. Thus, for any   ˆ, ˘ will be lower than 1 and the following
proposition is concluded
Proposition 21 If marginal damages are not great enough, in particular if  be-
longs to the interval (ˆ1(2) ˆ], there will not be any stable R&D agreement without
information exchange.
When  is in the interval (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], the previous proposition also applies until
we reach to the lowest natural number on the right of the curve ˆ1() in Figure 2.1
where total costs are given by (2.22) and (3.10).
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Now, the auxiliary function Ω() is given by
Ωˆ() = ¯
1 + (− 1)(
1
 − (1 + ( − 1))) (3.15)
where Ωˆ() is a decreasing linear function. Doing Ωˆ() = 0, the solution for ˆ becomes
the same given by (2.68). Thus, the curve ˆ() in Figure 2.1 also represents all the
values of  for diﬀerent values of  for which (3.15) is zero. Thus, to check the internal
stability condition for the lowest natural number on the right of curve ˆ1(), function
(3.15) must be used. So, we need to know which is the relative position of functions
(3.15) and (3.13) to advance in the stability analysis. The diﬀerence between Ωˆ()
and Ω˘() is given by the following expression
Ωˆ()− Ω˘() = −¯(1 + ( − 1)
1 + (− 1)
µ− 1 + (1 + (− 2))
1 + (− 2)
¶
 0
which is negative for all  ≥ 2. So that, it can be concluded that Ωˆ()  Ω˘() and
consequently ˆ1 is lower than ˘. Let us now call ˜ to the lowest natural number
on the right to the of curve ˆ(). Then, the following relationship is obtained:
ˆ1  ˜    ˘. According to the function Ω˘(), none of the values from ˜ + 1
to  satisfy the internal stability condition, but the internal stability condition for
˜ must be checked using the function Ω˘(), and as ˆ1 is lower than ˜ we find that
Ω˘(˜) is negative and ˜ satisfies the internal stability condition. Moreover, as Ω˘(˜+1)
is positive, the external stability condition is also satisfied and then an agreement
consisting of a number of signatories equal to ˜ is the only stable R&D agreement
without information exchange. Figure 3.1 illustrates this argument.
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Figure 3.1 Stability conditions
The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 22 If marginal damages are not great enough, in particular if  belongs
to the interval (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], the lowest natural number greater than ˆ1 is the unique
stable R&D agreement without information exchange.
Moreover, as ˆ1 decreases when the marginal damages increase according to func-
tion ˆ1() we obtain that
Corollary 23 If marginal damages are not great enough, in particular if  belongs
to the interval (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], the greater are the marginal damages, the lower is the
level of participation in R&D agreement without information exchange.
A standard result in the literature of international environmental agreements.
3.2 Research Joint Venture Agreement (RJV)
The research joint venture agreement is modeled as a three stage game as the
emission agreement with information exchange that has been analyzed in the second
chapter. The main diﬀerence between the two agreements is that all countries, non-
signatories and signatories of the research joint venture agreement, are acting non-
cooperatively at the third stage of the game (emission game).
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3.2.1 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment Game
In this section, stages two and three are solved by backward induction assuming
that in the first stage  countries, with  ≥ 2, have signed the agreement. As we
have supposed that there is no cooperation in the third stage of the game (emissions),
total emissions and total costs supported by all countries are given, as in the fully
non-cooperative equilibrium, by (2.7) and (2.9) while the global eﬀective investment
in R&D is given by (2.103).
Next, the partial agreement Nash equilibrium of the investment game is calculated.
As the non-signatories countries do not cooperate at this stage, the solution for non-
signatories is identical to the solution that has been developed in the fully non-
cooperative equilibrium. Thus, non-signatories countries will invest in R&D provided
that the marginal damages are higher than ˆ where ˆ is given by (2.12).
For signatories countries, acting non-cooperatively at this stage, the optimization
problem that yields the optimal investment is given as follows
min
 = 
2
2 + ¯ −  + 
 (3.16)
 ¯ −
− −  ≥  (3.17)
 ≥ 0 (3.18)
where  is given by (2.103).
Although the optimization problem is diﬀerent from the optimization problem of
signatories of emission agreement with information exchange given by (2.104)-(2.106),
the eﬀect of investment on total costs function is the same. Thus, the critical value
of marginal damages which defines the stable research joint venture agreement is the
same ˆ2() given by (2.107). Therefore, the decision on investing in R&D for both
signatories and non-signatories are defined as in figure 2.2.
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When  ≥ ˆ, as signatories invest in R&D to eliminate completely the GHG
emissions, their optimization problem is given by (2.109), while the constraints on
eﬀective investment are given by (2.14)-(2.15).
As the optimization problem is the same as that presented in the emission agree-
ment with information exchange, the solution of this stage yields the same levels of
investments for non-signatories and signatories given by (2.113) and (2.114) respec-
tively, and the eﬀective investment for signatories is the same for non-signatories given
by (2.17).
However, the critical value of marginal damages for which the constraint on eﬀec-
tive investment given by (2.14) is satisfied, is the same ˜ given by (2.18) instead of
(2.38). Thus, the range of marginal damages can be defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˆ2(2)  ˆ2()
First, when  ≥ ˜, total costs for non-signatories and signatories are given by
(2.116) and (2.117). Next, if  ∈ (ˆ ˜], both signatories and non-signatories find
it profitable to invest at the level of eﬀective investment given by (2.6) which yields
the following levels of investment for non-signatories and signatories
 = ¯(1 + ( − ))  (3.19)
 = ¯(1 + ( − ))  (3.20)
Notice that the signatories’ investment is always lower than the non-signatories’
investment. Moreover, for non-signatories, investment increases as participation in-
creases. However, for signatories, it depends on the number of signatories and the
scope of the spillovers.
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Now, by substituting the eﬀective investments in the total cost functions, the
following expressions for the total costs are obtained
 = 
2
2 +
¯
(1 + ( − ))   = 1   −  (3.21)
 = 
2
2 +
¯
(1 + ( − ))   = 1   (3.22)
Where the first term represents the abatement costs and the second term rep-
resents the investment costs. Observe that the signatories’ total costs are always
lower than the non-signatories’ total costs and that there are negative spillovers for
non-signatories stemming from cooperation, i.e. cooperation increases the cost of
non-signatories. Nevertheless, global total costs decrease as cooperation increases.
When  ∈ (ˆ2(2) ˆ], as the marginal damages are low enough to make unprof-
itable the investment in R&D for non-signatories countries, the optimal investment
level for signatories countries is given by
 = ¯ (3.23)
which is decreasing with the level of cooperation.
As signatories eliminate emissions completely, while non-signatories do not, the
eﬀective investment for signatories is given by
 = ¯  (3.24)
while global emissions are
 = ¯(1− )
Notice that the greater the spillovers, the lower the non-signatories’ emissions.
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Adding the eﬀective investment for signatories and non-signatories, the global
eﬀective investment is obtained as follows
 = ¯(+ ( − )) (3.25)
Finally, adding the emissions for non-signatories, we obtain that global emissions
decrease with cooperation as follows
 = ¯( − )(1− ) (3.26)
Now, by substituting eﬀective investment and emissions in the total cost functions,
the following expressions are obtained
 = 
2
2 + ¯( − )(1− )  = 1   −  (3.27)
 = 
2
2 + ¯( − )(1− ) +
¯
  = 1   (3.28)
Where the first term represents the abatement costs, the second term represents
the environmental damages and the third term, in the total costs of signatories,
represents the investment costs. Contrary to the previous case, the total costs of
signatories are greater than the total costs of non-signatories regardless of the level of
cooperation. Moreover, positive spillovers now stem from cooperation. This diﬀerence
in the sign of spillovers from cooperation explains, as we will see in the next section,
the diﬀerent results as regards participation in a stable agreement depending on the
level of marginal damages.
However, if  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ1(2)], total costs functions are still the same given by
(3.27) and (3.28) until we reach to the lowest natural number on the right of the curve
ˆ2() in Figure 2.2, at this point the total costs function of signatories countries is
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still the same given by (3.28), while non-signatories’ total costs function should be
changed taking into account that by moving form the area above the curve ˆ2()
in Figure 2.2 to the area below, signatories countries will react to the exit reducing
investment to zero. For zero investment, the total costs of non-signatories is given by
(2.22).
3.2.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
Next, the stability analysis is developed to investigate whether there exists a
stable research joint venture agreement. It is already known from the analysis of the
emission agreement with information exchange that the grand coalition is stable for
any level of marginal damages higher than or equal to ˜. However, if  ∈ (ˆ
˜], we calculate Ω() using the total costs functions given by (3.21) and (3.22) as
following
Ω() = ¯
µ
1 + ( − + 1)− (1 + ( − ))
(1 + ( − ))(1 + ( − + 1))
¶
 (3.29)
As the denominator is positive for any level of cooperation, the solution to equation
Ω() is given by the number that does the numerator equal to zero. Developing the
numerator, the following function of  is obtained
() = 2 − (1 + ( + 1)+ 1 + ( + 1) (3.30)
It is easy to show that () = 0 has two real positive roots provided that  is
equal to or greater than three, and that the function is decreasing around the lowest
root and increasing around the greatest root. Then, an agreement consisting of a
number of signatories equal to the greatest natural number on the left of the highest
root is self-enforcing provided that this number is lower than  . We call to this
number ˜. In order to ascertain whether this is the case, we only need to substitute
 in (3.30). The result is that () is negative for  ≥ 2 which means that  ≤ ˜
and implies that the grand coalition is the unique stable agreement. Remember that
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for the grand coalition, it is only necessary to check the internal stability condition to
ascertain whether it is stable or not. Therefore, the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 24 The grand coalition is the unique stable research joint venture agree-
ment for any level of marginal damages higher than or equal to ˆ, independently of
the degree of spillover eﬀects.
Next, stability conditions are analyzed when it is not optimal for non-signatories to
invest, i.e. when marginal damages are equal to or lower than ˆ. Now, the auxiliary
function Ω() is built using the total costs for non-signatories given by (3.27) and the
total costs for signatories given by (3.28) as follows
Ω˘() = ¯
µ
1
 − (1− )
¶
 (3.31)
The solution to the equation Ω˘() = 0 is
˘ = 1(1− )  (3.32)
As the slope of Ω˘() is negative, when Ω˘() = 0, the only stable agreement is the
grand coalition provided that  is greater than ˘. Thus, the diﬀerence
 − ˘ =  − 1(1− ) 
should be positive or zero for the grand coalition to be stable. The diﬀerence is
positive when
 ≥ ˘ = 1(1− )  (3.33)
In order to advance in the analysis of the stability conditions, the properties of the
function ˘() defined by the r.h.s of (3.33) must be studied. It is easy to show that
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˘() is an increasing convex function that take the value 1 for  = 0 and tends to
infinite when  tends to one. Moreover, ˘() is equal to ˆ when ˚ = (−1)(2−1)
so that for  in the interval [0 ( − 1)(2 − 1)), ˘() is lower than ˆ. Then we
can conclude that when  is lower than or equal to ( − 1)(2 − 1), if the marginal
damages are larger or equal to ˘(), the grand coalition is the only stable research
joint venture agreement as the internal stability condition will be satisfied for  .
When this is not the case and the marginal damages are lower than ˘() for all values
of , two cases can be distinguished. First, when marginal damages are lower than
˘() and they belong to the interval (ˆ2(2) ˆ] which requires that  is greater than
¯1 = ( − 2)2( − 1).1 In this case, signatories invest regardless of the number of
countries that belong to the agreement and only the grand coalition can be stable,
but as condition (3.33) is not satisfied because the marginal damages are lower than
˘(), it must be concluded that there does not exist any stable agreement for these
values of marginal damages. The second case to analyze is when marginal damages
are lower than ˘() and they belong to the interval (ˆ2() ˆ2(2)].2 As in the previous
case, the grand coalition is not stable. But for these values of the marginal damages,
signatories invest in R&D provided that a minimum of participation given by (2.108)
is reached. Otherwise, signatories’ investments are zero. Given this diﬀerence with the
previous case, it should be investigated whether an agreement consisting of a number
of signatories lower than  may be stable. In particular, whether an agreement that
satisfies the minimum of participation defined by the curve ˆ2() in Figure 2.2 may
be stable. Notice that if membership moves from the area above the curve ˆ2() to
1This critical value ¯2 is obtained doing ˘() equal to ˆ2(2). Remember that ˘() is an increasing
convex function so that for   ( − 2)2( − 1), ˘() is going to be greater than ˆ(2).
2Notice that if  belongs to the interval [0 ( − 2)2( − 1)], then when the marginal damages
are lower than ˘() they are also lower than ˆ2(2). However, this is not true when  is greater than
( − 2)2( − 1). For this reason we have to impose this second condition.
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the area below, the signatories will react to the exit by reducing investment to zero
and this may be enough to deter the exit and stabilize the agreement.
Thus, now the diﬀerence in costs that must be used to check the internal stability
condition is given by the diﬀerence of expression (3.28) for signatories and expression
(2.22) for non-signatories corresponding to the fully non-cooperative equilibrium as
follows
Ωˆ() = ¯
µ
(( − )(1− )−) + 1
¶
 (3.34)
Using Ωˆ() = 0, the following second degree equation is obtained
(1− )2 + − 1 = 0 (3.35)
which has two real roots, one is negative and the other is positive. Moreover, (3.34)
is a decreasing convex function for   0. Remember that only at   ˆ2, where ˆ2 is
given by (2.108), signatories countries will find that it is profitable to invest in R&D.
It is easy to check that the positive root of (3.35) is lower than ˆ2. Therefore, it can
be concluded that only at the lowest natural number higher than ˆ2, the stability
condition given by (3.34) can be applied and the agreement will be stable only if
  ˆ2. So, the diﬀerence between  and ˆ2 is taken as follows
 − ˆ =  − 1
1−  (
1
 −) = − 1
which is higher than zero for all   ˆ2().
Finally, to confirm whether the diﬀerence in costs (3.34) can be used to check
the internal stability condition, we must ascertain the relative position of functions
(3.31) and (3.34). The diﬀerence between Ωˆ() and Ω˘() is given by the following
expression
Ωˆ()− Ω˘() = −¯ ((− 1) (1− ) + )  0
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which is negative for all  ≥ 2. So that, the same argument which illustrated by
Figure 3.1 in the analysis of the R&D agreement without information exchange is
also applied. Thus, it can be concluded that if the marginal damages are lower than
ˆ() for all  and they belong to the interval (ˆ2() ˆ2(2)], the lowest natural number
greater than ˆ2 is the unique stable research joint venture agreement.
The following proposition summarizes these results that are represented in Figure
3.2.
Proposition 25 If marginal damages are not suﬃciently large, in particular if  ∈
(ˆ2() ˆ], the membership of stable agreement depends on the level of marginal
damages and the scope of spillover eﬀects. Three cases can be distinguished: )   ≥
˘() then the grand coalition is the unique stable research joint venture agreement.
This condition can be satisfied only for  ∈ [0 ( −1)(2 −1)]; )   ≤ ˘() and
 ∈ (ˆ2(2) ˆ], then there does not exist any stable research joint venture agreement.
These two conditions can be satisfied only for   ( − 2)2( − 1); )   ≤ ˘()
and  ∈ (ˆ2() ˆ2(2)], then the lowest natural number greater than ˆ2 is the unique
stable research joint venture agreement. These two conditions can be satisfied for all
.
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The previous analysis clearly establishes that it is impossible to stabilize the grand
coalition if the spillover eﬀects are greater than 12 or if the marginal damages are
lower than 1 when non-signatories do not invest in R&D.
Moreover, as ˆ2 decreases when the marginal damages increase according to func-
tion ˆ() it is obtained that
Corollary 26 If  belongs to the interval (ˆ2() ˆ2(2)] and is lower than ˘(), the
greater the marginal damages, the lower the level of participation in the research joint
venture agreement.
3.3 R&D Agreement with Information Exchange
The R&D agreement with information exchange is modeled as a three stage game
as the emission and R&D agreement with information exchange that has been ana-
lyzed in the second chapter. The main diﬀerence between the two agreements is that
all countries, signatories and non-signatories of the R&D agreement with informa-
tion exchange, are acting non-cooperatively at the third stage of the game (emission
game).
3.3.1 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment Game
In this section, stages two and three are solved by backward induction assuming
that in the first stage  countries, with  ≥ 2, have signed the agreement. As we
have supposed that there is no cooperation in the third stage of the game (emissions),
total emissions and total costs supported by all countries are given, as in the fully
non-cooperative equilibrium, by (2.7) and (2.9) while the global eﬀective investment
in R&D is given by (2.103).
Next, the partial agreement Nash equilibrium of the investment game is calculated.
As the non-signatories countries do not cooperate at this stage, the solution for non-
signatories is identical to the solution that has been developed in the fully non-
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cooperative equilibrium. Thus, non-signatories countries will invest in R&D provided
that the marginal damages are higher than ˆ where ˆ is given by (2.12).
For signatories countries, acting cooperatively at this stage, the optimization prob-
lem that yields the optimal investment is given by (3.1), while the constraints on
investments are given by (3.17)-(3.18). Thus, the critical value of marginal damages
which defines the stable R&D agreement with information exchange is the same ˆ3()
given by (2.143). Therefore, the decision on investing in R&D for both signatories
and non-signatories are defined as in Figure 2.3.
However, the critical value of marginal damages for which the constraint on sig-
natories’ eﬀective investment given by (3.17) is satisfied, is the same ˜() given by
(2.38). By comparing ˜() with ˆ3(2), it is found that ˜() ≥ ˆ1(2) for any  ≥ ˆ3
where
ˆ3 = − 42 ( − 2)  (3.36)
and vice versa
According to that, three possibilities should be analyzed. First, if  ≥ ˘ where ˘
is given by (2.39), the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˜()  ˆ  ˆ3(2)  ˆ3()
Second, if  ∈ (ˆ3 ˘], the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˜()  ˆ3(2)  ˆ3()
and finally, if   ˆ3, the range of marginal damages is defined as follows
˜  ˆ  ˆ3(2)  ˜()  ˆ3()
For the same reason concluded in the solution of R&D agreement without infor-
mation exchange, that the value of ˘ is going to be very high, reaches to 1 at the
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level of full cooperation, our analysis for profitability of joining the agreement will
be focused on the two cases when  ∈ (ˆ3 ˘] and when   ˆ3. However, the lev-
els of investments and the corresponding total costs functions of non-signatories and
signatories countries will be analyzed for the diﬀerent three cases.
In all cases, when  ≥ ˜, total costs for non-signatories and signatories are given
as in the emission and R&D agreement with information exchange by (2.149) and
(2.150) respectively. Next, we analyze the case when  ≥ ˘. If  ∈ (˜() ˜], total
for non-signatories and signatories are given by (2.154) and (2.155). However, if  ∈
(ˆ ˜()], total costs for non-signatories and signatories are given as in the research
joint venture agreement by (3.21) and (3.22) respectively. If  ∈ (ˆ3(2) ˜()], total
costs for non-signatories and signatories are given by (3.28) and (3.27). However, if
 ∈ (ˆ3() ˆ3(2)], total costs functions are still the same given by (3.27) and (3.28)
until we reach to the lowest natural number on the right of the curve ˆ3() in Figure
2.3, at this point the total costs function of signatories countries is still the same
given by (3.28), while non-signatories’ total costs function should be changed taking
into account that by moving form the area above the curve ˆ3() in Figure 2.3 to the
area below, signatories countries will react to the exit reducing investment to zero.
For zero investment, the total costs of non-signatories is given by (2.22).
Second, if  ∈ (ˆ3 ˘] and  ∈ (ˆ ˜], the total costs for non-signatories are given
by (2.154), while given by (2.155) for signatories countries. However, if  ∈ (˜()
ˆ], total costs are given by (2.159) and (2.160). As the new constraint on eﬀective
investment given by
 =  ≥ ¯ (3.37)
is satisfied for any level of marginal damages higher than ˚1() given by (3.12). Notice
that ˚1() is higher than ˆ3() for all  ≥ 2, while it is lower than ˆ3(2) for high
levels of cooperation. If  ∈ (ˆ3(2) ˆ], the solution is the same as presented above
provided that  ≥ ˚1(). Otherwise, total costs will be given by (3.27) and (3.28).
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For  ∈ (ˆ3() ˆ3(2)], as ˚1()  ˆ3(), the solution is the same as that presented
for  ≥ ˘ and  ∈ (ˆ3() ˆ3(2)].
Finally, if   ˆ3, it is clear that for any level of marginal damages lower than
ˆ, the critical value of marginal damages given by (2.38) doesn’t play role in sat-
isfying the constraint over signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (3.37) and the
new critical value of marginal damages (3.12) is the one that plays this role. Thus,
it can be concluded that the analysis, at the diﬀerent intervals of marginal damages,
under the assumption   ˆ3 is exactly the same as the analysis developed under the
assumption  ∈ (ˆ3 ˘].
Next, the profitability of joining the R&D agreement with information exchange
is analyzed for any level of   ˘. Notice that as the total costs functions at the
high levels of marginal damages are the same as those obtained in the analysis of the
emission and R&D agreement with information exchange, the numerical examples
given by Table 2-8 and Table 2-9 are applied here at the same levels of marginal
damages and the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 27 R&D agreement with information exchange is profitable.
3.3.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
Next, the stability analysis is developed to investigate whether there exist a stable
agreement. At  ≥ ˆ3(2), the same proposition of the emission and R&D agreement
with information exchange is concluded
Proposition 28 The grand coalition of emission and R&D agreement with infor-
mation exchange is stable at any level of marginal damages higher than or equal to
ˆ3(2).
However, for  ∈ (ˆ3() ˆ3(2)], as total costs are given by (3.27) and (3.28) as
in the research joint venture agreement, the same auxiliary function Ωˆ() given by
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(3.34) is applied here. Observe that the positive solution to equation (3.35) is the
same like the positive solution to equation (2.144), i.e. it coincides with ˆ3, the value
for which the total costs of the agreement are independent of the investment. Thus,
the same proposition of the research joint venture agreement can be concluded here3
Proposition 29 If marginal damages are not suﬃciently large, in particular if  ∈
(ˆ3() ˆ], the membership of stable agreement depends on the level of marginal
damages and the scope of spillover eﬀects. Three cases can be distinguished: )   ≥
˘() then the grand coalition is the unique stable research joint venture agreement.
This condition can be satisfied only for  ∈ [0 ( −4)(3 −4)]; )   ≤ ˘() and
 ∈ (ˆ3(2) ˆ], then there does not exist any stable research joint venture agreement.
These two conditions can be satisfied only for   (−4) (3 − 4) ; )   ≤ ˘()
and  ∈ (ˆ3() ˆ3(2)], then the lowest natural number greater than ˆ3 is the unique
stable research joint venture agreement. These two conditions can be satisfied for all
.
3.4 Comparison Between the Diﬀerent Types of Agreements
In this section, a comparison between the diﬀerent types of agreements, analyzed
in this chapter and in the previous one, is introduced. It is clear from the analysis
of all agreements, that under diﬀerent levels of marginal damages, each agreement
provides diﬀerent level of cooperation and diﬀerent total costs. According to that, we
have to compare first all the critical values of marginal damages in order to determine,
for a given level of marginal damages, which agreement is dominating the others with
respect to the level of cooperation and total costs.
3Now ˘() is equal to ˆ3(2) at ¯2 = ( − 4)(3 − 4).
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3.4.1 Comparison Between the Critical Values of Marginal Damages
By taking the diﬀerences between all the critical values of the marginal damages for
the diﬀerent agreements, it is found that the critical values of the marginal damages
of both emission agreement with information exchange given by (2.107) are higher
than the critical values of the marginal damages of the emission and R&D agreement
without information exchange given by (2.67), which in turn are higher than those of
the emission and R&D agreement with information exchange given by (2.143). Also,
it is found that for any   ¨ (where ¨ = −2
2(−1) ), ˆ2() is going to be higher than
ˆ1(2) and the relation between the critical values of the marginal damages is given as
in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: The relation between the critical values of marginal damages at ¨
However for any   ¨ and at high values of  , ˆ1(2) is higher than ˆ3(2) which
is higher than ˆ2() and the relation between the critical values of the marginal
damages is given as in Figure 3.4. (See appendix 1).
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Notice that ¨ = ¯1 where ¯1 is the same value for which ˘() equal to ˆ2(2). Thus,
the relation between the diﬀerent critical values of marginal damages given by Figure
3.3 and Figure 3.4 can be combined in Figure 3.5 which draws the relation between
critical values of marginal damages with respect to the diﬀusion parameter.
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Next, we compare the diﬀerent types of agreements under the assumption that
  ¨ = ¯1 where the critical values of marginal damages intersect as in Figure
3.4 and as in the left side of Figure 3.5. The comparison will be divided into two
parts: First, the corner solution, i.e. at the high values of marginal damages,  ≥ ˆ,
where all countries invest at the maximum level of investment to eliminate completely
the GHG emissions. Second, the comparison at low values of marginal damages, i.e.
  ˆ, where only signatories countries invest to eliminate completely the GHG
emissions while non-signatories countries don’t invest.
3.4.2 Comparison Between the Diﬀerent Types of Agreements at the
Corner Solution
We know from our analysis to the diﬀerent types of agreements that at the high
values of marginal damages, the grand coalition is stable only for the agreements that
include information exchange, i.e. emission agreement with information exchange
and emission and R&D agreement with information exchange in the second chapter,
and both research joint venture agreement and R&D agreement with information
exchange in the third chapter . Also, it is shown that cooperation in the third stage
of the game, emission game, doesn’t play role at the high values of marginal damages
( ≥ ˜) on the level of cooperation and total costs of non-signatories and signatories,
as all countries invest in R&D at the maximum level to eliminate completely the
GHG emissions. Thus, at  ≥ ˜, both research joint venture agreement (as the
emission agreement with information exchange) and R&D agreement with information
exchange (as the emission and R&D agreement with information exchange) yield
the grand coalition and dominate the other agreements with respect to the level of
cooperation. However, the total costs of the grand coalition of the research joint
venture agreement is given by  (10) = 1998 as shown by the numerical example
of Table 2.8 and the profitability is given by  = 4253, while for the R&D
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agreement with information exchange, by substituting in the total costs functions
given by (2.116) and (2.117) with the same values for diﬀerent parameter used in
Table 2-8, it is found that  (10) = 22 and the profitability is given by  =
405. Thus, R&D agreement with information exchange dominate the other types of
agreements with respect to total costs.
Next for  ∈ (ˆ ˜], emission agreement with information exchange and re-
search joint venture agreement and R&D agreement with information exchange (as
emission and R&D agreement with information exchange) yield the grand coalition
and dominate the other agreements with respect to the level of cooperation. However,
the total costs of the grand coalition of the emission agreement with information ex-
change is given by  (10) = 22 as shown by the numerical example of Table 2.6 and
the profitability is given by  = 39651, while for the R&D agreement with infor-
mation exchange, the total costs of the grand coalition is given by  (10) = 1998
as shown by the numerical example of Table 2.9 and the profitability is given by
 = 4168. Finally, for the research joint venture agreement, by substituting in
the total costs functions given by (3.21) and (3.22) with the same values for diﬀerent
parameter used in Table 2-9, it is found that  (10) = 2038 and the profitability is
given by  = 4102. Thus, R&D agreement with information exchange dominate
the other types of agreements with respect to total costs. According to that, the
following proposition can be concluded
Proposition 30 Emission and R&D agreement with information exchange and R&D
agreement with information exchange are the dominant agreements for any level of
marginal damages higher than ˆ.
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3.4.3 Comparison Between the Diﬀerent Types of Agreements at Low
Values of Marginal Damages
In this section, the comparison between the diﬀerent types of agreements is an-
alyzed at the low values of marginal damages, where   ˆ. It is known that for
  ˆ, the decision of non-signatories, under any type of agreements, is not to invest
in R&D.
3.4.3.1 For  ∈ (ˆ2(2) ˆ]
In this interval of marginal damages, the grand coalition is stable for the emission
agreement with information exchange, emission and R&D agreement with informa-
tion exchange, R&D agreement with information exchange and the research joint
venture agreement. By substituting for  =  in (2.160), total costs function of both
emission and R&D agreement with information exchange and R&D agreement with
information exchange is given as follows
 () = 1222 +
 − 1
22  (3.38)
Nevertheless, by substituting for  =  in (3.28), it is found that total costs of
signatories of the research joint venture agreement is the same given by (3.38) at
 = ˆ2() = 1 . As total costs function given by (3.28) is increasing in the level
of marginal damages, it is concluded that for  = ˆ2(2)  ˆ2(), the total costs
function of the research joint venture agreement is higher than total costs function
given by (3.38). Finally, by substituting for  =  in (2.141), the total costs function
of the emission agreement with information exchange is given as follows
 () = 1222 +
 − 1
2  (3.39)
It is easy to check that total costs function given by (3.38) is higher than the total
costs function given by (3.39) and the following proposition is concluded
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Proposition 31 Emission agreement with information exchanges is the dominant
agreement in the interval of marginal damages given by  ∈ (ˆ2(2) ˆ].
3.4.3.2 For  ∈ (ˆ3(2) ˆ2(2)]
In this interval of marginal damages, the grand coalition is stable for both emission
and R&D agreement with information exchange and R&D agreement with informa-
tion exchange, where the total costs function for both agreements is given by (3.38)
and the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 32 Emission and R&D agreement with information exchange and R&D
agreement with information exchange are the dominant agreements in the interval of
marginal damages given by  ∈ (ˆ3(2) ˆ2(2)].
3.4.3.3 For  ∈ (ˆ2() ˆ3(2)]
For any given  in this interval of marginal damages, it is known that for both
emission and R&D agreement without information exchange and R&D agreement
without information exchange, the only astable agreement is given by the lowest nat-
ural number on the right of the curve ˆ1(). However, for both emission agreement
with information exchange and research joint venture agreement, the stable agree-
ment is given by the lowest natural number on the right of the curve ˆ2(). Finally,
for both emission and R&D agreement with information exchange and R&D agree-
ment with information exchange, the stable agreement is given by the lowest natural
number on the right of the curve ˆ3() in Figure 3.4. It is known from the numerical
example solved in the emission agreement with information exchange, assuming that
 = 011, that the level of cooperation is given by  = 9 while  (9) = 38255. Also,
from the solution of numerical example solved for the emission and R&D agreement
with information exchange, for  = 011, the level of cooperation is given by  = 3
while  (4) = 18165. However, for the research joint venture agreement, by substi-
tuting with the same values of diﬀerent parameter solved in the numerical examples,
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assuming  = 011, in the total costs function given by (3.28) where  = 9, it is
found that  (9) = 38846. Doing the same for R&D agreement with information
exchange, where total costs are the same given by (3.28) and  = 3, it is found that
 (3) = 18 194. Finally, for both emission and R&D agreement without informa-
tion exchange and R&D agreement without information exchange, where total costs
functions are given by (2.89) and (3.10) respectively, where  = 3 and  = 011, it
is found that total costs of the emission and R&D agreement without information
exchange are given by  (3) = 20971, while total costs of the R&D agreement
without information exchange are given by  (3) = 20979. By analyzing the dif-
ferent levels of cooperation and the corresponding total costs for each agreement, the
following proposition is concluded
Proposition 33 Emission agreement with information exchange is the dominant
agreement in the interval of marginal damages given by  ∈ (ˆ2() ˆ3(2)].
3.4.3.4 For  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ2()]
For any given  in this interval of marginal damages, it is known that for both
emission and R&D agreement without information exchange and R&D agreement
without information exchange, the only stable agreement is given by the lowest natural
number on the right of the curve ˆ1(). Finally, for both emission and R&D agreement
with information exchange and R&D agreement with information exchange, the stable
agreement is given by the lowest natural number on the right of the curve ˆ3() in
Figure 3.4. It is obvious from the previous analysis that the agreements that include
cooperation in the third stage yield lower costs than the agreements that don’t include
cooperation. Thus, both emission and R&D agreement without information exchange
and emission and R&D agreement with information exchange are dominating all the
other types of agreements. However, by assuming that ( = 011  = 025), total
costs of the emission and R&D agreement without information exchange are given by
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 (7) = 8 880 7 for the level of cooperation given by  = 7, while the total costs
function of the emission and R&D agreement with information exchange are given by
 (4) = 9 477 3 for the level of cooperation given by  = 4. According to that, the
following proposition is concluded
Proposition 34 Emission and R&D agreement without information exchange is the
dominant agreement in the interval of marginal damages given by  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ2()] .
3.4.3.5 For   ˆ1()
The unique stable agreement is given by the emission and R&D agreement with
information exchange and R&D agreement with information exchange and the fol-
lowing proposition can be concluded directly
Proposition 35 Emission and R&D agreement with information exchange is the
dominant agreement for any level of marginal damages lower than ˆ1().
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the three diﬀerent types of agreements studied in the second chap-
ter (emission and R&D agreement without information exchange, emission agree-
ment with information exchange and emission and R&D agreement with informa-
tion exchange) are analyzed again, but assuming that signatories countries act non-
cooperatively in the third stage of the game (emission game).
Although the optimization problems of signatories of the diﬀerent types of agree-
ments are diﬀerent from the optimization problems of signatories of the corresponding
types of agreements that have been solved in the second chapter, the eﬀect of invest-
ment on the total costs function is the same. Thus, the critical values of marginal
damages which define the stable agreements are the same as those obtained in the
second chapter.
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In the analysis of this chapter, it is found that as far as signatories invest at the
maximum level of R&D investment to eliminate completely the GHG emissions, the
solution of each agreement at the high levels of marginal damages, yields the same
level of cooperation and total costs functions as those obtained in the corresponding
type of agreement solved in the second chapter where signatories act cooperatively in
the third stage of the game (emission game). However, acting non-cooperatively in
the third stage of the game has an eﬀect on the critical values of marginal damages
which satisfy the constraints on signatories’ eﬀective investment, and this explains
the changes that occur between the diﬀerent types of agreements from those solved in
the second chapter at the low values of marginal damages, i.e. when signatories are
not investing at the maximum level of investment to eliminate completely the GHG
emissions.
The main result of the second chapter, that exchanging R&D information is
enough to eliminate countries incentives to act as free-rider, is also concluded in
this chapter. Thus, the grand coalition is found to be stable and profitable only
for the types of agreements that allow information exchange (research joint venture
agreement and R&D agreement with information exchange).
By comparing the diﬀerent types of agreements that have been analyzed in this
chapter and in the second chapter, at the low values of technological spillovers, it is
found that at the corner solution, when all countries invest in R&D, emission and
R&D agreement with information exchange and R&D agreement with information ex-
change are the dominant agreements. However, for low values of marginal damages,
when it is not profitable for non-signatories to invest in R&D, emission agreement with
information exchange becomes the dominant agreement in the interval of marginal
damages given by  ∈ (ˆ2(2) ˆ]. Then, emission and R&D agreement with infor-
mation exchange and R&D agreement with information exchange return to be the
dominant agreements in the interval of marginal damages given by  ∈ (ˆ3(2) ˆ2(2)].
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For any   ˆ3(2), the grand coalition is not stable anymore under any type of agree-
ments. Thus, for  ∈ (ˆ2() ˆ3(2)], emission agreement with information exchange
return to be the dominant agreement as it stabilizes higher level of cooperation and
lower total costs than the other types.
Emission and R&D agreement without information exchange appears ad a domi-
nant agreement only in the interval of marginal damages given by  ∈ (ˆ1() ˆ2()].
Finally, for any level of   ˆ1(), emission and R&D agreement with information
exchange becomes the dominant agreement.
3.6 Appendices
3.6.1 Appendix 1: The comparison between all the critical values of the
marginal damages
In order to investigate the relation between all the critical values, we take the
diﬀerences between those values as following;
First, we will rewrite all the critical values for the diﬀerent agreements to make
the comparison easier.
The critical values of the R&D agreement without information exchange
ˆ1(2) = 12(1 + ( − 1))  ˆ

1() = 1(1 + ( − 1)) 
The critical values of the RJV agreement
ˆ2(2) = 1(2 + ( − 2))  ˆ

2() = 1 
The critical values of the R&D agreement with information exchange
ˆ3(2) = 12(2 + ( − 2))  ˆ

3() = 12 
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It is pretty obvious that ˆ3(2)  ˆ2(2) and ˆ3()  ˆ2(). Now, we take the
diﬀerences between ˆ1(2) and ˆ2(2)
ˆ1(2)− ˆ2(2) = 1(
−
2(1 + ( − 1))(2 + ( − 2))  0
which means that ˆ1(2)  ˆ2(2). Next, we take the diﬀerences between ˆ1() and
ˆ2()
ˆ1()− ˆ2() = 1 (
−( − 1)
1 + ( − 1))  0
which means that ˆ1()  ˆ2(). Now, we have to take the diﬀerences between
ˆ1(2) and ˆ3(2)
ˆ1(2)− ˆ3(2) = 12(
1− 
(1 + ( − 1))(2 + ( − 2)))  0
which means that ˆ3(2)  ˆ1(2). Then, the diﬀerences between ˆ1() and ˆ3()
ˆ1()− ˆ3() = 1 (
( − 1)(1− )
(1 + ( − 1)))  0
which means that ˆ3()  ˆ1().
As ˆ2(2)  ˆ2() ˆ2()  ˆ1() and ˆ1()  ˆ3() then ˆ2(2)  ˆ1() 
ˆ3()
Also, as ˆ1(2)  ˆ1() and ˆ1()  ˆ3() then ˆ1(2)  ˆ3() Now, the
relations that are left to be checked, in order to have a complete comparison be-
tween all the critical values, are the relations between [ˆ2() ˆ1(2)] [ˆ3(2) ˆ1()]
and [ˆ2() ˆ3(2)]
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First,
ˆ2()− ˆ1(2) = 1(
2(1 + ( − 1))−
2(1 + ( − 1)) )
As the denominator is always positive, we check numerator
2 + 2 − 2 −
is going to be positive for any
  ¯1 =  − 22( − 1) 
Second,
ˆ3(2)− ˆ1() = 1(
(1 + ( − 1))− 2(2 + ( − 2))
2(2 + ( − 2))(1 + ( − 1)) 
As the denominator is always positive, we check numerator
2 + − 3 + 4 − 4
observer that the derivative of this numerator with respect to  is
2 − 3 + 4  0 ∀ ≥ 1
This means that (ˆ3(2) − ˆ1()) is increasing with respect to  Now, assuming
that  = 0 then this numerator becomes
 − 4  0 ∀  4
and for  = 1 it becomes
2 − 2  0 ∀  2
125
then we can conclude that ant any   4, (ˆ3(2)− ˆ1()) is positive regardless
the value of  In other words, we can say that it is suﬃcient condition that   4
to have ˆ3(2)  ˆ1()
Finally, we compare [ˆ2() ˆ3(2)] Notice that if the condition   ¯1 is satisfied,
which means that ˆ2(2)  ˆ1(2) and as ˆ1(2)  ˆ3(2) then ˆ2()  ˆ3(2) But if this
is not the case and the condition   ¯1 is not satisfied, then we have to take the
diﬀerence between [ˆ2() ˆ3(2)] as follows
ˆ2()− ˆ3(2) = 1(
2(2 + ( − 2))−
2(2 + ( − 2)) )
As the denominator is always positive, we check numerator
4 + 2 − 4 −
is going to be positive for any
  ˜ =  − 4
2( − 2) 
So for any
¯1    ˜ ⇒ ˆ2()  ˆ3(2)
and if
  ˜ ⇒ ˆ3(2)  ˆ2()
If we compare ¯1 and ˜,
¯1 − ˜ = 2(2 − 3 + 3) 
taking the derivative of this diﬀerence with respect to 
=
−22 + 6
(2(2 − 3 + 3))2  0 ∀  1
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So the higher is  the lower is the diﬀerence between ¯1 and ˜. Thus, at a higher
value of  , we will find that ˆ3(2)  ˆ2()
So, if   ¯1, then Figure 3.3 concludes the comparison between the critical
values of the marginal damages. However if this condition is not satisfied and  is
high enough to decrease enough the diﬀerence between ¯1 and ˜ then Figure 3.4
concludes the comparison between the critical values of the marginal damages.
127
CHAPTER 4
EXTENSION OF THE ANALYSIS (EXAMINATION OF
ROBUSTNESS)
In this chapter, the robustness of our model assumptions is examined, mainly,
the assumption of the linear investment costs and the assumption of linearity of
environmental damages. In particular, we examine whether these assumptions are
critical for achieving the result that grand coalition is stable at high levels of marginal
damages or not.
It is concluded from the analysis of the previous two chapters that the grand coali-
tion is stable, at the high levels of marginal damages, and yields the lowest total costs
for the agreements that include information exchange, i.e. both emission agreement
with information exchange and emissions and R&D agreement with information ex-
change analyzed in the second chapter, and both research joint venture agreement
and R&D agreement with information exchange analyzed in the third chapter. Never-
theless, we concluded that at the high levels of marginal damages, cooperating in the
third stage of the game, doesn’t play any role in reducing the total costs of signatories
as far as they invest at the maximum level of investment to completely eliminate the
GHG emission. Thus, at the high levels of marginal damages, both emission agree-
ment with information exchange yield the same solution, while both emission and
R&D agreement with information exchange and R&D agreement with information
exchange yield the same solution. According to that, our analysis in this chapter
will be focused on both research joint venture agreement and R&D agreement with
information exchange.
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4.1 Quadratic Investment Costs
In order to check whether the assumption of the linear investment cost is critical
for achieving the result that the grand coalition is stable at the high levels of mar-
ginal damages, in this chapter, we introduce the same model presented in the second
chapter, but now assuming that the investment costs are quadratic.
According to that, the total costs function of controlling GHG emissions for the
representative country, instead of (2.4), is now given by
 = 
2
( −  −)2 +  + 
2
2  (4.1)
where  =  + − with  ∈ [0 1].
Before analyzing the research joint venture agreement and R&D agreement with
information exchange, we introduce both the fully non-cooperative equilibrium and
the eﬃcient solution.
4.1.1 Fully Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
The fully non-cooperative equilibrium can be calculated as the equilibrium of a
two-stage game. In the first stage, countries decide the level of investment in R&D. In
the second stage they decide about emissions. In both stages, the Nash equilibrium
is calculated. Solving by backward induction, we begin analyzing the equilibrium of
the second stage.
For a given technology, the optimal emissions can be calculated by minimizing the
following total cost function
 = 
2
( −  −)2 +   = 1 
The solution of the third stage yields the same solution of the fully non-cooperative
equilibrium analyzed in the second chapter, According to that, total costs can be
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written as
 = 
2
2 + (¯ −  ) +

2
2  (4.2)
where the first term represents abatement costs, the second term stands for environ-
mental damages and the third term for investment costs.
Now we calculate the equilibrium for the first stage, when  ∈ (0 ¯], as follows
min
{}
 = 
2
2 + (¯ −  ) +

2
2  (4.3)
  =
X
=1
( + −)  (4.4)
Observe that global eﬀective investment in R&D becomes a public good. Any
investment made by a country reduces the total costs of all countries because of the
reduction in global emissions. Thus, in the second stage of the game, countries have
to decide which is the provision of a public bad whereas in the first stage they have
to decide about the provision of a public good.
The first-order condition for an interior solution is

 = −

 +  = 0
where  = 1 + ( − 1), so that
 (1 + ( − 1)) = 
where the left-hand side represents marginal revenue of investment while the right
hand side represents marginal cost. Thus, the level of investment of the fully non-
cooperative equilibrium is given by
 =  (1 +  ( − 1))  (4.5)
130
If we focus on the symmetric solution, the eﬀective investment is
 =  + − =  + ( − 1) =  (1 + ( − 1))
 =  (1 +  ( − 1))
2  (4.6)
while global eﬀective investment is given by
  =  =  (1 +  ( − 1))
2  (4.7)
Notice that eﬀective investment increases with marginal damages and spillover
eﬀects. Finally, the level of global emissions is now given by
 = ¯ −   = ¯ − 
2
 (1 +  ( − 1))
2  (4.8)
The total costs in this case are given by
 =  − 
2 (2 − 1)
2
¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢  (4.9)
where the first term represents abatement costs, the second term the environmental
damages and the last term the investment costs.
As the eﬀective investment given by (4.6) increases with respect to marginal dam-
ages whereas the eﬀective investment which yields zero emissions given by (2.6) de-
creases, there will be a threshold value for marginal damages for which the level given
by (2.6) becomes operative. This threshold value for marginal damages is given by1
ˆ =  + 2(1 + ( − 1))2  (4.10)
1Notice that by comparing ˆ with the level of  =  which yield the trivial solution, it is easy
to find that ˆ  .
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Thus, for  ≥ ˆ, the level of emissions and global emissions are equal to zero,
and countries invest in the interval  ∈ (¯ ] in order to eliminate completely
the GHG emissions. Now, the equilibrium for the first stage is given as follows
min
{}
 = 
2
( − )2 + 
2
2  (4.11)
  =  + − ≥ ¯ (4.12)
The first-order condition is

 = − ( −  − −) +  = 0
where − = ( − 1) so that
 ( −  − −) = 
where the left-hand side represents the marginal revenue of investment while the
right hand side represents the marginal cost. Thus, the level of investment of the
fully non-cooperative equilibrium is given by
 =  + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))  0 (4.13)
If we focus on the symmetric solution, the eﬀective investment is
 =  (1 +  ( − 1)) =  (1 +  ( − 1)) + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))  (4.14)
while global eﬀective investment is given by
  =  =  (1 +  ( − 1)) + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))  (4.15)
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In order to investigate whether the constraint on the eﬀective investment given
by (4.12) is satisfied or not, the diﬀerence between the levels of eﬀective investments
given by (4.14) and (2.6) is taken as follows
 − 1
µ
 − 
¶
= −  + 2 (1 +  ( − 1)) +


So, it is clear that the condition on the eﬀective investment is only satisfied at the
level of marginal damages higher than
˜ =  + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))  (4.16)
which is higher than the level of marginal damages ˆ.2
According to that, it is concluded that in the range of the marginal damages (ˆ
˜], the level of eﬀective investment is given by (2.6). By substituting this level of
eﬀective investment in total costs function given by (4.11), the total costs can be
written as follows
 =
¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢ 2 − 2+ 22
222 (1 +  ( − 1))2  (4.17)
while in the range of marginal damages (˜ ], the level of eﬀective investment is
given by (4.14), and the total costs function in this case can be written as follows
 = 
2 ( + 2)
2 ( + 2 (1 +  ( − 1)))2  (4.18)
where the GHG emissions are completely eliminated.
2Notice that the level of marginal damage given by ˜ is lower than the level of marginal damages
 =  which yields the trivial solution.
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4.1.2 The Eﬃcient Solution
In order to characterize the eﬃcient solution, the game is solved again in two
stages, but on this occasion assuming that countries minimize global total costs in
both stages. We begin analyzing the solution of the second stage. Given the technol-
ogy, countries select emissions to minimize the global total costs
 =
X
=1
 =
X
=1
³ 
2
( −  −)2 + 
´
  = 1  
The solution to the optimization problem is3
 =  −  −   (4.19)
So that, the eﬀective investment which yields zero emissions for each country is
given by
ˆ = 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (4.20)
while the critical value of eﬀective investment which eliminates completely the busi-
ness as usual emissions (BAU) is still given by (2.2). Thus, the range of eﬀective
investment and the corresponding levels of emissions can be determined as follows
 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
¡ −  ¢−    ∈ (0 1 ¡ −  ¢]
0   ∈ ( 1
¡ −  ¢   ]
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭

Using (4.19), global emissions can be calculated
 =
X
=1
 = 
µ
 − 
¶
−  (4.21)
3Again, in this case for  ≥  the model has a trivial solution. For this reason, we will
limit the analysis in this paper to the interval of values for  between zero and  Notice that
if  ≥  the damages are so large that it is not necessary to invest in cleaner technologies to
eliminate completely the emissions.
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where  is global eﬀective investment in R&D which is given by4
 =
X
=1
 =
X
=1
( +−) (4.22)
Using (4.19) and (4.21), total costs for the representative country can be written
as
 = 
22
2 + 
µ

µ
 − 
¶
− 
¶
+

2
2  (4.23)
where the first term represents abatement costs, the second term stands for environ-
mental damages and the third term for investment costs.
Next, in the first stage, countries select the level of investment to minimize the
global total costs of controlling emissions that are given by the following expression
 =
X
=1
 =
X
=1
µ22
2 + 
µ

µ
 − 
¶
− 
¶
+

2
2
¶
=
23
2 + 
µ

µ
 − 
¶
− 
¶
+

2
X
=1
2  (4.24)
Now we calculate the equilibrium for the first stage, when  ∈ (0 1
¡ −  ¢], as
follows
min
{1}
 = 
23
2 + 
µ

µ
 − 
¶
− 
¶
+

2
X
=1
2  (4.25)
  =
X
=1
( +−) (4.26)
The first-order condition for an interior solution is

 = −

 +  = 0
4We assume that when countries cooperate they pool their R&D investment so as to fully inter-
nalize the spillover eﬀects, i.e.  = 1 for the eﬃcient solution.
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where  =  , so that, since  = 1
2 = 
where the left hand side represents the marginal revenue of investment while the right
hand side represents the marginal cost. Thus, the level of investment of the eﬃcient
solution is given by
 =  
2 (4.27)
and the level of eﬀective investment, focusing on the symmetric solution, is
 =  +− =  =  
3 (4.28)
while global eﬀective investment is given by
  =  =  
4 (4.29)
Observe that investment increases with marginal damages.
Finally, the level of global emissions is now given by
 = 
µ
 − 
¶
− 
2
 
4 (4.30)
The total costs in this case are given by
 =  − 
22
2
¡ + 22¢  (4.31)
As the eﬀective investment given by (4.28) increases with respect to marginal
damages whereas the eﬀective investment which yields zero emissions given by (4.20)
decreases, there will be a threshold value for marginal damages for which the level
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given by (4.20) becomes operative. This threshold value for marginal damages is
given by condition ˆ =  and is equal to5
ˆ =  (22 + )  (4.32)
Thus, for  ≥ ˆ, the level of emissions and global emissions are equal to zero,
and countries invest in the interval  ∈ ( 1 ( −)  ] in order to eliminate
completely the business as usual emissions (BAU). Now, the global total costs of
controlling emissions are given by the following expression
 =
X
=1
 =
X
=1

2
( − )2 + 
2
X
=1
2  (4.33)
Next, the equilibrium for the first stage is calculated as follows
min
{1}
 = 
2
X
=1
( − )2 + 
2
X
=1
2  (4.34)
  =  =
X
=1
 ≥ 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (4.35)
As the first-order condition is

 = − ( − ) +  = 0
so that,
 ( − ) = 
5By comparing ˆ with the level of  =  which yield the trivial solution, it is easy to find
that ˆ   .
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where the left hand side represents marginal revenue of investment while the right
hand side represents marginal cost. Thus, the level of investment of the eﬃcient
solution is given by
 =  + 22  0 (4.36)
If we focus on the symmetric solution, the eﬀective investment is
 =  = 
2
 + 22  (4.37)
while the global eﬀective investment is given by
  =  = 
3
 + 22  (4.38)
In order to investigate whether the condition given by (4.35) is satisfied or not,
the diﬀerence between the levels of eﬀective investment given by (4.37) and (4.20) is
taken as follows
 − 1
µ
 − 
¶
=
2
 + 22 −
1

µ
 − 
¶
= −  ( + 22) +

 
So, it is clear that the condition on the eﬀective investment is only satisfied at the
level of marginal damages higher than
˜ = ˆ =  (22 + )  (4.39)
Thus, it is concluded that for any level of marginal damages higher than ˆ, all
countries will invest at the level of investment given by (4.36), and the total costs
function in this case can be written as follows
 = 
2
2 (22 + )  (4.40)
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where both the level of emissions and the level of business as usual emissions are
completely eliminated.
By comparing the eﬃcient outcome with the fully non-cooperative equilibrium,
the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 36 The level of eﬀective investment of the eﬃcient solution is higher
than the level of eﬀective investment of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium, while
the total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium are higher than the total costs
of the eﬃcient solution for all levels of marginal damages.
Proof: Appendix 1.
4.1.3 Research Joint Venture Agreement (RJV)
In order to check whether the assumption of the linear investment cost is critical
for achieving the result that the grand coalition is stable at the high levels of marginal
damages, the research joint venture agreement (RJV) is solved again in this section,
assuming the linearity of the environmental damages while considering a quadratic
investment costs (decreasing returns to scale of the R&D eﬀorts).
In this case, the total cost function is given by (4.1), where the three stages of
the game and the levels of eﬀective investment for signatories and non-signatories are
defined in the same way as in the second chapter with linear environmental damages
and linear investment costs.
4.1.3.1 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment Game
In this section, stages two and three of the research joint venture agreement (RJV)
are solved backward induction assuming that in the first stage  countries with  ≥ 2
have signed the agreement. As the only change in the analysis of the RJV agreement
in this case from the RJV agreement that has been analyzed in the previous chapter
occurs in the second stage of the game (the investment game), the levels of emissions
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for both non-signatories and signatories are the same like those obtained in the previ-
ous chapter. However, as we have supposed that there is no cooperation in the third
stage of the game (emissions), the level of investment for non-signatories countries is
the same as in the fully non-cooperative equilibrium given by (4.5). For signatories
countries, as  = + ( − ), the level of investment for a signatory country
is given by
 =  (+ ( − ))  (4.41)
If we focus on the symmetric solution for each type of country, the eﬀective in-
vestment of non-signatories is
 =  + (− +) = (1 + ( − − 1)) + 
=

 ((1 +  ( − 1)) (1 +  ( − − 1)) +  (+  ( − )))  (4.42)
However, the eﬀective investment for the signatories is
 =  +  =  + ( − )
=

 ( (+  ( − )) +  ( − ) (1 +  ( − 1)))  (4.43)
It is easy to show that the eﬀective investment of both signatories and non-
signatories increases with the number of signatories. Moreover, if we compare the
investment done by each type of country using (4.5) and (4.41), the following expres-
sion is obtained
 −  =  (1− ) (− 1)  0
Thus, signatories devote more resources for R&D than non-signatories for any
level of participation. The same occurs for the eﬀective investment.
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Finally, in order to calculate the total costs, we aggregate the eﬀective investment
of the diﬀerent countries to obtain the global eﬀective investment in R&D:
 = ( − )  +  
which yields
 = 
¡
( − ) (1 +  ( − 1))2 +  (+  ( − ))2¢ 
so that global emissions are given by
 = ¯− = ¯− 
2

¡
( − ) (1 +  ( − 1))2 +  (+  ( − ))2¢  (4.44)
The first derivative of the global emissions with respect to  is negative for  ≥ 2.
Global emissions decrease as the international cooperation increases.
Thus, total costs of non-signatories are given by
 = 
2
2 +  +

2
³

´2  (4.45)
where  is given by (4.44) and investment by (4.5). The total costs of signatories are
given by the same kind of expression, but with investment defined by (4.41)
 = 
2
2 +  +

2
¡¢2  (4.46)
The comparison of the total costs is immediate because we have established above
that signatories invest more resources in R&D. Thus, as the abatement costs and
environmental damages are the same, it is the diﬀerence in investment that explains
the diﬀerence in the total costs. The signatories invest more and support a larger
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cost for controlling pollution. Moreover, there are positive externalities for non-
signatories stemming from cooperation, i.e. cooperation decreases the total costs
of non-signatories. The incorporation of one country to the agreement reduces global
emissions and has no eﬀect on the non-signatories’ investment.
Now by substituting the levels of investment in the total costs functions, the
following expressions for total costs are obtained
 = 
2
2 + ¯ −
22
2
¡
2 (+  ( − ))2 + (1 +  ( − 1))2 (2 ( − )− 1)¢ 
(4.47)
for non-signatories, and
 = 
2
2 + ¯ −
22
2
¡
2 ( − ) (1 +  ( − 1))2 + (+  ( − ))2 (2− 1)¢ 
(4.48)
for signatories.
In order to examine the profitability of joining the RJV agreement, the total costs
function of a signatory country given by (4.48) should be compared by the total costs
function of playing non-cooperatively which is obtained by substituting for  = 1 in
(4.47). The total costs function of playing non-cooperatively is given by
 = 
2
2 + ¯ −
22
2
¡
2 (1 +  ( − 1))2 + (1 +  ( − 1))2 (2 ( − 1)− 1)¢ 
(4.49)
Now, the diﬀerence between (4.48) and (4.49) is taken as follows
 −  = −
22
2 (1− )
¡
22 − 3+ 1¢ (2 + (+ 1) (1− ))  0
and the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 37 The research joint ventures agreement is profitable for signatories.
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4.1.3.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
As was declared from the previous proposition that the investment in R&D by
signatories countries of the RJV agreement is profitable, it is important now to ex-
amine the stability of the agreement under the assumption of decreasing returns to
scale of the R&D eﬀorts.
Using the total costs functions given by (4.47) and (4.48), the stability condition
can be calculated as follows
Ω() =  ()−  (− 1)
Ω() = −
22
2 (1− ) (− 1) ((1− ) (5− 1) + 6)  0∀  1
and for the grand coalition
Ω() = −
22
2 (1− ) ( − 1) (5 − 1 + (1 +))  0∀  1
and the following proposition can be concluded
Proposition 38 The grand coalition is the unique stable research joint venture agree-
ment, under the assumption of quadratic investment cost, regardless the level of mar-
ginal damages and the degree of spillover eﬀects.
4.1.4 R&D Agreement with Information Exchange
In order to check whether the assumption of the linear investment cost is crit-
ical for achieving the result that the grand coalition is stable at the high levels of
marginal damages, the R&D agreement with information exchange is solved again in
this section, assuming the linearity of the environmental damages while considering
a quadratic investment costs (decreasing returns to scale of the R&D eﬀorts).
The total cost is the same given by (4.1), where the three stages of the game and
the levels of eﬀective investment for signatories and non-signatories are defined in
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the same way as in the second chapter with linear environmental damages and linear
investment costs.
4.1.4.1 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment Game
In this section, stages two and three of the R&D agreement with information
exchange are solved backward induction assuming that in the first stage  countries
with  ≥ 2 have signed the agreement. As the only change in the analysis of the
R&D agreement with information exchange in this case from the R&D agreement
with information exchange that has been analyzed in the previous chapter occurs
in the second stage of the game (the investment game), the levels of emissions for
both non-signatories and signatories are the same like those obtained in the previous
chapter. However, as we have supposed that there is no cooperation in the third stage
of the game (emissions), the level of investment for non-signatories countries is the
same as in the fully non-cooperative equilibrium given by (4.5).
For signatories, as they are minimizing the agreement total costs function given
by
min
{1}
 = 
2
2 + 
¡¯ −  ¢+ 
2
X
=1
2  (4.50)
The first-order condition for an interior solution is

 = −

 + 
 = 0
where  = + ( − ), so that the interior solution is given by the following
expression6
 =  (+ ( − )) (4.51)
which is higher than the level of investment by non-signatories.
6For  =  this expression gives the level of investment corresponding to the eﬃcient solution.
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If we focus on the symmetric solution for each type of country, the eﬀective in-
vestment of non-signatories is
 =  + (− +) = (1 + ( − − 1)) + 
=


¡
(1 +  ( − 1)) (1 +  ( − − 1)) + 2 ( − )¢  (4.52)
However, the eﬀective investment for the signatories is
 =  +  =  + ( − )
=


¡2 (+  ( − )) +  ( − ) (1 +  ( − 1))¢  (4.53)
It is easy to show that the eﬀective investment of both signatories and non-
signatories for the interior solution increases with the number of signatories. More-
over, if we compare the investment done by each type of country using (4.5) and
(4.51), the following expression is obtained
 −  = −
¡
(1− )2 + − (1 +  ( − 1))¢ 
that is negative for  ≥ 2 and  ∈ (0 1). Thus, signatories devote more resources
for R&D than non-signatories for any level of participation. The same occurs for the
eﬀective investment.
Finally, in order to calculate the total costs, we aggregate the eﬀective investment
of the diﬀerent countries to obtain the global eﬀective investment in R&D:
 = ( − )  +  
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which yields
 = 
¡
( − ) (1 +  ( − 1))2 + 2 (+  ( − ))2¢ 
so that global emissions are given by
 = ¯− = ¯−
2

¡
( − ) (1 +  ( − 1))2 + 2 (+  ( − ))2¢  (4.54)
The first derivative of the global emissions with respect to  is negative for  ≥ 2.
Global emissions decrease as the international cooperation increases.
Thus, total costs of non-signatories are given by
 = 
2
2 +  +

2
³

´2  (4.55)
where  is given by (4.54) and investment by (4.5). The total costs of signatories are
given by the same kind of expression, but with investment defined by (4.51)
 = 
2
2 +  +

2
¡¢2  (4.56)
The comparison of the total costs is immediate because we have established above
that signatories invest more resources in R&D. Thus, as the abatement costs and
environmental damages are the same, it is the diﬀerence in investment that ex-
plains the diﬀerence in the total costs. The signatories invest more and support
a larger cost for controlling pollution. Moreover, there are positive externalities for
non-signatories stemming from cooperation, i.e. cooperation decreases the total costs
of non-signatories. The incorporation of one country to the agreement reduces global
emissions and has no eﬀect on the non-signatories’ investment. The result is a reduc-
tion in the cost of the countries that stay outside the agreement.
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4.1.4.1.1 Only the Signatories Eliminate Emissions As it occurs for the
fully non-cooperative equilibrium and eﬃcient solution, there is a threshold value of
marginal damages for both types of countries for which the level of eﬀective invest-
ment given by (2.6), that yields zero emissions level, becomes operative. In order
to calculate the threshold values, we write  =  where  is given by (4.52) and
 =  where  is given by (4.53). The results are the following values for marginal
damages
ˆ() = 2(2(+ ( − )) + (1 + ( − 1))(1 + ( − − 1))) +   (4.57)
ˆ() = 2(( − )(1 + ( − 1)) + 2(+ ( − ))) +   (4.58)
The comparison of these threshold values is not so complicated because the nu-
merators are the same. The comparison yields that ˆ() is lower than ˆ(). A result
that is consistent with those obtained in the previous sections. Now, the diﬀerence is
that the threshold values depend on the number of signatories.
Thus, we can conclude that in the interval of marginal damages  ∈ (0 ˆ()],
the interior solution presented above applies. For continuity, if marginal damages are
greater than ˆ() but close to this value, the solution combines an interior solution for
non-signatories and a corner solution, with zero emissions, for signatories. Thus, the
global level of emissions is given now by the total level of emissions for non-signatories
as follows
 =
−X
=1
 =
−X
=1
µ
 −  − 


¶
= ( − )
µ
 − 
¶
− 
−X
=1
  (4.59)
where
−X
=1
 =   =
−X
=1
Ã
 + 
Ã X
=1
 +
−−1X
=1

!!
 (4.60)
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Next, the equilibrium of the first stage for non-signatories is given by
min

 = 
2
2 + 
µ
( − )
µ
 − 
¶
−  
¶
+

2
³

´2
  =  + 
Ã X
=1
 +
−−1X
=1

!
≤ 1
µ
 − 
¶

 ≥ 0
The first order condition for an interior solution is


= −


+  = 0
where   = 1 +  ( − − 1), so that
 (1 +  ( − − 1)) =  
where the left hand side represents marginal revenue of investment while the right
hand side represents marginal cost. Thus, the level of investment for a non-signatory
country is given by
 =  (1 + ( − − 1)) (4.61)
For signatories countries, as they invest at the level of eﬀective investment in the
interval (¯ ] to eliminate completely the business as usual emissions, they select
the level of investment to minimize the global total costs of controlling emissions that
are given by the following expression
 =
X
=1
 =
X
=1
µ 
2
¡ − ¢2 + µ( − )µ − 
¶
−  
¶¶
+

2
X
=1
¡¢2 
(4.62)
where  stands for the total costs of the agreement.
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Next, we calculate the equilibrium for the first stage as follows
min
{1}
 = 
2
X
=1
¡ − ¢2 + µ( − )µ − 
¶
−  
¶
+

2
X
=1
¡¢2 (4.63)
  =
X
=1
 + 
Ã−X
=1

!
≥ 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (4.64)
 =
X
=1
 + 
Ã−X
=1

!
≤  (4.65)
 ≥ 0  = 1  
By forming the Lagrangian function of the previous minimization problem as
follows
 = 
2
X
=1
¡ − ¢2 + µ( − )µ − 
¶
−  
¶
+

2
X
=1
¡¢2
+1
Ã
1

µ
 − 
¶
−
X
=1
 − 
Ã−X
=1

!!
+2
Ã X
=1
 + 
Ã−X
=1

!
− 
!

we obtain the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions

 = −
¡ − ¢−   +  − 1 − 2 ≥ 0
 ≥ 0   = 0
where the conditions on the multipliers are given by

1 =
1

µ
 − 
¶
−
X
=1
 − 
Ã−X
=1

!
≤ 0
1 ≥ 0 1 1 = 0
149

2 =
X
=1
 + 
Ã−X
=1

!
−  ≤ 0
2 ≥ 0 2 2 = 0
As

  0, then  = 0,  = 1 2
thus, we obtain
 ¡ − ¢+   = 
where   =  ( − ), so that
 ¡ − ¢+  ( − ) =  (4.66)
where the left hand side represents marginal revenue of investment while the right
hand side represents marginal cost. By assuming the symmetry, and by substituting
for
 =  +  ( − )  (1 +  ( − − 1))  (4.67)
in (4.66), it is obtained the following level of investment for signatories countries
 =  ( +  ( − ) ( − 
2 (1 +  ( − − 1))))
 ( + 22)  (4.68)
By analyzing the level of investment given by (4.68), it is found that this level of
investment is positive for any value of marginal damages provided that
 ≥ 2 (1 +  ( − − 1))  (4.69)
while if this condition is not satisfied, then the level of investment given by (4.68) is
going to be positive only in the interval of marginal damages given by
 ∈ [ˆ() ˘())
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where ˆ() is given by (4.58) and7
˘() =  ( − ) (2 (1 +  ( − − 1))− )  (4.70)
Next, by substituting (4.68) in (4.67), the eﬀective investment for signatories is
given by
 =  (
2 +  ( − )  (2 + 1 +  ( − − 1)))
 + 22  (4.71)
In order to investigate whether the constraint on eﬀective investment given by
(4.64) is satisfied or not, the diﬀerence between the levels of eﬀective investments
given by (4.71) and (2.6) is taken and it is found that this constraint on investment
is only satisfied at the values of marginal damages higher than ˜() which is given
by
˜() = 2 ((1 +  ( − )) (2 +  ( − ))− 2 ( − )) +   (4.72)
which, by comparison, is higher than the level of marginal damages given by (4.58).
Therefore, it is concluded that in the interval  ∈ (ˆ() ˜()], the level of
eﬀective investment is given by (2.6). In this range of marginal damages, the level of
investment for signatories can be obtained by substituting the level of investment of
non-signatories given by (4.61) in the following expression
ˆ = 1
µ
 − 
¶
=  +  ( − ) 
which yields8
7By comparison, it is easy to check that ˜()  ˆ().
8This level of investment is positive at any level of ∗ 
 ¡2 ( − ) (1 +  ( − − 1)) + ¢  which is higher than ˜() given by (4.72). Thus, it is
concluded that the level of investment for signatories is positive in the interval  ∈ (ˆ() ˜()].
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 =  −  ( + 
2 ( − ) (1 +  ( − − 1)))
  (4.73)
Next, by substituting the level of investment of signatories in the following ex-
pression
 =  (1 +  ( − − 1))
2 +  (4.74)
the eﬀective investment of non-signatories can be calculated in both case, i.e. when
 ∈ (ˆ() ˜()] and when  ≥ ˜(). The calculations yield
 =  +


¡2 (1 +  ( − − 1)) (1 +  ( − )) (1− )− ¢  (4.75)
when  ∈ (ˆ() ˜()], and
 =  ( + 22)(
2 + ((1 +  ( − − 1))2 + 22 ( − ))
+22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − − 1)) (1 +  ( − ))) (4.76)
when   ˜(). By taking the diﬀerence between (4.75) and (4.76), we find that
they intersect at the level of marginal damages given by (4.72), such that  given by
(4.76) is higher than  given by (4.75) for marginal damages higher than this level
and vice versa.
4.1.4.1.2 The Corner Solution By comparison, we find that the eﬀective in-
vestment of signatories given by (4.71) is higher than the eﬀective investment of
non-signatories given by (4.76) for any level of marginal damages lower than
`() = 
2
(1 +  ( − − 1)) ( + 22 (1 +  ( − )))− 2 ( − )  (4.77)
which is higher than the level of marginal damages given by (4.72). Taking into
account that both levels of non-signatories’ eﬀective investment given by (4.75) and
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(4.76) intersect at the level of marginal damages given by (4.72), it is concluded
that the critical value of marginal damages for non-signatories, which separate the
corner solution of non-signatories from the interior one, will be on the right of ˜().
Therefore, this critical value of marginal damages for non-signatories is given by the
diﬀerence between the levels of eﬀective investment given by (4.76) and (2.6), which
yields
˜() =  ( + (1− ) 
22)
2 + 2+ 242  (4.78)
where  = ¡(1 +  ( − − 1))2 + 2 (1 + 2 ( − ))¢ 
 = (1− ) (1 +  ( − )) (1 +  ( − − 1)) 
Then, for marginal damages larger than ˜(), the corner solution applies for both
types of countries and the business as usual emissions are completely eliminated. Now,
the equilibrium of the first stage for non-signatories is given by
min

 = 2
³
 − 
´2
+

2
³

´2 
  =  + 
Ã X
=1
 +
−X
=1

!
≥ 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (4.79)
 =  + 
Ã X
=1
 +
−X
=1

!
≤  (4.80)
The first order condition yields the following level of investment for non-signatories
 = 
³
 − 
´
 (4.81)
By substituting the level of investment given by (4.81) in the total costs function
of non-signatories, their total costs can be written as
 =  ( + 
2)
2
³
 − 
´2  (4.82)
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For signatories countries, as they select the level of investment to minimize the
agreement total costs of controlling emissions, the equilibrium of the first stage for
them is given by
min
{1}
 = 
2
X
=1
¡ − ¢2 + 2
X
=1
¡¢2 
  =
X
=1
 + 
Ã−X
=1

!
≥ 1
µ
 − 
¶
 (4.83)
 =
X
=1
 + 
Ã−X
=1

!
≤  (4.84)
The first order condition yields the following level of investment for signatories
 = 
¡ − ¢  (4.85)
By substituting the level of investment given by (4.85) in the total costs function
of signatories, their total costs can be written as
 =  ( + 
22)
2
¡ − ¢2  (4.86)
By substituting the levels of investment for non-signatories and signatories given
by (4.81) and (4.85) in the levels of eﬀective investment for both non-signatories and
signatories, the following expressions for the eﬀective investment are obtained
 =  ( (1 +  ( − − 1) + 
2) + 22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − )))
 ( + 2 (1 +  ( − − 1) + 2)) + 422 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (4.87)
for non-signatories, and
 =  ( (1 +  ( − ) + 
2) + 22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − )))
 ( + 2 (1 +  ( − − 1) + 2)) + 422 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))  (4.88)
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for signatories, such that the eﬀective investment of signatories is higher than the
eﬀective investment of signatories. These levels of eﬀective investment are satisfying
the conditions given by (4.80) and (4.84).
Substituting the levels of eﬀective investments given by (4.87) and (4.88) in the
total costs functions given by (4.82) and (4.86), respectively, the following total costs
functions are obtained
 () = 
2 ( + 2) ( + 2 (1− )2)2
2 ( ( + 2 (1 +  ( − − 1) + 2)) + 422 (1− ) (1 +  ( − )))2 
(4.89)
for non-signatories, and
 () = 
2 ( + 22) ( + 2 (1− ))2
2 ( ( + 2 (1 +  ( − − 1) + 2)) + 422 (1− ) (1 +  ( − )))2 
(4.90)
for signatories countries.
In order to investigate whether the constraint on eﬀective investment given by
(4.79) is satisfied or not, the diﬀerence between the levels of eﬀective investment
given by (4.87) and (2.6) is taken and it is found that this constraint on eﬀective
investment is only satisfied at the level of marginal damages higher than ”() which
is given by
”() =  ( + (1− )
22)
 ( + 2 (1 +  ( − − 1) + 2)) + 422 (1− ) (1 +  ( − )) 
(4.91)
which, by comparison, is higher than the level of marginal damages given by (4.78).
Therefore, it is concluded that in the interval of marginal damages  ∈ (˜()
”()], the level of eﬀective investment for non-signatories is given by (2.6). In this
range of marginal damages, the level of investment for non-signatories can be obtained
by substituting the level of investment of signatories given by (4.85) in the following
expression
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ˆ = 1
µ
 − 
¶
= (1 +  ( − − 1)) + 
which yields
 =
 − − 222 + 322
 (1 +  ( − − 1))  (4.92)
Next, by substituting the level of investment of non-signatories in the following
expression
 =  ( − ) + 
2

¡ − ¢ 
the eﬀective investment of signatories, in the interval of marginal damages  ∈ (˜()
”()], is given by
 =  ( − ) ( − ) + 
222 (1− ) (1 +  ( − ))
 ( (1 +  ( − − 1)) + 22 (1− ) (1 +  ( − )))  (4.93)
which is decreasing with the level of marginal damages, and for  ≥ ”() the level
of eﬀective investment is given by (4.88).
4.1.4.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
In this section, we use stability conditions to investigate which is the level of
participation the R&D agreement with information exchange can achieve under the
assumption of the quadratic investment costs.
We begin with the corner solution, when the marginal damages are suﬃciently
large. We examine directly the stability of the grand coalition. For this case, the
auxiliary function Ω() given by
Ω() =  ()−  ( − 1)
can be obtained by substituting for  =  − 1 in (4.89) which yields
 ( − 1) = 
2 ( + 2) ( + 2 (1− ) ( − 1)2)2
2
¡2 + 2 ¡1 + ( − 1)2¢+ 42 ( − 1)2 (1− 2)¢2 
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and for  =  in (4.90) which yields
 () = 
2 ( + 22) ( + 2 (1− ))2
2 (2 + 2 (1−  +2) + 422 (1− ))2 
Thus, when the emissions are completely eliminated, The result is that having
  12 is suﬃcient condition to have Ω() negative which means that the grand
coalition is stable agreement at the low values of the spillovers parameter. Remember
that for the grand coalition is only necessary to check the internal stability condition
to ascertain whether it is stable. Thus, the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 39 If the marginal damages are suﬃciently large, in particular if  is
bigger than ”(), the grand coalition is stable for low values of spillover eﬀects.
For values of marginal damages lower than the critical value ”(), the signatories’
investment for  is larger than the non-signatories’ investment for  − 1 and the
stability of the grand coalition is not guaranteed. The analysis of the stability becomes
more complicated. Nevertheless, we do not expect a high degree of participation for
low values of marginal damages because as we have commented in the previous section
the properties of the solution change depending whether the solution is interior or
a corner solution. For the corner solution, there are negative externalities for non-
signatories coming from cooperation that play for cooperation. However, for the
interior solution the sign changes and the positive externalities for non-signatories
play against cooperation. In fact, the analysis of the stability for the interior solution
yields the following result
Proposition 40 If marginal damages are suﬃciently small, in particular if  is lower
than ˆ(), the participation in an IEA increases as the spillover eﬀects decrease
although the membership upper bound is of six countries.
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Proof. In order to prove this result, we write the auxiliary function Ω() for the
interior solution
Ω() = (()−(− 1)) + 
2
³
()2 −  (− 1)2
´

where global emissions are given by (4.54) and investment in R&D by (4.5) for non-
signatories and by (4.51) for signatories. The diﬀerence in global emissions is
()−(− 1) = 
2

¡
(1 + ( − 1))2 + (− 1)2(1− )2
−2(− 1)2(1− )(+ ( − ))− (2− 1)(+ ( − ))2¢ 
and the diﬀerence in investments is given by
()2 −  (− 1)2 = 
22
2
¡2(+ ( − ))2 − (1 + ( − 1))2¢ 
Doing the substitution in Ω() the diﬀerence in total costs is
Ω() = 
22
2
¡
(1− )(3 − 82 + 10− 4)(+ ( − ))
+(2 − 4+ 2)(+ ( − )) + 2(− 1)2(1− )2 + (1 + ( − 1))2¢ 
It is immediate that Ω() is positive for  ≥ 7 since 3 − 82 + 10 − 4 is positive
for  ≥ 7 and 2 − 4 + 2 is positive for  ≥ 4 and the other terms are positive for
all  Thus, no agreement consisting of seven or more signatories is going to satisfy
the internal stability condition. Next, we study the stability of a bilateral agreement.
For  = 2 the diﬀerence in costs is
Ω(2) = −
22
2
¡
(2 − 10 + 13¢ 2 + (10 − 26) + 13)
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which is negative for  ≥ 9 Thus, the internal stability condition is satisfied for any
value of  ∈ (0 1) In order to evaluate the external stability condition, we need to
look at the sign of Ω(3) :
Ω(3) = 2
22
 ((5 − 12) 
2 − (5 − 24) − 12)
This expression is negative for  in the interval (0 1) and  ≥ 99 Thus, as the ex-
ternal stability condition requires that Ω(3) be positive, a bilateral agreement cannot
be stable. For an agreement with three countries, the internal stability condition is
fulfilled for all  because Ω(3) is negative as we have just seen. On the other hand,
the external stability condition requires that
Ω(4) = 3
22
2
¡
(2 + 6 − 31¢ 2 − (6 − 62) − 31)
be positive. Doing Ω(4) = 0 we obtain a critical value for  in the interval (0 1)
defined by the positive root of this equation
¯( ; 4) = 9325 − 312 + 6 − 31
such that if  is larger than or equal to ¯( ; 4) the external stability condition is
satisfied. Then, an agreement consisting of three countries is stable provided that 
is larger than or equal to ¯( ; 4) For an agreement with four countries, the internal
stability condition is fulfilled if  is lower than ¯( ; 4) because then Ω(4) is negative.
Moreover, the external stability condition requires that
Ω(5) = 4
22
 ((
2 − − 14)2 + ( + 28) − 14)
9We do not investigate the stability of an IEA for  ≤ 8 because the focus of the paper is on
global environmental problems that involve a great number of countries.
159
be positive. Doing now Ω(5) = 0 we obtain a critical value for  in the interval (0 1)
defined by the positive root of this equation
¯( ; 5) = 3275 − 142 − − 14 
such that if  is larger than or equal to ¯( ; 5) the external stability condition
for an agreement consisting of four countries is satisfied. Then, the agreement is
stable provided that ¯( ; 5) is lower than ¯( ; 4) It is not complicated to show that
this is the case and therefore we can conclude that an agreement consisting of four
countries is stable in the interval [¯( ; 5) ¯( ; 4)] For an agreement consisting of
five countries the internal stability condition is satisfied for all  lower than or equal
to ¯( ; 5) because then Ω(5) is negative. However, the external stability condition
requires that
Ω(6) = 
22
2 ((15
2 − 70 − 45)2 + (70 + 90) − 45)
be positive. Doing Ω(6) = 0, we obtain a critical value for  in the interval (0 1)
defined by the positive root of this equation
¯( ; 6) = 859 − 45
152 − 70 − 45 
such that if  is larger than or equal to ¯( ; 6) the external stability condition for
an agreement consisting of five countries is fulfilled. Then, as ¯( ; 6) is lower than
¯( ; 5) we can conclude that an agreement consisting of five countries is stable in the
interval [¯( ; 5) ¯( ; 6)] Finally, an agreement consisting of six countries can be
stable if  is lower than or equal to ¯( ; 6) because the external stability condition
is satisfied for all  Remember that Ω() is positive for all  ≥ 7 regardless of the
value of 
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In order to illustrate this result, we have calculated the critical values for  when
 = 10 When there are only ten countries involved in the externality the critical
values for  are: ( = 10  = 4) = 048 ( = 10  = 5) = 024 ( = 10  =
6) = 005 Then if  ∈ (0 005] and agreement consisting of six countries is stable.
However, if  ∈ (005 024] the stable agreement is formed by five countries. For
values of  in the interval (024 048], the stable agreement consists of four countries.
Finally, if   048 only three countries can form a stable agreement. Table 4.1
shows the solution of the investment game for diﬀerent values of participation. The
selected set of values for parameters yields an interior solution for emissions for both
types of countries. It can be seen that for all  between 1 (the fully non-cooperative
equilibrium) and 10 (the grand coalition), the signatories’ investment is larger than the
non-signatories’s investment and that this diﬀerence is increasing with membership.
The same occurs with total costs. Moreover, at the aggregate level, total costs and
global emissions decrease as the participation in the agreement increases.
      
1 99775 0065 9979 99790
2 996 90 0065 0160 9970 9975 99712
3 994 33 0065 0285 9944 9964 99502
I4 98892 0065 0440 9890 9938 99093
5 97928 0065 0625 9794 9891 98422
6 96374 0065 0840 9638 9814 97437
7 94037 0065 1085 9405 9698 96101
8 90696 0065 1360 9071 9532 94398
9 86104 0065 1665 8611 9303 92343
10 79867 2000 8987 89870
=1 =025 =100 =075 =001 =05 =10
Table 4.1: Numerical example with  = 025
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In Table 4.2 we have recalculated the example for  = 0025 According to our
results, the participation increases. In this example from four countries to six. Basi-
cally, what explains the increment in participation is that the reduction in the spillover
eﬀects soften the variations in investments caused by the exit of one country from
the agreement. Except for  = {9 10} when one country leaves the agreement the
reduction in investment that it achieves when  = 0025 is lower than when  = 025
Thus, when spillover eﬀects are lower the incentive to act as a non-signatory is reduced
because the saving in investment costs is then smaller. On the other hand, we find
that the reduction in spillover eﬀects has the same eﬀects on global emissions. Ex-
cept for  = {8 9 10} when one country leaves the agreement the increase in global
emissions that the exist causes when  = 0025 is lower than when  = 0025 Thus,
when spillover eﬀects are lower the incentive to act as a non-signatory is augmented
because the increment in environmental damages is in this case smaller. But for an in-
terior solution, marginal damages are low and the first incentive dominates the second
yielding a larger level of participation. Thus, although the increase in environmental
damages is lower when spillover eﬀects are lower, the decrease in investment costs is
also lower and the net eﬀect, because of the low marginal damages, is that the exit
from the agreement becomes unprofitable for a larger level of signatories.
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      
1 99957 0024 9996 99960
2 99924 0024 0088 9993 9994 99930
3 997 84 0024 0190 9979 9987 99813
4 99418 0024 0332 9942 9969 99530
5 98658 0024 0512 9866 9931 98988
I6 97296 0024 0732 9730 9864 98101
7 95072 0024 0990 9507 9752 96790
8 91686 0024 1288 9169 9583 95005
9 86789 0024 1624 8680 9339 92734
10 79867 2000 8987 89870
=1 =0025 =100 =075 =001 =05 =10
Table 4.2: Numerical example with  = 0025
According to the previous analysis of both research joint venture agreement and
R&D agreement with information exchange, the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 41 The assumption of constant returns to scale of the R&D investment
(linear investment costs) is not critical for achieving the result that grand coalition
of both the research joint venture agreement and R&D agreement with information
exchange is stable, at the high levels of marginal damages.
4.2 Quadratic Environmental Damages (Increasing Marginal
Damages)
It is well known that with linear environmental damages, the emissions game has
an equilibrium in dominant strategies, in other words, the reaction functions of the
countries are orthogonal. In order to check whether this assumption is critical for
achieving the result that the grand coalition is stable at the high levels of marginal
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damages for the research joint venture agreement and R&D agreement with informa-
tion exchange, the model is solved again for quadratic environmental damages. In
this case, the total costs function is given by10
 = 
2
( −  −)2 + 0 + 1
2
2 +  (4.94)
where the three stages of the game and the levels of eﬀective investment for signatories
and non-signatories are defined in the same way as in the previous chapter with linear
environmental damages.
4.2.1 Research Joint Venture Agreement (RJV)
In order to check whether the assumption of the linear environmental damages is
critical for achieving the result that the grand coalition is stable at the high levels
of marginal damages, the research joint venture agreement (RJV) is solved again
in this section, assuming quadratic environmental damages while considering linear
investment costs.
In this case, the total cost function is given by (4.94), where the three stages of
the game and the levels of eﬀective investment for signatories and non-signatories are
defined in the same way as in the second chapter with linear environmental damages
and linear investment costs.
4.2.1.1 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment Game
In this section, stages two and three of the research joint ventures agreement (RJV)
are solved by backward induction assuming that in the first stage  countries with
 ≥ 2 have signed the agreement. The emission for non-signatories and signatories
10Notice that now the marginal environmental damages are increasing and positive for zero emis-
sions as it occurs for the linear case.
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are given by the first order conditions of the total costs function given by (4.94) as
follows
 = ¯ −  − 1   = 1   −  (4.95)
 = ¯ −  − 1   = 1   (4.96)
where ¯ = − (0). Thus, the reaction functions for signatories and non-signatories
are
 = (¯ − 

 )
+ 1 −
1
+ 1−  = 1   −  (4.97)
 =
(¯ −  )
+ 1 −
1
+ 1−  = 1   (4.98)
where − and − stand for global emissions minus non-signatory ’s emissions and
minus signatory ’s emissions respectively. Thus, as the reaction functions have a
negative slope, emissions are strategic substitutes.
By solving both (4.97) and (4.98), the following pair of reaction functions of
emissions are obtained
 =
(¯ −  )− 1
+ 1 ( − )  (4.99)
 =
(¯ −  )− 1( − )
+ 1  (4.100)
such that the increase in emissions of one type of countries reduces the emissions of
the other type.
The solution of both (4.99) and (4.100) yields the following levels of emissions for
each type
 =
¯ + 1 −  (+ 1)
+ 1  (4.101)
 =
¯ + 1 ( − ) −  (+ 1 ( − ))
+ 1  (4.102)
such that the increase in the eﬀective investment of one type of countries increases
the emissions of the other type, while the eﬀective investment of each country reduces
has a negative eﬀect on it.
165
According to that, the following pair of reaction functions, representing the re-
quired levels of eﬀective investment that lead to zero emissions for each type, are
obtained
 =
¯ + 1
 (+ 1)  (4.103)
 = ¯ + 1 ( − )


 (+ 1)  (4.104)
The solution of both (4.103) and (4.104) yields the same level of eﬀective invest-
ment for both non-signatories and signatories given by (2.6).
Aggregating for (4.95) and (4.96), the total emissions are obtained as follows
 =
−X
=1
 +
X
=1
 =
−X
=1
µ
¯ −  − 1 
¶
+
X
=1
µ
¯ −  − 1 
¶

 = 
¡¯ −  ¢
+1  (4.105)
where  is the global eﬀective investment in R&D that is given by (2.103).
Then, by substitution in (4.95) and (4.96), the emissions for non-signatories and
signatories become
 = ¯ −  − 1
¡¯ −  ¢
+1   = 1   −  (4.106)
 = ¯ −  − 1
¡¯ −  ¢
+1   = 1   (4.107)
in order to ascertain the eﬀect of investment on emissions, the derivative of both
(4.106) and (4.107) with respect to investment is taken as follows
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

= −



+
1
+1


= −+ 1+1 (1 + ( − 1))
= −1( − 1)(1− ) + +1  0
Thus, it is concluded that investment in R&D by a non-signatory country reduces
its emissions. The same result is obtained for signatories

 = −

 +
1
+1


= −+ 1+1 (+ ( − ))
= −1( − )(1− ) + +1  0
Doing the substitution of (4.105), (4.106) and (4.107) in the total cost function
and in the light of our assumption that there is no cooperation in the emission game,
the total costs faced by all countries are given by
 = 
2
0
2+0
µ + 1
+1
¶¡¯ −  ¢+ 1
2
µ (+ 1)
(+1)2
¶¡¯ −  ¢2+ (4.108)
Next, the Nash equilibrium of the investment game is calculated using (4.108).
By taking the derivative of the total cost function with respect to the investment in
R&D of non-signatories countries, it is obtained that


= −0
µ + 1
+1
¶ 

− 1
µ (+ 1)
(+1)2
¶¡¯ −  ¢  + 1 = 0
for  = 1  −. As  = 1+(−1), the previous condition can be written
as
(1 + ( − 1))(+ 1)
+1
Ã
0 + 1 
¡¯ −  ¢
+1
!
= 1 (4.109)
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where the left-hand side represents the marginal benefits of investment for the non-
signatories.11
Taking the derivative of the total cost function with respect to the investment in
R&D of signatories countries, it is obtained that

 = −0
µ + 1
+1
¶ 
 − 1
µ (+ 1)
(+1)2
¶¡¯ −  ¢  + 1 = 0
for  = 1  . As  = + ( − ), the previous condition yields
(+ ( − ))(+ 1)
+1
Ã
0 + 1 
¡¯ −  ¢
+1
!
= 1 (4.110)
where the left-hand side represents the marginal benefits of investment for signatories.
By comparing (4.109) and (4.110), it is pretty obvious that the marginal benefits
of signatories are higher than the marginal benefits of the non-signatories countries
for all   1 for the same level of global eﬀective investment.
Next, the conditions to get a corner solution, i.e. to eliminate completely the
emissions, are studied. This occurs when the marginal benefits of investment are
greater or equal to the marginal costs for zero global emissions. Then, using (4.109)
and (4.110), a critical value for 0 can be obtained for both non-signatories and
signatories, which makes the derivative of total costs equal to zero for zero global
emissions as follows
ˆ0 = +1(+ 1)(1 + ( − 1))  (4.111)
ˆ0() = +1(+ 1)(+ ( − ))  (4.112)
Observe that in this case, the critical values of 0 for both non-signatories and
signatories are depending on  and 1. Also, as in the linear model, the critical value
11Notice that (0 + 1 (¯− )+1 ) = 0 + 1 stands for the marginal environmental damages.
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of 0 for the signatories countries is decreasing with respect to the level of cooperation
and takes values between
ˆ0() = +1(+ 1) ≤ ˆ

0() ≤ ˆ0(2) = +1(+ 1)(2 + ( − 2)) 
Moreover, it is obvious that ˆ0 = ˆ0(1), so that ˆ0  ˆ0 for all   1. Therefore,
for any 0  ˆ0 , both signatories and non-signatories will invest at the maximum
level that leads to the elimination of the emissions. In this case, the optimization
problems of non-signatories and signatories countries are the same as in the previous
chapter given as follows
min

 = 2
³
 − 
´2
+   (4.113)
  =  + − ≥ ¯ (4.114)
 =  + − ≤  (4.115)
for non-signatories, and
min
 = 2
¡ − ¢2 +  (4.116)
  =  +  ( − ) ≥ ¯ (4.117)
 =  +  ( − ) ≤  (4.118)
for signatories. Thus, the previous optimization problems yield the same solutions
obtained in the previous chapters with the levels of investments given by (2.113) for
non-signatories and (2.114) for signatories, where the eﬀective investment for both
types of countries is given by (2.17).
We know from the solution of the previous chapter that the constraints on eﬀective
investment given by (4.114) and (4.117) are satisfied for any level of marginal damages
higher than ˜ given by (2.18).
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By comparing ˜ with ˆ0 , it is found that ˜  ˆ0 for any   ˜ given by
˜ = 1+ 1  (4.119)
and vice versa. According to that if   ˜, then the total costs for any  ≥ ˜
are given as in the previous chapter by (2.116) and (2.117) for non-signatories and
signatories countries respectively. However, if  ∈ (ˆ0  ˜], the levels of eﬀective
investment for both non-signatories and signatories will be given, as in the linear
model, by
 =  = ¯  =
¯
 
except that now ¯ =  − (0), and the same occurs for the investment in R&D:
 = ¯(1 + ( − ))  
 =
¯
(1 + ( − )) 
Finally, by substituting the levels of investment in the total costs functions, the
following total costs functions are obtained
 = 
2
0
2 +
¯
(1 + ( − ))   = 1   −  (4.120)
 = 
2
0
2 +
¯
(1 + ( − ))   = 1  (4.121)
where the first term represents the abatement cost and the second term represents
the investment cost.
4.2.1.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
As the total costs obtained here are the same like those obtained in the previous
chapter, it is clear that the stability analysis when the level of the marginal damage
is high enough will yield the same result as those obtained with the assumption of
linear environmental damages. Thus, the following proposition is concluded
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Proposition 42 If marginal damages are suﬃciently large, in particular if  is bigger
than ˆ0 , the grand coalition is the unique stable research joint ventures agreement even
when the marginal damages are quadratic, regardless the degree of spillover eﬀects.
4.2.2 R&D Agreement with Information Exchange
In order to check whether the assumption of the linear environmental damages is
critical for achieving the result that the grand coalition is stable at the high levels
of marginal damages, the R&D agreement with information exchange is solved again
in this section, assuming quadratic environmental damages while considering linear
investment costs. As obtained in the solution of the research joint ventures agree-
ment, it is found that R&D agreement with information exchange, at the high levels
of marginal damages yields the same levels of total costs for both non-signatories
and signatories as those obtained for the R&D agreement with information exchange
solved in the previous chapters. Thus, total costs for both non-signatories and signa-
tories, for any  ≥ ˜ are given by (2.149) and (2.150) respectively. However, taking
into account that signatories countries cooperate at the second stage of the game, the
critical value of marginal damages for signatories is now given by
ˆ0() = +1(+ 1)(+ ( − ))  (4.122)
while for non-signatories it is still given by (4.111).
Also, as in the linear model, the critical value of 0 for the signatories countries
is decreasing with respect to the level of cooperation and takes values between
ˆ0() = +12(+ 1) ≤ ˆ

0() ≤ ˆ0(2) = +12(+ 1)(2 + ( − 2)) 
According to that, the following proposition is concluded
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Proposition 43 If marginal damages are suﬃciently large, in particular if  is bigger
than ˜, the grand coalition is the unique stable R&D agreement with information
exchange even when the marginal damages are quadratic, regardless the degree of
spillover eﬀects.
According to the previous analysis of both research joint venture agreement and
R&D agreement with information exchange, the following proposition is concluded
Proposition 44 The assumption of linear environmental damages is not critical for
achieving the result that grand coalition of both the research joint venture agreement
and R&D agreement with information exchange is stable, at the high levels of marginal
damages.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, the robustness of our model assumptions is examined, mainly,
the assumption of the linear investment costs and the assumption of linearity of
environmental damages. In particular, we examined whether these assumptions are
critical for achieving the result that grand coalition is stable at high levels of marginal
damages or not for the agreements that allow R&D information exchange.
Our analysis in this chapter is focused on both research joint venture agreement
and R&D agreement with information exchange, as we concluded in the previous
chapter that at the high levels of marginal damages, cooperating in the third stage
of the game, doesn’t play any role in reducing the total costs of signatories as far
as they invest at the maximum level of investment to completely eliminate the GHG
emission.
According to the analysis introduced in this chapter, it is found that both of the
assumptions of constant returns to scale of the R&D investment (linear investment
costs) and the assumption of linear environmental damages are not critical for achiev-
ing the result that grand coalition of both the research joint venture agreement and
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R&D agreement with information exchange is stable, at the high levels of marginal
damages.
It is concluded that under the assumption of decreasing returns to scale of the R&d
eﬀorts, exchanging R&D information of the break-through technologies is enough
eliminate countries incentives to act as free-rider at any level of marginal damages.
However, coordinating the R&D investment reduces the level of cooperation at the
low values of marginal damages.
4.4 Appendices
4.4.1 Appendix1: The Proof of Proposition 36
In order to have a complete view about the comparison between the eﬃcient
outcome and the fully non-cooperative equilibrium, the range of the level of marginal
damages should be divided into four parts as follows
 ∈ (0 ˆ)  ∈ [ˆ ˆ)  ∈ [ˆ ˜) and  ≥ ˜
as the levels of eﬀective investment and the total costs change along those parts.
First: when  ∈ (0 ˆ).
By comparing the eﬀective investment of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium
given by (4.6) with the eﬀective investment of the eﬃcient solution given by (4.28)
as follows
 −  =  
3 −  (1 +  ( − 1))
2
=


¡3 − (1 +  ( − 1))2¢  0   (0 1) 
it is clear that
   
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Next, the level of emissions of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium is compared
by the level of emissions of the eﬃcient solution as follows
 − =  −  − 
 −  +  + 

=

 ( − 1) +  (
 −  )  0
so, it is concluded that
   
Finally, the total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium given by (4.9) are
compared with the total costs of the eﬃcient solution given by (4.31) as follows
 −  =  − 
2 (2 − 1)
2
¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢
− + 
22
2
¡ + 22¢
=
2
2
¡ ¡2 − 2 + 1¢+ 2 ¡4 − (2 − 1) (1 +  ( − 1))2¢¢  0
for any (0 1). So, it is concluded that
   
Second: when  ∈ [ˆ ˆ).
By comparing the eﬀective investment of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium
given by (4.6) with the eﬀective investment of the eﬃcient solution given by (4.37)
as follows
 −  = 
2
 + 22 −

 (1 +  ( − 1))
2 
we find that  =  at
∗ = 
2
( + 22) (1 +  ( − 1))2 
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Thus, at any  lower than ∗, the level of eﬀective investment of the eﬃcient
solution is higher than the level of eﬀective investment of the fully non-cooperative.
By comparing the level of marginal damages given by (4.10) with ∗ as follows
∗ − ˆ = 
2
( + 22) (1 +  ( − 1))2 −

 + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2
= 2
Ã
2 − (1 +  ( − 1))2
( + 22) (1 +  ( − 1))2 ¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢
!
 0
it is clear that ∗  ˆ which means that in the range of  ∈ [ˆ ˆ)
   
Finally, the total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium given by (4.9) are
compared with the total costs of the eﬃcient solution given by (4.40) as follows
 −  =  − 
2 (2 − 1)
2
¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢− 2
2 ( + 22) 
where the first derivative of the diﬀerence is given by
− (2 − 1)
¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢+ = 0
and the second derivative is given by
−(2 − 1)
2
¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢  0
Thus, it is clear that the function of the diﬀerence in the total costs has a maximum
at
` = 
(2 − 1) ¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢  0
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By assuming that  = ˆ and substituting in the diﬀerences of the total costs as
follows
∆
³
ˆ
´
=
2
2 (22 + )
Ã ( − 1)2 + 2 ¡4 − (2 − 1) (1 +  ( − 1))2¢
2 (22 + )
!
 0
and by comparison, it is easy to find that `  ˆ.
Now, assume that  = ˆ and substituting in the diﬀerence of the total costs
∆
³
ˆ
´
=
222 ¡2 − (1 +  ( − 1))2¢
2
¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢2  0
and by comparison, it is easy to find that ˆ  `. So, it is concluded that for any
 ∈ [ˆ ˆ)
   
Third: when  ∈ [ˆ ˜).
By comparing the eﬀective investment of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium
given by (4.47) with the eﬀective investment of the eﬃcient solution given by (4.37)
as follows
 −  = 1
µ
 − 
¶
− 
2
 + 22 
we find that  =  at
˜ = 
( + 22) 
Thus, at any  higher than ˜, the level of eﬀective investment of the eﬃcient
solution is higher than the level of eﬀective investment of the fully non-cooperative.
By comparing the level of marginal damages given by (4.10) with ˜ as follows
˜− ˆ = 
( + 22) −

 + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2
= 22
Ã
2 (1 +  ( − 1))2 −2
( + 22) ¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢
!
 0
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it is clear that ˆ  ˜ which means that in the range of  ∈ [ˆ ˜)
   
Finally, concerning the comparison of the total costs, it is clear that at the level
of marginal damages  = ˆ, the total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium
are higher than the total costs of the eﬃcient solution, as calculated previously.
Next, the total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium in the range of
˜    ˆ are given by (4.17)
 =
¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢ 2 − 2+ 22
222 (1 +  ( − 1))2 
which has a minimum at
˘ =  + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2 = ˆ

so, the total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium at this minimum is given
by
 = 22
Ã
2 (1 +  ( − 1))2
 + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2
!
 0
Thus, as the costs of the eﬃcient solution are constant and it is already known
from the comparison of costs at  = ˆ, previously, that    , it is concluded
that    in this range of marginal damages.
Fourth: when  ≥ ˜.
By comparing the eﬀective investment of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium
given by (4.14) with the eﬀective investment of the eﬃcient solution given by (4.37)
as follows
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 −  = 
2
 + 22 −
 (1 +  ( − 1))
 + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))
= 
µ  (2 − (1 +  ( − 1)))
( + 22) ( + 2 (1 +  ( − 1)))
¶
 0
which means that
   
Next, the total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium given by (4.18) are
compared with the total costs of the eﬃcient solution given by (4.37) as follows
 −  = 
2 ( + 2)
2
¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢ − 
2
2 ( + 22)
=
2
2
Ã2 (2 + 1− 2 (1 +  ( − 1))) + 24 ¡2 − (1 +  ( − 1))2¢
( + 22) ¡ + 2 (1 +  ( − 1))2¢
!

which means that
   
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